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PREFACE 
The Netherlands and the Federal Republic o f  Germany: an institutional 
comparison 
Uwe Blien, Frank den Butter 
The present volume investigates the institutional structure of the Netherlands 
and the Federal Republic of Germany as this affects the labour market situation. 
Among the countries of Europe, these two nations are undergoing particularly 
dynamic developments. Following changes in the balance of power in 
Parliament, a new government has taken office in the Netherlands. In Germany 
radical reforms of the labour market have been discussed and a start made on 
them. For these reasons it is worth looking closely at the institutional framework 
of the labour market and the economy in general in both countries. 
The Netherlands and the Federal Republic also lend themselves particularly well 
to comparison for other reasons: they are not just neighbours but many of their 
regulations have much in common. At the same time there are important charac- 
teristic differences, in which respect the question arises as to whether these are 
able to explain the major discrepancies that have characterised the development 
of the labour market in recent years. Can the fact that the Netherlands has 
achieved virtually full employment in recent years while unemployment once 
again exceeded the four million mark in the Federal Republic in the summer 
2002 be explained in terms of the structure of the central institutions of the 
economy? This is the key analytical issue addressed by this volume. 
The subjects examined by the individual articles are of interest for the light they 
throw on the background to the vigorous institutional reform process in both 
countries coming to an end at precisely the present time. How are we to provide 
an explanation for the functioning of institutions except by drawing a compari- 
son between different countries? Since experiments on a macro-economic or 
societal scale are ruled out, one is obliged to turn to international comparison for 
an understanding of the way in which institutional arrangements work. 
The growing internationalisation of economic processes and further European 
integration provide additional reasons for looking beyond national frontiers and 
drawing comparisons between countries. Not just the markets for goods but 
labour markets have long been internationalised and, for this reason alone, 
labour market research has been obliged to take an overarching perspective. The 
actors in the labour market have only a limited awareness of the limiting condi- 
tions under which they act. Whereas in the Netherlands, for example, pay settle- 
ments reached in neighbouring Germany have for some time provided a frame of 
reference for wage policy, there has to date been little evidence of any interna- 
tionalisation of wage policy in the Federal Republic. 
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The majority of the individual contributions to this volume have arisen from 
papers given at a Workshop held in February 2002 organised by the Scientific 
Council for Government Policy (WRR) of the Netherlands and the Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB) in the Federal Republic. Participants in the 
Workshop were drawn from the staff of the institutions involved, collaborating 
academics and decision-makers in government and the Federal Employment 
Services. 
The WRR is briefly introduced to the German public in a short message of greet- 
ing by its Chairman, Professor Scheltema. The Dutch Council corresponds only 
in the broadest sense with the Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der 
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (German Council of Economic Experts), as 
it works on an interdisciplinary basis and its reports are not so much concerned 
with the current state of the economy as with long-term economic and social 
developments. 
The Workshop was arranged in such a way that current developments and the 
underlying institutional structures in each country were presented by a scholar 
in the context of that country. These roles were performed for the Netherlands 
by UrRR member Frank den Butter and for Germany by Jiirgen Kromphardt, a 
member of the Council of Economic Experts. Further to these leading papers 
commentaries were provided from the perspective of each country, with Ulrich 
Walwei discussing the developments in the Netherlands and Kees van Paridon 
those in the Federal Republic. Based on this round, two further papers reviewing 
a number of countries were presented: Rainer Fehn discussed the developments 
in the Federal Republic against the background of other OEcD countries, while 
Ronald Schettkat drew a direct institutional comparison between the 
Netherlands and the Federal Republic. The articles in this volume are to be inter- 
preted along corresponding lines, with just the addition of a further contribution 
by way of conclusion and completion by the authors of this foreword. The 
Workshop arose out of the cooperation between the authors over many years in 
the Executive Committee of the European Association of Labour Economists 
(EALE) and the shared interest in economic, social and labour market policy 
issues. 
This volume is designed to present further analytical material for international 
comparison purposes. We thank all those who presented papers and the authors 
for their cooperation and permission to publish their contributions. We thank 
Frau Limberger-Katsumi for her cooperation with the translation and Frau Elsner 
and Frau Brehm for helping to organise the Workshop. 
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The role o f  the Scientific Council for Government Policy 
Michiel Scheltema, chairman WRR 
I t  is great pleasure for the delegates of the Dutch Scientific Council for 
Government Policy (WRR) to take part in this seminar, that is organised by our 
institutions to compare the German and Dutch policies in the field of employ- 
ment and labour market institutions. 
Let me say a few words about our Council, the WRR. In a way the Council is a 
part of the Dutch model that aims at consensus in the relations between the 
social partners. In general we pay much attention to reaching consensus in socie- 
ty on important issues of policy. 
Scientific information can play an important role in reaching agreements or com- 
promises between different parties. E.g. the Council on Social and Economic 
Affairs (SER) that advises the government on issues of economic and social poli- 
cy, consists of representatives of the social partners, but also includes a number 
of independent experts, mostly professors in economics. Because of their partici- 
pation the social partners are obliged to give sound arguments for their positions. 
Proposals that clearly do not meet the standards of good argumentation, cannot 
be upheld. 
We can see the same influence of scientific information in the field of politics. 
The Netherlands has a number of institutions that do research in order to advise 
the government. Well known is the CPB, the Netherlands Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis (in Dutch still called Centraal Planbureau: CPB), that makes fore- 
casts on economic developments and on the consequences of policy decisions. 
Even political parties ask the CPB to give an opinion about the economic conse- 
quences of their election-programs. I t  shows the influence that this kind of 
information has. 
The WRR is the broadest of the 'think-tanks' for the government. It was set up in 
1972 to advise the government on long term policy issues, on the base of scientif- 
ic information. Members of the Council are mostly university-professors; they 
come from various disciplines like economics, law, sociology and biology. At this 
moment we have eight members; they spent about three days a week at the 
Council. The Council is funded from the budget of the government, but is inde- 
pendent in its advices. It chooses its own subjects after consultation with the 
government. The subjects are mostly very broad, which means that they are rele- 
vant for different ministries at the same time. Since the ministries always have 
troubles in looking outside their field of policy, the Council tries to take a broader 
look. Examples of recent reports are Generationally-aware Policy (dealing with 
the relationship between generations), Safeguarding thepublic interest (on pri- 
vatisation), and A continuing Growth of Labour Force Participation. The last one 
is most relevant for our discussions today. The most recent reports deal with the 
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Enlargement of the European Union (Towards a Pan-European Union), and with 
the important problems around immigration and integration. 
I look forward to the discussion of today. I hope they will demonstrate that con- 
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LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND EMPLOYMENT 
I N  GERMANY 
Jiirgen Kromphardt 
INTRODUCTION 
Although Germany's labour market and employment system show a whole 
string of weak points and problems, they are not as bad as they are made out to 
be. Reference is made here to the labour force participation rate and the unem- 
ployment rate. The labour force participation rate measures the proportion of the 
resident population of working age between the ages of 16 and 64 that wishes to 
take part in working life, in other words the proportion that finds participation 
in the labour market sufficiently attractive to perform a job or look for one. Table 
1.1 below shows that in 2000 the labour force participation rate in Germany lies 
clearly above the EU average; it is also higher than in the Netherlands, whose 
labour force participation rate is below the average. If the unemployment rates as 
defined by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) are then examined, 
Germany's rate is only slightly better than the EU average of 8.2 percent. Here, 
though, the Netherlands come off far better with a rate of only 3.3 percent. 
Table 1.1 Labour force participation rate and unemployment rate in Germany, 
the Netherlands and the EU 
Average 1974-84 1985 1991 1995 2000 











68.0 (b) 67.4 (b) 73.9 72.8 74.8 
58.0 56.0 59.0 61.7 66.2 
66.9 66.3 68.5 67.9 69.9 
7.2 7.9 (d) 8.2 7.9 
8.3 5.8 6.9 2.9 
8.2 10.7 8.2 
I L 
a) the labour force (i.e. people who are in work or seeking work) aged from 16 to 64 as a 
proportion of the resident population of this age 
b) western Germany only 
c) standardised unemployment rates 
d) 1993 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, No. 80, Dec.2001, Tables lg and 22 
Compared with the EU average there is thus no reason to describe the German 
labour market as especially incapable, immobile or decrepit. If this occurs any- 
way, then it is due to the development in the iggos. During that time the labour 
force participation rate and the unemployment rate hardly changed in Germany. 
In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the labour force participation rate 
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increased clearly and the unemployment rate fell clearly. The 1990s therefore did 
not bring any improvement in Germany's situation, whilst in the Netherlands 
the situation on the labour market improved very clearly, although it is known 
that when interpreting the figures it  must be taken into account that part-time 
work has increased far more strongly in the Netherlands than it has in Germany 
and is in the meantime far more widespread there. 
In view of the stagnation on the German labour market (measured in terms of 
the rates, not the absolute figures: in the 1990s both the size of the labour force 
and the number of people in employment increased) there are repeated demands 
for reforms and institutional changes to the German labour market institutions. 
Here I would like to begin by saying that Germany's labour market is charac- 
terised in institutional terms by four features: 
Wage determination occurs above all by means of industry-wide wage 
agreements which show only a small wage disparity. The state has little 
influence, as the collective bargaining autonomy is protected in the 
Constitution. 
The structure of wages shows a relatively small disparity according to 
qualifications. 
The unemployed and the economically non-active are relatively well 
protected. 
Dependent employment is made considerably more expensive by high social 
security contributions (above an income of € 325 per month). 
As I have been invited as a member of the German Council of Economic Experts 
I would now like to present this Council's proposals for reforming the labour 
market and to take a critical look at them. 
Statements of criticism and ideas for reform made by the German Council of 
Economic Experts with regard to these characteristics emerge most clearly from 
four consecutive sections of the ~ g g g  annual report which are entitled 'Xeep 
wage increases below the level of productivity growth" (sections 332-340)~ 
"Facilitate downward wage differentiation" (sections 341-343), 'A separate pro- 
gramme for the low-wage sector?" (sections 344-353) and "Gear the labour mar- 
ket system towards more employment!" (sections 353-365). With regard to the 
problem of the burden resulting from social security contributions the Council 
restricts itself to the low-wage sector. 
The main bone of contention for the majority of the Council is the industry- 
wide wage agreement, which they see as playing a hampering role in all four 
problem areas. I will therefore deal with this institutional regulation first of all. 
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1.2 INDUSTRY-WIDE WAGE AGREEMENT AND EMPLOYMENT 
The majority of the German Council of Economic Experts criticises the domi- 
nance of the industry-wide wage agreements in Germany because of their nega- 
tive consequences on employment. I would like to sum up this criticism into 
four points: 
I. The first point of criticism is that the industry-wide wage agreement rein- 
forces the division between insiders and outsiders. The insiders are already 
protected against dismissals by the dismissal protection, and the industry- 
wide wage agreement prevents outsiders from undercutting wages in an 
attempt to get into the employment system by displacing insiders. 
First of all this argument overlooks the fact that such a substitution does not 
increase employment. Secondly, although it is true that, as long as it is 
observed, the industry-wide wage agreement does not permit the undercut- 
ting of wages, it does not follow from this that there would be successful 
hirings on a large scale by means of wage undercutting if there were no 
industry-wide wage agreements. As Solow (1990) points out, in the USA 
-a country in which industry-wide wage agreements do not exist - there is a 
social norm that prohibits displacing someone from his or her job by under- 
cutting the wage. Such a social norm was able to become established because 
an action such as wage undercutting puts a strain on the peaceful coopera- 
tion within the firm, which is why the person undercutting the wages is not 
accepted by the colleagues, and the employers can not expect to have 
employees who are satisfied and therefore motivated to achieve. Moreover 
the previous outsider, if he or she is accepted, immediately becomes an 
insider and will demand the same pay for the same work. 
Irrespective of this it is misleading to associate the division of the labour 
force into insiders and outsiders with the idea that one is dealing with two 
solid blocks. The hurdle between insiders and outsiders is often overcome. 
One way in which this occurs is by workers voluntarily moving from a firm 
in which they were insiders to a different firm for which they were previ- 
ously outsiders. However, there are no statistical data in Germany about the 
total number of such job changes within the employment system. 
The other way to clear the hurdle consists of moving from unemployment 
into an employment relationship or (for previous insiders) by changing from 
employment to unemployment. According to the statistics of the Federal 
Employment Service (Bundesanstalt fiir Arbeit) (2001) about 2.84 million 
unemployed people moved into dependent employment in 2001 and 0.69 
million unemployed people commenced a training relationship. In the same 
year 3.42 million employees became unemployed, as did 220,000 trainees, 
-145,oo of whom had successfully completed their training and 75,000 who 
had not. 
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These considerably high figures show that even without wage undercutting 
and in spite of existing dismissal protection there is a considerable exchange 
between insiders and outsiders, for these figures do not record the direct 
changes between two employment relationships. 
2. According to the majority of the Council the industry-wide wage agreement 
and the lack of wage undercutting prevent cheaper outsiders being hired in 
addition. This would already change if there were lower entry-level wages 
for the newly hired. There is no evidence that firms would then hire addi- 
tional workers however. The firms will only do this because of slightly lower 
wages if they expect their customers to buy the goods produced in addition 
by these additionally hired workers. It can hardly be assumed that the 
employers expect the workers they hire to spend their additional income 
entirely on the goods produced by these firms. 
What supports my reservations is the fact that relatively little use has been 
made of the entry-level wages such as those which have been agreed in the 
German chemical industry. But even if they had been used this would still 
not be proof of an employment effect since the new entrants to the labour 
market might have been hired even without entry-level wages. 
3. A third statement in the annual report criticises the industry-wide wage 
agreements with the argument that they force firms to make redundancies in 
the event of a crisis within the company as long as they do not contain hard- 
ship clauses; these clauses "serve to maintain the usual jobs of employees 
who would have been laid off if the collectively agreed wages were used" 
(section 358). It is necessary to point out with regard to this matter that such 
hardship clauses are already incorporated in many collective agreements. 
However, for good reason their use is dependent on the consent of the two 
sides of industry. This commitment to the consent of all parties makes sense 
because in this way it is ensured that a case of hardship, in other words a 
particularly precarious situation, really exists at the firm that wishes to make 
use of such a clause. Furthermore the firm applying for the use of this clause 
has to prove that it has a reorganisation concept that can lead the firm back 
out of the crisis again. In addition to this the consent regulation ensures that 
the clause is only used in real hardship cases; this guarantees that the firms 
which have got into difficulty also actually gain a competitive advantage 
over their competitors, which enables the firm to get out of the difficult sit- 
uation again. If on the other hands the wages were lowered in general, then 
this firm would not have a competitive advantage. 
As hardship clauses are not included in all collective agreements and they 
also often do not permit a reduction of the hourly wages, the majority of the 
German Council of Economic Experts (section 358) proposes 'to permit by 
law emergency negotiations at plant level also without them being subject to 
consent from the two sides of industry". The path to such a change in the 
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collective agreements is via the annulment of § 4, section 3 of the Collective 
Bargaining Act and a reformulation of § 77, section 3 of the Industrial 
Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) (see section 3604. The reason 
given for annulling the consent proviso is that this proviso results in "the 
effect on the remaining job-holders [being] decisive for the trade-unionpoli- 
cy judgment on hardship clauses" (ibid). In contrast I assess the consequence 
as positive. Without a consent proviso, there would be a danger of the 
agreed wage reduction being applied to the other job-holders so that the 
advantage of the hardship clause, which is to give support to an individual 
firm that is in a desperate situation, would be cancelled again. In this respect 
I am keeping to my minority opinion that the proposed undermining of the 
industry-wide wage agreement should also be rejected because it would 
restrict the effectiveness of the hardship clauses. Furthermore, transferring 
the wage determination rights to the firms and thus to the works councils 
leads to serious legal and material problems because works councils have no 
right to strike but are subject to a duty to maintain industrial peace. 
4. The central criticism levelled at the German industry-wide wage system, 
however, is that it makes it difficult to implement the wage increase rule 
demanded by the majority of the German Council of Economic Experts 
according to which the wage rises should remain behind the increases in 
productivity. By means of this wage restraint the productivity increases 
should be used to promote employment (annual report 1999, section 333). 
As the effects that wage increases have on employment constitute a complex 
subject I would like to discuss them in a separate section. 
WAGE RESTRAINT AND EMPLOYMENT: COUNCIL MAJORITY VERSUS 
COUNCIL MINORITY 
How wage restraint, in other words wage rises remaining behind the productivi- 
ty increases, can be used to promote employment is not explained in the ~ g g g  
annual report; instead reference is made to the 1998 annual report, section 423ff. 
There reference can be found to the positive (but not specified) effects of wage 
restraint as an improvement of the supply conditions, and the statement that it is 
worthwhile "for the firms to set up more jobs as a result of the wage restraint" 
(section 425). This is an imprecise formulation however. To be precise the argu- 
ment would have to be: it is worthwhile for the firms when setting up new jobs 
to organise them less capital-intensively. What remains unknown is why the 
firms should set up new jobs. The criticism of the demand-side reservations, 
which is presented in the same section, can at best justify the fact that demand in 
the economy as a whole does not decline if there is wage restraint - additional 
demand for goods is hardly likely to arise. 
In the lggg annual report, too, the majority of the Council once again concerned 
itself with the counterargument that when dealing with this issue it is also nec- 
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essary to take the demand side into account and then in my view (see my minori- 
ty vote, annual report 1999, sections 366-373) comes to the opinion that a general 
wage reduction does not send out any signals to the employers that they should 
hire more workers because of expected increases in sales. The opposite is more 
the case because if a wage increase remains behind the increase in productivity, 
the purchasing power of the workers' households also remains behind it, with 
the result that the producers of consumer goods receive signals to produce less 
but no signals to produce more. 
Wage restraint does not have a negative effect on the demand-side of the export 
trade. The effects ofwage restraint on the sectors therefore vary greatly. This is 
also confirmed by a study conducted by Blien et a1 (zooi), which is highly disag- 
gregated according to region and which brings out the fact that of the 113 districts 
or towns in eastern Germany the ones which were positively affected by wage 
increases between 1993 and 1999 were those in which services for the domestic 
market dominate. In contrast the districts with a high level of industry density 
were negatively affected because their products are mainly sold outside eastern 
Germany, with the result that the negative cost effects are not offset by positive 
demand effects. 
On balance therefore wage restraint does not result in any positive employment 
effects. What is behind the idea that wage restraint creates more jobs is therefore 
14 
presumably the old neo-classical doctrine, which was formulated for example in 
the 1977 annual report and probably continues to play a role today: - 
'Whatever may be a burden on the investment calculation, there is at any time a wage level at 
which no supply problems that may exist for other reasons make such a difference that full 
employment would become impossible"' (annual report 1977, section 288). 
At that time, however, the German Council of Economic Experts considered 
itself unable to quote this wage level which would make full employment possi- 
ble, instead it goes on to establish (annual report 1977, section 289): 
'Nobody knows even afterwards how to say what the wage development should have looked like 
which would have guaranteed an adequate reaction of the supply in the economy as a whole in 
the course of the most recent upswing. However, this concession does not change anything about 
the thesis that from the supply-orientated point of view less wage would have resulted in more 
employment! " 
Whereas at that time the German Council of Economic Experts was unable to 
quantify the aim but knew that it is approached by means of wage restraint, 
attempts have been made meanwhile to determine the necessary extent of wage 
reduction (always in relation to the increase in productivity). Relevant calcula- 
tions can be found in Fitzenberger/Franz (2001). They show that in order to 
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halve the respective unemployment figure it would be necessary to reduce wages 
by 37 percent in the lower wage sector and by 34 percent in the middle wage sec- 
tor2. It seems reasonable to suppose that such large-scale or long-lasting wage 
restraint could not be carried through either with or without industry-wide 
wage agreements. 
However, it would be wrong to think that the Germany industry-wide wage sys- 
tem prevents a wage restraint that lasts for many years. For this it is necessary to 
look at the temporal development of the real wage position in Germany in figure 
1.1 on the next page; this is defined as a quotient of the real wage per employee to 
the production per worker, and the change in this quotient measures the extent 
of wage restraint or non-restraint. As the real income per employee is related to 
the labour productivity per worker, the changes in the two quantities measure at 
the same time the changes in the real wage position and in the adjusted wage 
ratio if - as is usual when calculating the wage ratio - the output is measured in 
terms of the national income and not the gross domestic product, since it  applies 
that: 
Although this real wage position improved steadily in favour of the employed in 
West Germany from 1960 to 1982, because the real wages increased more strong- 
ly than labour productivity, after 1982 the picture reversed. From 1983 until 1991 
the real wages remained behind labour productivity generally in western 
Germany, with a small interruption in 1987. It was the unification boom that first 
resulted in an increase in the real wage position in 1992 and 1993. However, this 
constitutes only a short interruption in the wage restraint, as is shown in the fig- 
ures for the whole of Germany in figure 1.2. Overall from 1982 to 1991 the real 
wage position fell in western Germany from just under 78 percent to below 70 
percent, in other words by more than one tenth. If the majority of the Council is 
of the opinion that it is necessary to undermine the industry-wide wage, then 
obviously because in their opinion this wage restraint should be continued for as 
long as there is unemployment (annual report 2001, section 399). 
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Figure 1.1 Real wage position2# (relation between real wages and labour 
productivity) and ~mployrnent' - Western Germany 1960 until 1994 
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
Number of workers (mill.) 
Report of the German Council of Economic Advisers (9ahresgutachten" des Sach 
versBndigenrats) 2001, Table 2* and 1998, Table 2* 
Wage of an individual worker, divided by the labour productivity 
"DGB-Informationen zur Wirtschah- und Strukturpolitik" No. 51 2000, Table 3. Calculated as the 
proportion of wages to the social product and adjusted for changes of the proportion of 
dependent workers to the complete economically active population 
LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND EMPLOYMENT IN GERMANY 
Figure 1.2 Real wage po~i t ions~ ,~  and employment1 - Germany 1991 until 2000 
1. Report of the German Council of Economic Advisers ("Jahresgutachten" des Sachverstandigenrats) 
2001, Table 2* 
2. Wage of an individual worker, divided by the labour productivity 
3. CalculatedJ from "Jahresgutachten" 2001: Table 17a*, 15* and 22* 
In these two diagrams, from which it is possible to see the development of the 
real wage position from the ordinates, the number of workers is also entered on 
the abscissa. The diagram therefore shows not only the development of the real 
wage position but also the simultaneous development of the employment of 
workers. From this the remarkable result is obtained that from 1960 to 1982 the 
number of employed grew although the real wage position of the employed 
increased considerably as a result of expansionary wage policy. Then from 1982 
until 1991 a process of wage restraint was under way during the course of which 
more workers found a job once again - albeit with a time-lag of three years. Wage 
restraint and expansionary wage increases are therefore both obviously compati- 
ble with increasing employment. This leads me to the supposition that it is not 
the changes in the real wage position that determine the development of 
employment but vice versa the development of employment determines the 
change in the real wage position. Thus there was high unemployment in 
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Germany from 1982. This weakened the bargaining position of the workers and 
their trade unions so considerably that they had to accept constant wage restraint 
until 1991. This process was only interrupted in the unification boom, in other 
words in a bargaining situation that was far more favourable for the trade unions, 
but afterwards the pressure of the high unemployment won through again. 
In an international comparison, too, there is no indication at all that Germany's 
industry-wide wage system encourages an expansionary wage policy to any par- 
ticular extent. As can be seen from table 1.2, which is based on EU figures, it is 
more the case that the development of the indicators shown occurred in 
Germany largely along the lines of the European Union average, with the excep- 
tion of the 1g6os, when the situation of full-employment and finally even 
overemployment led to the real wage position improving in Germany while it 
declined slightly in the EU in that decade. 
Table 1.2 Real wages, labour productivity and real wage positions in Germany, 
the Netherlands and the EU(=) - Annual average changes 
~ermanyc~) 
Real wages (RW) 
Labour productivity (LP) 
RW-LP 
Netherlands 
Real wages (RW) 
Labour productivity (LP) 
RW-LP 
European Union 
Real wages (RW) 
Labour productivity (LP) 
RW-LP 
a) real wage per employee and productivity per worker 
b) until 1990: Western Germany only 
Source: Schulten/Stiickler, 1999, Table 2 
Compared with Germany and the European Union the development in the 
Netherlands, where a policy of wage restraint was agreed in the famous 
Wassenaar Agreement of 1982, proceeded considerably more unevenly. In the 
1960s a very considerable overshooting of real wages over labour productivity 
could be observed in the Netherlands, which was far greater than that in 
Germany. The correction of this development then took place a decade later in 
the 1980s during which time the real wage position deteriorated even further in 
the Netherlands than in Germany. In the 199os, when in Germany and the EU 
the wage restraint was continued in a slightly more moderate form, the real wage 
restraint in the Netherlands almost came to a standstill; it came to only a third of 
the value for Germany. 
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What is striking is the small increase in productivity in the Netherlands in the 
~ggos,  which can be explained above all by the growth of part-time employment. 
Unfortunately it is not possible to gather from Schulten/Stiickler how the pro- 
ductivity per hour developed. 
I would like to point out that the wage restraint and its opposite are measured ex 
post here, i.e. in terms of the quantities that were actually realised. This develop- 
ment need by no means have corresponded to the intentions of the two sides of 
industry. For the response of the economic system to collective wage agree- 
ments, however, it probably depends above all on the actual development. I can 
not imagine that the economy, which in the case of Germany for instance knows 
that the actual wage agreements usually end up at half of the wage demand origi- 
nally made, is impressed by high wage demands being made initially, such as this 
spring. Nevertheless this ritual of first putting forward high wage demands and 
then allowing themselves to be bargained down to roughly half of the amount is 
one of the negative sides of the industry-wide wage agreement system. 
Another negative aspect of the wage development is concealed by the formation 
of averages over ten years, that is the considerable fluctuations in the annual 
rates of change. This applies firstly for the nominal wages: in western Germany 
in the 1990s the increase in nominal wages fluctuated between 6.1 percent in 
lggl and 1.3 percent in 1997. These increases in the nominal wage also had an 
effect on the real wage position, which improved by two percentage points 
between 1991 and 1993 and then fell even more heavily until 1998. 
These considerable fluctuations in the development of wages show what nega- 
tive effects result if the respective market and power positions first of the one 
side and then of the other side are exploited heavily in the wage negotiations. It 
would be better if the two sides of industry were to agree upon a permanently 
viable wage formula, namely upon the formula of a real wage increase that is ori- 
entated towards productivity, where the real wage position and thus the (adjust- 
ed) distribution of incomes between workers and firms remains constant. 
Agreement on this formula, which makes sense in macroeconomic terms and is 
permanently acceptable for both sides, would lead to a greater continuity in the 
development of wages, thus making it easier for firms to calculate and predict 
the development of wage costs, which would in turn make their production and 
investment decisions easier. 
1.4 ON THE DEMAND FOR GREATER WAGE DISPARITY 
Concerning the demand for greater wage differentiation the German Council of 
Economic Experts starts out from the indisputable observation that the demand 
for labour is shifting at the expense of the lower qualified. This shift is reflected 
in above-average high unemployment rates of low-skilled workers. The Council 
suggests offsetting this trend of declining demand for low-skilled workers by 
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means of a greater downward wage disparity. This wage disparity should either 
occur in the collective agreements themselves or be made easier to implement by 
decentralising wage determination. 
As regards the question as to the sectors in which low-paid jobs can be created it 
is hardly possible to consider industry since it  will neither make sense nor be 
implementable to spread the wages in Germany so far downwards that produc- 
tion lines that are performed above all with low-skilled labour are produced as 
cheaply as in low-wage countries such as in Eastern Europe or in India. 
Therefore it would be pointless in the sectors where it is possible to shift pro- 
duction to prevent this occurring by means of a greater wage disparity in 
Germany. 
Pushing through a wage structure that is spread more strongly downwards is not 
sufficient for a higher employment level, however. I t  is more the case that there 
are supposedly far too few people who are willing to perform low-paid activities. 
The Council sees disincentive effects arising from the current social assistance 
and unemployment assistance regulations as a key reason for this supply-side 
disturbance. In the case of social assistance these disincentives arise above all: 
a) as a result of the full deduction of earned income exceeding a low maximum 
amount; 
b) as a result of an insufficiently large gap between the wage of low-skilled peo- 
ple and the social assistance payments, especially those for families with chil- 
dren, since the small gap can be attributed above all to the different treatment 
of the maintenance costs for children. For instance the child allowance for 
working people amounts to DM 300, but social assistance is increased by up to 
DM 650 per child. 
With regard to the deduction of earned income the Council suggests testing a 
deduction rate of 50 percent. Because of the different treatment of child 
allowance the idea seems to suggest itself of granting a child allowance supple- 
ment of DM zoo per child to workers who leave social assistance, as is being done 
in Rhineland-Palatinate in their pilot scheme. However, in the Rhineland- 
Palatinate scheme this supplement is limited to one year, with the result that the 
wage gap problem is only solved temporarily. 
What must also be taken into consideration is that the enlargement of the gap 
between wage and social assistance by means of child allowance supplements or 
other measures can not prevent social assistance recipients who have suitable 
abilities from being in a better position if they draw social assistance and in addi- 
tion do more or less occasional "clandestine" work. By means of the corrections 
named it  is not possible to gain control of this possibility, which is of course not 
open to all social assistance recipients who are fit to work, but i t  may be at best 
moderated somewhat. 
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In addition to social assistance, the existence of unemployment assistance also 
creates undesired disincentives. Unemployment assistance is also linked to 
needs, but differs from social assistance in that the level of assistance is oriented 
towards the previous earned income. This orientation then creates problems 
when it is a matter of inducing unemployed people who previously worked in 
industry to accept low-paid jobs in the services sector. In industry they often 
earned a relatively high income owing to piecework and overtime, so that their 
unemployment assistance which is orientated towards this income (even if it 
only amounts to 57 percent of the net income) is so high that accepting a job in 
the services sector becomes unattractive. Therefore unemployment assistance 
should be amalgamated with social assistance, though the Council does not give 
any concrete information about details. The possibilities range from a degressive 
organisation of unemployment assistance, through the setting of time limits for 
it, to the abolition of unemployment assistance. This would take into account the 
necessary structural change from the production of goods to services. In this way 
the labour market would become more flexible. 
1.5 MORE FLEXIBILITY ON THE LABOUR MARKET - BUT WHAT KIND OF 
FLEXIBILITY? 
The subject of increasing flexibility is of great importance not only in  the lggg 
annual report, but is also taken up again in the annual reports of 2 0 0 0  and 2001, 
whereby the annual report 2000 deals especially with the law passed in 2000 on 
part-time work and fixed-term employment contracts. In section 430 it is 
acknowledged that part-time work is welcome "in principle", but the legal regu- 
lations are reproached for not adequately extending the flexibility within the 
part-time work regulation. In the case of fixed-term employment contracts, too, 
the Council demands (section 429) more flexible regulations (the same applies to  
the amended Industrial Constitution Act, section 431). The 2001 annual report, 
too, sends a reminder about more flexibility, without new arguments being pro- 
duced for it. 
The papers by Fehn and Schettkat (in this book) deal in detail with the flexibility 
of the German and Dutch labour markets. For this reason I would like to restrict 
myself to a fundamental reflection on the issue of flexibility on the labour mar- 
ket. It seems to me here to be very important for the discussion that a distinction 
be made between 
a) flexibility in terms of quantity and 
b) flexibility in terms of price. 
Flexibility in terms of quantity refers to the use of hours worked. In view of the 
demand for labour fluctuating with the seasons and economic cycles it should be 
made possible to control the deployment of labour more flexibly than used to be 
the case. In particular annual working time accounts, which are becoming more 
and more widespread in the meantime, are of use within the firms in this 
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respect. With such accounts the maximum total number of hours to be worked 
in the course of a whole year is still established, but the division of this total 
across the individual months, weeks and days of the year can in contrast be 
geared towards the needs within the establishment. Such annual working time 
accounts have the advantage for the firms that they have to pay less overtime 
with its corresponding overtime-premia, but have the same annual working 
time, since the additional hours worked in excess of the regular working week at 
certain times in the year are not judged as overtime but are balanced out by hours 
off at a later date. 
By means of this balancing possibility the overall number of hours worked, in 
other words the total of working hours paid in accordance with and in excess of 
the agreed wage, can fall if, before the introduction of working time accounts, the 
overtime was worked and paid as overtime and was not balanced out by addi- 
tional free time. In this respect the annual working time accounts can lead to a 
reduction of the actual annual working time. Whether positive employment 
effects are associated with this is probably disputed in the German Council of 
Economic Experts. 
A flexibility of the deployment of labour outside the firm occurs through dis- 
missals and lay-offs. As can be seen from the figures cited earlier, such a flexibili- 
ty exists on a large scale, in contrast to  what the insider/outsider discussion sug- 
gests. This flexibility is reinforced even further by the fact that in the meantime 
part-time work and fixed-term employment contracts are possible according to 
the law passed in 2000 that was mentioned above. The existing extent of quanti- 
tative flexibility does not rule out the fact that there are sensible ways to increase 
this flexibility even further, e.g. by means of mobility assistance for employees 
who have to  move house in order to change their job or take up employment for 
the first time. 
A flexibility in terms of price on the labour market (i.e. wage rates that can be 
changed for a short time) only makes sense in my view in individual cases, for 
instance in the hardship cases mentioned above. Otherwise, though, I consider a 
general flexibility in terms of price, in the sense of a flexible wage level, to be 
even harmful, since when unemployment is high it can lead to the economy 
coming close to deflation as a result of repeated reductions of the wage level, 
thus creating a danger of firms and consumers further postponing their demand 
for goods, especially for consumer durables, if they expect a further decline in 
prices and wages. Current demand is therefore absent, with the result that the 
market situation and thus the employment situation deteriorate further and the 
economy slides into a vicious circle. Japan is obviously in such a situation; there 
the government's repeated spending programmes only sufficed to offset to some 
extent the loss of private demand caused by the deflationary tendencies. So far 
they have not been able to reverse the trend. 
LABOUR MARKFT INSTITUTIONS AND EMPLOYMENT IN GERMANY 
NOTES 
' In 1977 structural unemployment was not yet of any significance. Otherwise the 
Council would probably have spoken more cautiously at that time of the reduction of 
non-structural unemployment instead of full employmen. 
Fitzenberger/Franz calculate in addition a clearly lower required reduction, but only 
if they set the output elasticity < I estimated by them at equal to one, because they 
(mistakenly) regard the estimated value as implausible. 
REFERENCES 
Blien, Uwe u.a. (ZOOI), Neue Bundeslander: Einflussfaktoren der Regionalentwicklung. 
Studie von IAB/DIW im Auftrag der KfW. Nurnberg/Berlin (/IAB/DIW). 
Bundesanstalt f i r  Arbeit (ZOOI), Arbeitsmarkt in Zahlen. Aktuelle Daten. Dezember 2001. 
Fitzensberger, Bernd/Franz, Wolfgang (2000): Jobs. Jobs? Jobs! Orientierungshilfen fur 
den Weg zu mehr Beschaftigung. In: W. Franz u.a. Hrsg. (ZOOI), Wirt~chaftspolitische 
Herausforderungen an der Jahrtausendwende. Tubingen (Mohr Siebeck). 
Schulten, Thorsten/Stiickler, Angela (2000): Lohnpolitik in Europa. In: WSI- 
Informationen zur Tar~fiolitik. Diisseldorf (Hans Bockler-Stiftung). 
Solow, Robert (1990): The Labor Market as a Social Institution. Oxford (Blackwell). 
LABOUR PARTICIPATION A N D  UNEMPLOYMENT; A COMPARISON OF DEVELOPMENTS 
AND INSTITUTIONS IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS 
2 THE GERMAN LABOUR MARKET SITUATION, 
FROM A DUTCH PERSPECTIVE 
Kees van Paridon 
2.1 UNEMPLOYMENT: AN UNSOLVABLE PROBLEM? 
When back in 1973 the first oil crisis hit the OECD-economies, the fairy tale of 
full employment was shattered. Due to Keynesian theory and Keynesian orient- 
ed policies, the unemployment problem was more or less solved. All the people 
who wanted a job had one. The business cycle phenomenon was something of 
the past, many people believed. But reality was different after 1973, with stagnat- 
ing growth and rising unemployment. Whatever governments tried to do in the 
late 70s to restore full employment and to bring the unemployment rate back to 
the desired levels, nothing seemed to work. With the 1981 crisis and each subse- 
quent new recession the unemployment rate rose to new record levels. The 
ensuing upsurge was normally not strong enough to reduce this again to more 
acceptable levels. At the same time the employment growth was minimal. The 
economic and social problems increased in many European economies. The gold- 
en age of the 60s was definitely over. Due to the so-called 'jobless growth' devel- 
opment, the traditional goal of full employment seemed to have become imprac- 
ticable. Furthermore, because national economies had become more open and 
more dependent on foreign influences, strict national policies had lose the power 
to control the economic development. Governments, unions and labourers had 
to accept, so the common opinion, that only through labour time redistribution 
policies a socially acceptable solution was still possible. 
Although also affected by such negative opinions, a few countries tried to find a 
more positive solution for the unemployment problem. And they succeeded. 
Countries like Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands were able to change their 
pattern of economic development. They showed a diverging labour market per- 
formance: there a remarkable employment growth could be observed, and the 
unemployment rate could be brought back to unexpected low levels. They 
demonstrated that it was still possible to realise a more attractive labour market 
situation. Other countries have been eager to observe what they could learn 
from these successful experiences. In Germany the Dutch experiences and its 
Poldermodel has attracted considerable attention. But so far it seems that 
Germany was not able to realise the same labour market performance. 
This contribution comments the current German labour market situation from a 
Dutch perspective. The paper of Professor Jiirgen Kromphardt for this confer- 
ence has been a major focus in this respect'. My main argument is that the 
German economy is still at the beginning of a process of radical changes, not 
only at the labour market but also in other policy areas, necessary to make the 
economy competitive again and able to realise the goal of full employment. I'll 
start with asking the question whether there is a labour market problem in 
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Germany. Then I will make clear why a higher employment level is absolutely 
essential for the economic and social well-being of a developed economy, and 
what the requirements are for such a labour market. Using the Dutch experi- 
ences, I'll then comment the German efforts to improve their labour market 
performance, thereby also reacting on some of the remarks of professor 
Kromphardt. 
I S  THERE A GERMAN LABOUR MARKET PROBLEM? 
Jiirgen Kromphardt starts his paper with the sentence that a lot of criticism on 
the German labour market and the German employment system is possible and 
that surely a number of weaknesses and problems can be indicated, but that the 
actual situation is better than the general opinion believes. Kromphardt shows a 
table with the development of the labour force rate and the unemployment. The 
labour force is the people with a job and the official unemployed. Divided 
through the total population this gives the labour force rate. There are good argu- 
ments to come up with this indicator. It shows the number of people willing to 
work. The data given by Kromphardt indicate that this number has increased, 
mainly due to the increase of female labour participation, and, even more impor- 
tant, by the reunification with the former GDR. There the labour force rate was 
much higher, above 80 percent. 
Is the labour force rate an adequate indicator for the labour market performance? 
In my view the employment rate is more important. Only people with a job do 
earn their own income, and are able to contribute through taxes and premiums 
for the expenditures in the social security system, and so for the unemployment 
benefits. The more people do have a job, the lower the individual tax and premi- 
um rate can be fixed for a given social security level, the better the proper incen- 
tives will work at the demand- and the supply-side of the labour market, and the 
lower the labour costs will be. Furthermore, there are clear indications that 
employed people are happier and more content with their life situation than 
people without work. Therefore the employment rate is in my view a better indi- 
cator for the labour market performance than the labour force rate. Figure 2.1 
indicates that the Dutch employment rate, with employment measured in per- 
sons, has shown a considerable increase in the last ten years, while the German 
employment rate remained at about the same level2. 
As is known, the number of part-time jobs in the Netherlands is remarkably 
high. They are also fully accepted. Whereas in many other European countries 
most people on a part-time job indicate that such a job is second choice, while no 
full-time job is available, the preferences of the Dutch are strongly part-time ori- 
ented. According to the Labour Force Survey of EUROSTAT, the Dutch employees 
working part-time have the least demand in the European Union for getting a 
full-time job. At the same time, Dutchmen with a full-time job have the highest 
demand for a part-time job3. Because the number of part-time jobs in the 
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Figure 2.1 Labour force participation rate (in Ole) 
1 Germany . The Netherlands I 
Netherlands is so high, it is relevant to calculate the employment rate in so- 
called full-time equivalents, for instance while people working part-time do also 
pay only part-time premiums. The employment rate, calculated in full-time 
equivalents, is in my view therefore for economic, productivity and budget rea- 
sons the best indicator on labour market performance. Figure 2.2 indicates that in 
full-time equivalents the Dutch employment rate has increased considerably in 
the last l o  years, and that its level is now higher than that in Germany. 
Figure 2.2 Labour force participation rate in full-time equivalents 
64 1 
I Germany W The Netherlands I 
Already since the 60s, the employment growth has been higher in the 
Netherlands than in Germany, as is shown in figure 2.3. This was partly due to 
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the higher population growth in the Netherlands, but the differences in the last 
decades have been the consequence of an increasing employment rate in the 
Netherlands, as is shown in figure 2.4. This fast employment growth contributed 
to a much lower official unemployment rate (figure 2.5). In the early 80s the cur- 
rent low level was thought to be impossible. The German unemployment situa- 
tion is clearly much higher since the early 90s. 
Figure 2.3 Employment Growth 
El Germany W The Netherlands 
Figure 2.4 Labour force participation rate in the Netherlands 
1,- - - Persons --C. Corrected for part-time employment I 
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Figure 2.5 Unemployment rate 
Germany +The Netherlands 
My conclusion therefore is that the German labour market situation is less posi- 
tive than Kromphardt indicates. In line with Kromphardt observations, I agree 
that the German employment rate (in persons) has remained more or less stable. 
However, the demand for jobs has increased and will continue to increase. The 
number of unemployed people, the high preference for jobs in the new Lander, 
29 
the ongoing emancipation and individualisation, and the need for more jobs - 
because of the demographic changes, are all tending in the same direction, name- 
ly that more jobs should become available. In the last decades the German econ- 
omy has not been able to create these new jobs. The picture becomes even more 
pessimistic when one looks at the slightly declining employment rate in full- 
time equivalents. A smaller group has paid the rising costs of social security in 
the recent past. This undermines German competitiveness. The conclusion is 
clear: something should be done to change the labour market situation of 
Germany. Before we try to answer that question, we return to the Dutch experi- 
ences. 
2.3 FROM COMBATING UNEMPLOYMENT TOWARDS INCREASING THE 
EMPLOYMENT RATE: THE CHANGING ECONOMIC AND LABOUR 
MARKET PERSPECTIVE I N  THE NETHERLANDS SINCE THE EARLY 8 0 s  
When the unemployment rate increased in the 70s and 80s towards very high 
levels, the main goal of social-economic policy was to bring down the unem- 
ployment rate. Initially it was tried with a demand-oriented policy, but in the 
80s the emphasis shifted more towards supply-oriented economic policies. From 
1983 a radical and broad strategy was applied, with wage moderation, expendi- 
ture cuts and subsequently tax- and premium rate cuts, with deregulation, and 
with painful changes in labour market and social security arrangements. In this 
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way the successive governments and the social partners tried to create more jobs 
and to realise a more acceptable unemployment level. Wage moderation was 
seen as essential to improve the competitiveness of exposed Dutch firms on the 
world market, but it was also judges as useful in sheltered service sectors because 
of the lower labour costs. 
Figure 2.6 Relation benefit recipients to Employment 
- Germany + The Netherlands 
30 
Figure 2.7 Relation benefit recipients (age 16-65) to Employment - 
I * Germany -The Netherlands I 
Initially labour time reduction policies and early retirement schemes were also 
favoured. It was thought that through such policies new jobs-for young people 
would become available. Only after a while it was learned that these policies 
hardly created any new job. Furthermore, such policies did increase the number 
of people dependent on social security. This raised the financial burden for the 
social security, with the consequence that labour costs remained high even 
THE GERMAN LABOUR MARKET SITUATION, FROM A DUTCH PERSPECTIVE 
though wage increases were moderate. Also the wage wedge remained high, pre- 
venting many employers to offer new jobs and hindering many labourers to 
change jobs or to step into the labour market. 
In the same period social security arrangements remained in their basic structure 
more or less unchanged. Still, social benefits declined in real terms, entrance 
requirements increased, and the instrument of sanctions became more applied. It 
did not produce however the right results: as figure 2.6 and 2.7 indicate, the rela- 
tion between the number of people dependent on social security and those with 
a job remained quite stable for a long period of time. Even though after 1983 the 
employment increased considerably, the number of people dependent on social 
security increased as fast, so their relative proportion hardly changed for a long 
Figure 2.8 Public spending rate 
Figure 2.9 Budget deficit 
I Germany +The Netherlands I 
Germany -The Netherlands 
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It is absolutely clear that the costs of reunification have been a burden for the 
whole German economy. But the current weak position is more structural; it has 
been connected with the apparent inability to adjust the economy towards the 
new requirements. These are the rise of more knowledge-intensive and service- 
oriented sectors, the growing differentiation at all levels of production, the 
increasing individualisation at all levels inside German society and more decen- 
tral ways of decision-making. These trends have undermined one of the biggest 
German assets, its manufacturing sector. For already more than 150 years 
German manufacturing firms have dominated the European and world market. 
Wi th  their revival they made the Wirtschaftswunder possible, their innovative- 
ness was famous. Because of these successes there was not so much incentive to 
change the basic elements. They remained characterised by internal financing 
and the absence of financing through shares, decision making remained cen- 
tralised and hierarchical, and German firms were reluctant to outsource activities 
or to use foreign direct investment. 
For a long time these characteristics had contributed to a very competitive econ- 
omy, but now it seems that these basic elements have to be adjusted to make the 
German economy not only more competitive, but also less manufacturing- 
oriented. The individualisation and differentiation trends will continue, making 
standard practices and solutions less preferable. Due also to technological 
progress, European integration and marketing practices the need for more de- 
central decision making has increased. These trends require more flexibility 
inside firms and at product and factor markets, allowing more differentiation and 
more competition. It has to be expected that productivity increases in the manu- 
facturing sector will remain high. In the recent years the manufacturing sector 
has brought about many changes. Their situation has certainly been improved, 
and the expectations are bright. But at the same time it is inevitable that they will 
provide less and less jobs. New jobs therefore have to be found in other sectors, 
especially the more knowledge-intensive and service-oriented ones. The impres- 
sion exists that the German economy and society has found it difficult so far to 
bring about the necessary changes to make this possible. 
The lack of sufficient changes has become visible in the labour market and in the 
social security system. Even though the manufacturing sector regained its strong 
position on the world market after the crisis in 1992, the employment growth in 
this sector remained low. New, extra jobs had to be created in the service sector, 
but their growth was low, too low to increase the employment rate and to bring 
down unemployment. Especially for lower educated people, for older employ- 
ees, and for those specifically trained for manufacturing practices, the chances on 
the labour market have declined dramatically. For older employees in the new 
Lander the situation was even more difficult. In my opinion, these structural 
mismatches explain the high German unemployment rate (figure 5) and the 
undiminished high percentage of long-term unemployed. 
THE GERMAN LABOUR MARKET SITUATION, FROM A DUTCH PERSPECTIVE 
While the employment growth was sluggish, the number of people depending 
on social security continued to increase. As figures 6 and 7 indicate, the propor- 
tion dependencies/employed people remained stable during the Sos, but 
increased in the 90s to a similar high and rather alarming level the Netherlands 
reached in the 80s. In the Dutch case a negative spiral in that time had con- 
tributed to this situation; firms already working at a high productivity level were 
confronted with new tax and premium increases, while more people became 
dependent on social security. So labour costs increased. To remain competitive, 
they had to fire the least productive employees to raise their productivity level. 
This, however, gave at the same time a new impulse to increase the premiums in 
social security. A similar negative spiral could have become relevant for 
Germany after 1990, due to the consequences of the reunification and of the 
dramatic restructuring in the manufacturing sector around 1992. 
In that respect, the argumentation of Kromphardt regarding wage rate develop- 
ments and employment growth I found not convincing. He stresses the develop- 
ment of collective wage agreements and of the real wage position of employees, 
but he neglects the development of total wage costs in relationship to productiv- 
ity growth. According to IW, the German unit labour costs ranked fourth in the 
OECD area; even a high productivity growth could not compensate for the very 
high growing labour costs=. Furthermore, Kromphardt mentions, illustrated in 
two accompanying figures, that both in times of relative real wage increases and 
of real wage declines the employment increased. He concludes that wage rate 
increases are not harmful. I have two problems with this presentation. First, he 
should concentrate on labour costs and not on real wage rates, and second, he 
should use the employment rate instead of the number of people employed. 
Changes in population growth and in labour participation behaviour, for instance 
that of women, are so much better taken into account. The 30 percent increase in 
employment between 1960 and 1994 for West Germany was for instance sur- 
passed by that of the population between 15 and 65. That grew in the same peri- 
od with 32 percent. In figures I and 2 it was made clear that the recent develop- 
ment of the German employment rate, both in persons and in full-time equiva- 
lents, are not really encouraging. And, while the number of jobs only slightly 
increased, the number of dependencies on social security increased much more, 
so raising the proportion (figures 6 and 7). This meant further increases in wage 
costs, and so another incentive for the negative spiral already mentioned. And 
finally, Kromphardt emphasises the demand-aspect of wage increases. In his 
view this aspect is neglected, while only the supply-side is taken into account 
with labour costs and tax- and premiumrates. Of course, Kromphardt is right in 
stressing the importance of the demand-effect, but he should not overstate it. In 
my view, consumer confidence is as important for consumption growth as wage 
increases. When that confidence fails, due to economic recession or because of 
negative expectations about individual labour market prospects, consumption 
growth will be moderate, whatever wage increase will be negotiated. On  the 
other side, when consumer confidence is high, consumers will react accordingly 
even when wage increases are only moderate. Wage moderation is not only help- 
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ful in reducing labour costs, but also in improving the chances on extra jobs. If 
this works out well, consumer confidence and so demand will increase. 
My conclusion therefore is that the need for adjustments is increased, at the firm 
and sector level, at product and factor markets, at the institutional level and at 
the state and Lander level with regard to economic and social policies. Without 
such changes it will become increasingly difficult to make the German economy 
sufficiently competitive again, sufficient in the sense of offering enough jobs to 
meet the actual demand and sufficient to the social security system demands. 
Such a policy advice is not new. In reports of for instance the O E C D ~  and the 
German Council of Economic Advisors7 similar recipes can be found. Yet, these 
advices seemed to be hardly noticed. Both the Kohl and Schroder administration 
have realised some changes, but they both have not been able to introduce and 
implement a much broader strategy, like the Dutch one. They did not came up 
with more and stronger policy changes, because they thought that the economic 
situation was not that bad, or because they feared the political consequences of 
such changes. My impression is that the last factor has been quite important. The 
factual situation, that the government majority in the Bundestag nearly always 
had to fight against a majority of the opposition parties in the Bundesrat, able to 
block important government proposals, have also hampered the decision making 
process. This factor of political reluctance should not be neglected. In that sense 
the German society seems to cope with the same problem many other successful 
countries and firms have been confronted with, namely the fact that all relevant 
actors - government, firms, employees, unions, ordinary people - have become 
so much accustomed to their current position and the related income that they 
resist any adjustment, and certainly the more painful ones, fearing that these 
losses will not be compensated. As long as the German government is frightened 
for the political consequences of a necessary, broader strategy, it has to be feared 
that the economic development will remain below potential. 
Two other points have to be mentioned here, both points where clear differences 
between the Netherlands and Germany can be observed. The first point deals 
with the position and influence of advisory bodies. In the Netherlands there 
exists a number of such institutions, like the CPB Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis and the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR). Both are 
highly regarded and judged as independent. Their advices therefore can have a 
strong influence in the decision making process, especially with issues or policy 
areas with strong income (distribution) consequences or a longer-term impact. 
These advisory bodies have according to my opinion contributed to the rather 
pragmatic decision making climate, in which these issues are discussed in the 
government, parliament and society. Similar advisory bodies do not exist in 
Germany at the moment. There does not exist in Germany an-independent and 
influential institute for the important long-term issues, like the Dutch WRR. Of 
course, the Germans have an independent Council of Economic Advisors and 
many other advisory bodies, but they seem less independent and powerful, and 
their opinions are therefore less influential for the public and political debate. 
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Furthermore, instead of just one CPB, there are many German economic insti- 
tutes. Competition is valuable, but the problem here is that government and 
political parties are selecting institutes according to the results they expect. That 
is not fruitful for a pragmatic discussion. In combination with a more ideological 
approach in German parliamentary discussions, this situation does not seem 
fruitful to me for encouraging pragmatic discussions, decisions and implementa- 
tion of painful, but necessary policy measures. 
The second point deals with the role of the social partners, and their relationship 
with the national government. Here both countries have chosen a different path 
after 1945. In the Netherlands, employers' associations and unions decided in 
1945 to start with the Labour Foundation, to discuss in this Foundation in a open 
and pragmatic way all relevant issues regarding collective agreements. In 1950 
the Social Economic Council was set up, where representatives of employers' 
associations, unions and so-called independent persons discussed all social- 
economic government proposals. In such a climate, and of course helped by the 
difficult economic situation of that time, it was possible in the Netherlands to 
realise a centralised wage moderation policy in the 50s and early 60s. Regular 
informal contacts between social parmers and the government were helpful to 
create a climate of trust. This economic policy contributed to the strong econom- 
ic revival then. After 1963 wage moderation was given up, and for almost 2 0  
years more ideological distance between the social partners could be noticed. 
Given the dramatic situation in the early 80s, it was however not a dramatic 
change when in 1982 the social partners decided to use that same wage modera- 
tion medicine again. In that way they hoped to create new jobs for outsiders. For 
all clarity, these institutional arrangements, these close contacts between social 
partners and government, have been frequently criticised, also in recent times, 
for instance because people feared that political responsibilities were blurred. 
Discussions in the SER could sometimes last almost indefinitely, or resulted in 
misty and useless advices. Social partners also sometimes misused their position 
to realise certain goals at the expense of other, i.e. the taxpayer. So, this 
'Poldermodel' certainly has been helpful, but its role should not be overstated. 
The model helped, but the measures taken were decisive. 
In Germany it was decided after the war to make a strict separation between the 
responsibilities of the government and the social partners. Experiences in the 
Weimar period had shown that too big a interference of these parties could 
undermine the political system. In 1949 the so-called Tarifautonomie was made 
law: employer's associations and unions were fully responsible for wage agree- 
ments, and the government should not intervene. On the whole this system has 
worked out well. Relatively moderate wage increases, a relatively low strike 
intensity and the well functioning of representative advisory bodies have cer- 
tainly contributed to the good economic performance. Once, however, the eco- 
nomic development started to stagnate, it was very difficult to realise necessary 
changes which involved the social parmers. To overcome this situation, 
Chancellor Kohl started in 1995 a so-called Biindnisfir Arbeit to try to win the 
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cooperation of the social partners, but his attempt failed. Three years later, and 
influenced by the Dutch experiences, the new Chancellor Schroder did the same. 
The results so far have been rather meagre. Because the wage development was 
immediately declared a non-issue, in line with the Tarifautonornie, the meetings 
in this alliance have been focussing on relevant, but not always the central issues. 
Furthermore, it seemed often that they were not able or willing to solve them. 
Not all actors involved seem convinced yet that the economic situation is really 
problematic, and also they do not trust each other sufficiently yet to realise nec- 
essary breakthroughs. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
For a long time Germany and the Netherlands have followed a quite similar pat- 
tern of economic development, with Germany with a slightly better perfor- 
mance. In the 70s both economies saw deteriorating economic results, but while 
the German economy remained relatively strong, the Dutch economy showed all 
signs of an economic crisis. This situation forced all Dutch actors in the early 80s 
to rethink their position and in the end to accept solutions that for a long time 
were unacceptable. This mixture, of drastic measures, of political courage to 
enforce them, of a sufficient social responsibility from the side of social partners 
to support these policies and of the willingness of the people to accept them for a 
rather long time, has turned the Dutch economy from a 'disease' into a 'miracle'. 
Especially the labour market performance has been outstanding. 
At the same time the German economy has lost more and more of its brilliance. 
Gradually the economic problems increased. Economic growth slowed down, 
the unemployment rate increased again and again. That was already the case in 
the 80s. The situation became more dramatic with the reunification. The 
German economy was not able to meet this new, unexpected and huge chal- 
lenge. The economic development worsened, and in recent years Germany 
showed up very low in the economic ranking among EU-countries. Old recipes 
did not work anymore, necessary changes could not be realised and the confi- 
dence of all actors was remarkably low. While the Netherlands under such cir- 
cumstances was able in 1983 to change its economic policies, it seems that the 
Germans are not able yet to do the same. The broad strategy is still failing, politi- 
cal parties are reluctant, social partners are unwilling, and also the population 
gives the impression that they have already done their part of the deal. It seems 
that there is no clarity about the question, what the main problems, develop- 
ments, challenges and solutions are, and strongly connected about the future of 
the German Soziale Marktwirtschaft. This indefiniteness, in combination with 
the huge problems, has created an atmosphere of distrust, which makes it even 
more difficult to arrive at a convincing and acceptable strategy. There is still a lot 
to do to revive the German economy. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
During the last fifteen years net labour participation (in persons) in the 
Netherlands witnessed a remarkable growth from an European low of 52 percent 
in 1985 to 65 percent in 2000, which is about European average. This labour par- 
ticipation growth can be regarded as a major indicator and consequence of the 
remarkable recovery from the 'Dutch disease' in the early eighties to what is now 
sometimes called the 'Dutch cure' or the 'Dutch miracle' (see e.g. Visser and 
Hemerijck 1997; Hazeu 1998; Schettkat and Reijnders 1999). The good perfor- 
mance of the Dutch economy in the last decades has raised the interest of the 
international economic profession in the so-called 'Polder model' which, for a 
large part, is held responsible for the recent economic success in the Netherlands. 
For a proper understanding of these developments in the Dutch economy during 
the last fifteen years it should be noted that the Dutch disease was not so much a 
consequence of poverty as of richness. The bonanza of natural gas, combined 
with oil price shocks, induced an appreciation of the Dutch guilder, which wors- 
ened the competitive position of the Netherlands and led to a relaxation of the 
budgetary discipline. Social security provisions were rather generous and were 
not combined with active labour market policies, so that social security expendi- 
tures rose considerably and net labour participation even decreased in the early 
eighties (see also Hartog and Theeuwes 1993; Kapteyn and De Vos 1999). 
Partly inspired by reports of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR 
1987, lggo), which underline the need for higher labour participation, a funda- 
mental reversal of budgetary and labour market policy took place during the 
period of government of Prime Minister Lubbers (1982-1994). Finally this most 
prominent policy goal of the last decade was most explicitly reflected in the 
theme of the First Cabinet (1994-1998) of Prime Minister Kok: "work, work, 
work". 
Amongst both Dutch and international analysts there is no unanimity about the 
principal blessings of the Polder model. It is, however, evident that part of its 
success has to do with the institutions of the Dutch labour market. In general 
five reasons can be mentioned which may explain this success. A first and very 
broad reason is that 'the platform for discussion and negotiation between the 
social partners in order to come to positive agreements which are beneficial to 
common interest" acts as the basis for successful policy. It is obvious that this 
mechanism to come to a consensus plays a most prominent role in the success of 
the Dutch Polder model. Policy measures which technocrats believe to be benefi- 
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cia1 to society, but which have no broad public support, will never be very effec- 
tive in the Netherlands. 
Very much in line with this broad characteristic of the Dutch Polder model is the 
second reason for its policy success, namely the institutionalised framework for 
negotiations between the social parmers in the 'Foundation of Labour' and the 
'Social Economic Council'. These institutionalised policy discussions generate 
trust amongst the social partners and lead to the formulation of policy proposals 
which seem useful in the eyes of all concerned, so that it enhances the effective- 
ness of the policy conducted in  line with these proposals. 
The third and probably most prominent reason for the success is the sustained 
policy of wage restraint in the Netherlands. The basis for this policy was the so- 
called Agreement of Wassenaar in 1982 and the following string of collective 
agreements between the social parmers which have never been in discord with 
the Wassenaar Agreement. Monetary policy has been a major condition to con- 
tribute to the success of the policy of wage restraint. As a matter of fact the long- 
term policy of fixing the value of the Dutch guilder to that of the German mark, 
has had the effect that the relative decrease of labour costs in the Netherlands 
due to the policy of wage restraint, has not been sterilised by a nominal apprecia- 
tion of the guilder. So the result was that the Dutch guilder depreciated in real 
terms which was very beneficial to the competitive position, and hence to eco- 
nomic activity and employment. Figure 3.1 shows the hypothetical appreciation 
of the guilder vis-a-vis the German mark in the period 1983-1998, in case the 
guilder would not have been fixed to the German mark. 
Figure 3.1 Hypothetical appreciation of the Dutch guilder vis-a-vis the German Mark, 
given the relative wage or price inflation 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators 
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The fourth reason for the success relates to the role and preferences of the trade 
unions. As social welfare and employment are major policy goals, the trade 
unions in the Netherlands have not much used their bargaining power for nego- 
tiating wage increases when specific investments by employers resulted in 
enhanced productivity. In this way the hold-up problem was avoided so that 
employers did not underinvest and negative externalities at the macro level from 
higher wage demands at the local level were avoided. 
The fifth and last reason for success is the institutional reform of social security 
conducted in the last decade. The system of passive and rather generous social 
security provisions became, - at least for a part - more activating, so that the neg- 
ative spiralling mechanism with respect to the wedge between gross weight cost 
and net earned wages could be turned into a positive spiral, where total expendi- 
ture on social security relative to national income decreased and the wedge 
became smaller (see also Den Butter and Kock 2001). 
The question now arises whether the policy for the next decade should be direct- 
ed towards a further growth of labour participation, and if so, what policy mea- 
sures for further institutional reform should be in order? This paper aims to 
answer these questions. 
The contents of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 provides two arguments why 
a further growth of labour participation should be desirable from the perspective 
of social welfare. However, in the public debate questions have been raised 
whether a further growth of labour participation is possible still and whether 
negative effects on welfare, such as enhanced traffic congestion, lack of time for 
unpaid care for children and the elderly, lack of education, and insufficient pro- 
ductivity of parts of the population will cause negative welfare effects that 
exceed positive welfare effects. In order to investigate these arguments we first, 
in section 3.3, give an impression of the role of labour in future life and of its 
characteristics. In order to quantify possible future restrictions we introduce in 
section 3.4 a scenario for further participation growth up to 2020 (WRR 2000). 
Section 3.5 discusses which restrictions may be encountered when the scenario 
is pursued, and what policy options may alleviate the restrictions. Section 3.6 
pays special attention to the necessary reform of social security provisions for 
illness and disability, which seem to be the largest impediments for the scenario 
to be fulfilled. Finally some conclusions are drawn in section 3.7. 
3.2 WHY I S  FURTHER PARTICIPATION GROWTH DESIRABLE? 
In the academic debate and amongst policy makers there is a broad consensus 
that from the macro perspective a further growth of labour participation is desir- 
able in order to enhance social welfare. This consensus is based on two argu- 
ments. The first argument concerns the basis of public revenues. The more peo- 
ple of working age are active labour participants, the larger is the basis for taxa- 
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tion and payment of social security premiums from which public expenditures, 
amongst which social security expenditure, can be paid. The greying of the 
Dutch population, and most specifically the demographic imbalances due to the 
high birth rates just after the Second World War (the baby boom), constitutes a 
major reason why having a good basis for public revenues will even gain impor- 
tance in the near future (see also WRR 1999). Moreover, this argument includes a 
kind of 'double dividend': active participants will not rely on social security pro- 
visions. 
The second argument relates to the external effects of labour participation. 
Besides income, work also generates social cohesion. When people have a paid 
job, it will stimulate them to coordinate their work with others including the 
giving and taking that goes along with it. In this way active labour participation 
yields positive external effects, whereas non-participation may have negative 
effects. Moreover, active labour participation enhances reciprocity in human 
behaviour at the social level. In spite of the secular increase in labour productivi- 
ty, it remains utterly important to preserve the values and norms connected with 
labour participation that have been passed over from generation to generation. 
As a matter of fact no society can afford to have two conflicting systems of val- 
ues: the system of values of those who earn the livings by hard work on the one 
hand, and the values of those who live like a leisure class during their working 
age on the other. Today there is no longer a closed wall between these two value 
systems so that the inclination to participate in paid labour and, by doing so, 
contribute to the provision of social security and other collective provisions, will 
always be undermined by such coexistence of conflicting value systems. 
These two arguments in favour of a further growth of labour participation stem 
from the macro perspective, but may be somewhat at variance with the micro 
perspective where time spent in paid work is regarded as a disutility in the indi- 
vidual welfare function as compared to leisure time. The individual valuation of 
paid work, apart from the fact that it generates an income, may, however, heavily 
depend on the type of work and may change over time. Therefore, in the next 
section, we discuss how the character of work and the way it is appreciated as a 
part of life may develop in the near future. 
3.3 FUTURE LABOUR DYNAMICS 
During the 2oth Century the Dutch economy, as most Western economies, wit- 
nessed a rapid change. After a long period of orientation on the agricultural sec- 
tor and the transition to an industrial economy, we have now come to an econo- 
my where services play a prominent role. Technological development followed 
the same path: from mechanisation through automation to the present era of 
robots and information. Obviously these developments have huge consequences 
for the way in which labour and labour organisations are shaped and for the 
functioning of people in these organisations. On the one hand mechanisation, 
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automation and new information technologies induce firms to concentrate on 
their basic activities with a core of personnel on fixed contracts. As a result the 
optimal firm size reduced. Firms became flatter, meaner and smaller. On the 
other hand, there is a tendency to enhance strategic cooperation between organi- 
sations by connecting them in networks and alliances. Modern communication 
technology stimulates these processes. I t  caused a fundamental change in the 
way labour is organised, and brought about spatial dispersion of organisations 
and flexible time management. To summarise, organisations are characterised 
more and more by dynamic processes, structural change and the strife for greater 
flexibility. Because firms also try to prevent large and expensive stocks, the fac- 
tor time has gained importance as well. 
A further change in the character of labour is that the amount of physical work 
has decreased and that skilled work increased (see e.g. Machin and Van Reenen 
1998, on skill biased technical progress). The ICT component of work plays a 
major role in this trend. In production much routine work is nowadays per- 
formed by the computer and even in seemingly simple jobs today workers are 
often confronted with new and unforeseen situations which require a quick and 
proper response. The computer is used for the standard cases, and what remains 
are the hard and difficult cases which require discretionary decisions. For many 
workers it will mean a challenge and progress - less disutility from work in the 
individual welfare function - but it also implies that in the course of time a job 
which in name is the same, requires much higher skills and is much more diffi- 
cult to perform. Functions which still demand highly practical skills, nowadays 
have also a higher cognitive component. For instance, automation of industrial 
processes implies that the operator is not so much handling a machine, but 
should be able to repair the machine when it breaks down. A further develop- 
ment, which is related to the previous one, is that in many professions the focus 
has moved from practical skills to the social skills of communication. This holds 
especially true in those jobs which involve frequent contacts with others, like 
clients, patients or pupils, who are nowadays much better informed than before 
and have a ready tongue. Good communication skills are also required for a prop- 
er co-ordination of the work with colleagues and contacts in co-operating. As 
much human knowledge of routines has been codified in computer software, its 
character has been changed from rival to non-rival. This implies that in the 
future knowledge that cannot be codified, i.e. implicit or tacit knowledge, will 
gain importance. 
In the future labour participation and individual careers will be influenced by 
labour market dynamics even more than now. Increased demand for skilled 
labour and informatisation of the economy contribute to the fact that the life 
expectation of a job with the same characteristics will shorten. Changes in the 
contents of a job are an important aspect of labour market dynamics. But labour 
market dynamics also leads to job creation, job destruction and to job to job 
mobility. Due to these dynamics individual professional careers will show less 
and less standard patterns. More transitions will occur to various labour market 
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states, e.g. schooling for another job, a sabbatical for reorientation, or temporary 
non-participation for other reasons. 
These dynamics in the labour market are linked to the dynamics in economy. 
Economies are constantly changing over time, due to shifts of preferences, new 
products that replace old products and due to new production technologies 
which replace old ones. Globalisation of the economy leads opens up new mar- 
kets and, as a consequence, to enhancement of economic activity. On the other 
hand, at traditional markets product demand will decrease, resulting in a fall in 
economic activity. Sometimes existing firms will be sufficiently alert to move 
their activities from the old to the new markets, in other cases starting firms will 
be the first to discover and exploit challenges of new markets whereas existing 
firms are too slow and too late in their reaction to the changing context. This is 
what drives the processes of job creation and job destruction: structural change 
makes that at the same time some firms have to downsize their activities, other 
firms will expand and still other firms are able to keep their activities at the same 
level due to continuous processes of restructuring and reorientation (see e.g. 
Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh 1996). 
In this respect we mention two trends that, in a discussion on labour participa- 
tion, are relevant from the perspective of labour market dynamics. First, in a 
knowledge society existing knowledge becomes obsolete much sooner than 
before, resulting in a faster depreciation of investments in human capital. Thus it 
is no longer most efficient that people acquire all general knowledge and the bulk 
of their professional knowledge in a period of schooling before the actual profes- 
sional career starts. Instead it is preferable that a working career be interrupted 
from time to time for periods of schooling (see also Snower 1999). I t  also means 
that those who decide to interrupt their labour market participation for some 
time, e.g. for taking care of the children or other members of the family, should 
pay more attention than before to the maintenance of their skills and the acquisi- 
tion of new skills when they wish to continue their career after the period of 
non-participation. 
The second trend concerns the so-called implicit contract that exists in the 
labour relation between employer and employee, namely that at the start of the 
career wages are below productivity, which is compensated at later age when 
wages often are higher than productivity. A future with enhanced labour market 
dynamics implies that workers change jobs more often. It marks the end of life- 
time employment, so that the implicit contract is no longer tenable in its present 
form. When in the time profile of wages the wage differentials between the 
young and the elderly do not change, it will become very costly for the employ- 
ers to start or even to continue labour relationships with elderly workers. 
Probably this constitutes a major cause for the low labour participation at this 
moment in the Netherlands for the age group between 55 and 65: in this category 
one out of three (still) has a job. Moreover, this low labour participation was 
enabled by the institutional arrangements with respect to. early retirement, 
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which were both beneficial to workers and employers since part of the expenses 
was passed of to collective burdens. Insight in the working of this mechanism is 
of importance for the design of policy measures that aim at enhancing labour 
participation of the elderly. As we will see in the next section, a further growth 
of labour participation in the future means that people in the 55-65-age category 
should stay longer on the labour market than at present. 
It is clear that the extent of labour market dynamics has an essential influence on 
the way in which (potential) labour supply will participate in paid work. On the 
one hand one can think of a labour market with very little dynamics. Such a situ- 
ation can, for instance, be characterised by high firing and hiring costs so that job 
duration is long and for that reason little frictional unemployment occurs. From 
a quantitative perspective labour participation may in that case be high, but 
potential productive capacity is not fully utilised. A main characteristic of such a 
labour market is the existence of unproductive labour relationships that continue 
to exist too long. Such a situation also leaves little room for the diffusion of new 
knowledge and for creative destruction of existing knowledge, which would 
enhance labour productivity. 
On the other hand one can imagine a labour market with a lot of dynamics. In 
that case we have high frictional unemployment with considerable search costs 
and low job duration. In this labour market there is a risk that the specific invest- 
ments in labour relationships will not become productive and that, in order to 
make these investments productive after all, employers will require a too high 
productivity from their workers. This leads to non-participation of those who 
are unable to comply with these high productivity demands. 
These two extreme situations illustrate the complicated relationship between 
labour market dynamics and participation. This means that for a proper utilisa- 
tion of the potential labour supply the golden mean has to be struck between a 
labour market that has too much and one that has too little dynamics. However, 
the position of that golden mean is not very well known, and depends on the 
institutional environment, on  the social preferences which are constantly subject 
to change, and on the new information and communication technologies which 
allows a larger flexibility with respect to place and time in the activities of work. 
Obviously one cannot just speak of too much or too low labour market dynam- 
ics, but somewhere an equilibrium has to be found for the extent to which old 
jobs disappear and new jobs are created, for the choice between working and 
learning, and for a choice between acquiring general knowledge and job-specific 
knowledge. 
These views on labour market dynamics are also of importance when judging the 
effectiveness of policy measures (see e.g. Blanchard and Diamond 1992, and 
Pissarides 2000, for modelling of labour market dynamics). When individuals 
choose between participation and non-participation, or when they consider a 
temporary break of their career for schooling so as to enable transition to another 
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job, expectations play an important role. These expectations relate, amongst 
others, to aspects of the future career, such as the probability of lay-off, or the 
probability of obtaining a better job in the future. These factors are related to 
labour market dynamics and are, besides wages, important determinants for the 
individual choice behaviour at the labour market. Policy, and also the judgement 
of the effectiveness of policy measures, has to reckon with these factors, espe- 
cially now that the quality of labour obtains a larger weight in the decision to 
participate. For instance, the design of social security provisions should take into 
account the fact that good career prospects have a positive influence on a deci- 
sion to participate. This can be called the irrigation function of social security. 
Good career prospects lead to a reduction of the reservation wage so that the 
choice between participation and non-participation will, given the wage offer, 
sooner be in favour of participation. 
More in general it appears that preferences change with respect to labour flexibil- 
ity and labour contracts. Because the character of work is due to  gradual change, 
the social function of work is also subject to change. Some recent opinion polls 
indicate for instance that the wage level obtains a smaller weight as compared to 
other conditions of the labour contract. This argument also plays a role in recent 
proposals in the Netherlands to make it more attractive to work in the public sec- 
tor. They indicate that in highly developed welfare states, work enables many 
people to develop both themselves and their knowledge base in  line with per- 
sonal interests. In many cases work isn't just a source of income, but it is also a 
factor that gives sense to life. The extent to which this qualitative aspect of 
labour is valued, will of course vary for different individuals; i t  depends on indi- 
vidual characteristics but also on the type of work people do and the sector of the 
labour market they are working in. From an analytical perspective it  is relevant to 
observe that the individual labour supply is determined by three factors: the 
wage (material and immaterial), quality of labour and sacrificed leisure time. 
Therefore, a structural increase in the quality of labour has a positive effect on 
preferences for labour participation, so that the enhanced preferences for the 
quality of labour at the micro level are in line with the social preferences for high 
labour participation at the macro level. Certainly this will not fully alleviate the 
fallacy of composition between individual and social preferences, as some ten- 
sion will remain between the public arguments to enhance labour participation 
and individual preferences or possibilities to participate. Obviously, in the future 
work cannot completely become a hobby and will not  always and for everyone 
provide sense to life. Work requires efforts and brings about pressures too, so 
that, especially in some parts of the labour market, the utility attributed to 
leisure will always be larger than the utility ofwork. So, the tensions between 
the ideals and practice of work will certainly remain i n  the future. 
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3.4 A SCENARIO FOR FURTHER PARTICIPATION GROWTH UP TO 2020 
In order to investigate the seriousness of the restrictions that will be encountered 
when the participation rate in the Netherlands increases further - restrictions 
which are sometimes put forward in the public debate as arguments against a 
further growth of labour participation -, we constructed a scenario which shows 
conditions for and consequences of an increase in net participation from 65 per- 
cent in 2000 to 75 percent in the year 2020 (WRR 2000). This scenario, which we 
labelled 'the further participation growth scenario', implies that in twenty years 
a situation of 'near full labour participation', as we called it, will be reached. In 
essence this scenario is a technical exercise in order to analyse the possibilities of 
a further growth of labour participation quantitatively. It is based on an update of 
trend extrapolations in labour supply made by the Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis and the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics in 1997 (see 
CPB/CBS 1997). We emphasise that this further participation growth scenario 
should not be regarded as a forecast nor as a policy goal. I t  is a scenario that indi- 
cates which participation growth is possible when a favourable economic growth 
continues. I t  is used as a frame of reference for possible restrictions and obsta- 
cles, and to foresee the policy options which are needed to relieve these restric- 
tions and facilitate the further growth of labour participation. 
The further growth scenario shows that in the years to come the trend of 
increased female labour participation will have to continue. In figure 2 the 
realised increase in female labour participation in various age classes in the past 
is confronted with the necessary future increases according to the further 
growth scenario. The figure illustrates that such continued female participation 
growth is by no means self-evident, since future growth should come from other 
age classes than in the past. In the past female labour participation mainly grew 
because of the additional participation of young women; in order to realise the 
further growth scenario, however, it will be mainly older women who will have 
to participate additionally. In terms of labour market dynamics this implies that 
women, much more than in the past, will have to remain active in the labour 
market also at higher age. It also means that women should aim at only a short 
interruption in their professional career in case they give birth to children. 
The need for continued labour participation at an older age is even much stronger 
for men. In contrast to women a trend reversal is essential when the male partici- 
pation rate is to comply with the rate in the further growth scenario. This is 
illustrated in figure 3. As a matter of fact men did not contribute at all to the 
increase in labour participation in the past twenty years in the Netherlands. 
There was a small increase in the participation rate of younger men, but that 
effect has completely been undone by the considerable decrease in participation 
of older men. The main policy for the future task lies with men between 55 and 
65 years of age. The baby boom generation should continue to participate. Fiscal 
stimuli and institutional reform of the pension system should contribute to this 
trend reversal (Hazeu 1999). 
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Besides policy options to keep women and baby boomers working there is also 
another group, namely the unskilled people, amongst which many (descendants 
of) immigrants, that requires specific policy attention. Now that demand is 
booming in other parts of the labour market, the labour participation of this 
group is also rising, although it  is relatively low still. 




- Sources: CBS-Statline and CPB 
Figure 3.2b Increase in female labour participation according to the further 
participation growth scenario (2020 compared to 2000) 
-- 
Sources: Own calculations (see WRR 2000) on the basis of CBS/CPB (1997) 
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Figure 3.3a Increase in male labour participation (1999 compared to 1981) 
.20J 
age category 
Sources: CBS-Statline and CPB 
Figure 3.3b Increase in male labour participation according to the further participation 
growth scenario (2020 compared to 2000) 
Sources: Own calculations (see WRR 2000) on the basis of CBS/CPB (1997) 
3.5 RESTRICTIONS TO FURTHER PARTICIPATION GROWTH AND 
POLICY OPTIONS TO ALLEVIATE THESE RESTRICTIONS 
This section summarises our analysis of possible restrictions that may hinder the 
realisation of the further growth participation scenario. It furthermore gives sug- 
gestions for policy options that may alleviate or even avoid these restrictions. 
Before doing so, however, a more fundamental question should be answered, 
namely what exactly is meant with restrictions in this analysis and why such 
restrictions may occur. In other words, the question is what kinds of market fail- 
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ures result from the malfunctioning of markets and thus provide a reason for 
policy intervention. Apparently, if the economic allocation mechanisms func- 
tioned well, there should be no reason why, in the long run, restrictions occur 
that will not be automatically removed by these equilibrating allocation mecha- 
nisms. In that case, in the end demand and supply will match both qualitatively 
and quantitatively, so that discrepancies will disappear in the long run. It is 
therefore noticeable that calculating the size of (possible) discrepancies and mar- 
ket failures by computing the differences between trend extrapolations of supply 
and demand - as is sometimes done - proves to be too pessimistic since it does 
not reckon with equilibrating mechanisms and changes in behaviour in reaction 
to these mismatches between demand and supply. 
Equilibrating mechanisms may, however, have the effect that participation 
growth will proceed at a lower rate than according to our further growth scenario 
for 2020, just because participation reacts on the restrictions revealed by our 
analysis. As a matter of fact this argument gives a specific interpretation to what 
we call a restriction, namely that because of adaptation to the restriction a lower 
participation equilibrium is reached than is considered desirable from the macro 
perspective of social welfare. Besides this specific interpretation of restriction as 
a situation where the economy reaches too low an equilibrium, one can think of 
other reasons why under the assumption of rational behaviour restrictions are 
not automatically resolved by the working of equilibrating mechanisms in the 
economy. These are the proper forms of market failure that require policy inter- 
vention in the economy. In our analysis of possible restrictions in the further 
participation growth scenario the following three forms of market failure come 
to the fore: 
- negative externalities, 
- incomplete information and bounded rationality, 
- rigidities. 
Negative externalities occur when individual activities are harmful and reduce 
the welfare of others. Policy intervention should correct these external effects. In 
order to do so, the government should have formulated preferences at the macro 
level, e.g. with respect to enhanced labour participation, which are democratical- 
ly legitimated, but which will differ from the aggregate of individual preferences. 
In this case social preferences may partly be in conflict with individual prefer- 
ences and policy intervention should be cast in such a way that it causes the least 
possible disturbance of economic allocation so that at least second best solutions 
are chosen. 
Incomplete information and bounded rationality may be due to high information 
costs. It implies that at the micro level wrong individual decisions are taken. In 
general such misallocation can be solved by lowering the information costs, e.g. 
when the government facilitates the work of labour offices, but also by the irriga- 
tion function of social security so that transition from a less productive to a more 
productive job can take place without large and expensive frictions. 
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In case of rigidities the return to the existing equilibrium or the transition to a 
new equilibrium after an unexpected shock will take too long from the perspec- 
tive of social welfare. However, policy intervention will not be very effective and 
too expensive when adaptation costs are high. On the other hand, an institution- 
al change may be beneficial when such change is not very costly and when it can 
speed up adjustment. 
This taxonomy of restrictions indicates that for policy analysis it is important to 
have insight in the underlying courses of the restrictions. That is because the pol- 
icy measures to alleviate the restrictions or even prevent them to occur, should 
be directed at these underlying courses. 
Congestion and mobility 
Traffic congestion due to increased mobility constitutes the first concern in the 
public debate on the question whether a further growth of labour participation is 
realistic. A study by Rietveld c.s. (2000) that takes our scenario as a basis, shows 
that mobility and more specifically mobility of road traffic, will indeed increase 
in future. However, to a large extent this increase has a structural character and it 
is the result of enhanced welfare and the growing population. Of course, the rela- 
tively fast growth of labour participation according to our scenario will con- 
tribute to this increase in mobility and more so to traffic congestion during rush 
hours. At this moment not more than 4 percent of the working population is 
structurally confronted with traffic jams during rush hours. Given road capacity, 
road congestion more than proportionally increases with mobility, namely with 
an elasticity of 2.2. The consequence is that further growth of labour participa- 
tion will more than proportionally contribute to the problem of road congestion. 
It has been calculated that our further growth scenario will enhance the times 
spent in cars by drivers with an average of 2 percent, which is four hours per per- 
son per year. Yet, as a matter of fact, the additional contribution of enhanced 
labour participation to road congestion is rather small as compared to the other 
causes of increases in road congestion. Moreover, the calculations show that this 
additional increase in congestion does not constitute a big impediment for possi- 
ble future participants to refrain from participation. The second order effect is 
very small. From the perspective of market failure the congestion can be consid- 
ered a negative externality of mobility. The main policy options to internalise 
these externalities are: (some) growth of capacity, road pricing, a strict policy 
with respect to car parking in urban areas, and incentives for employers to 
restrict the mobility of their personnel. 
Informal care 
Secondly there has been some public debate whether further growth of labour 
participation will leave sufficient time for informal care for children and elderly 
relatives. Yet, our quantitative analysis, which is partly based on survey data 
measuring time use of individuals, indicates that an increase in labour participa- 
tion will, in principle, not lead to time restrictions for informal care. Time avail- 
able for informal care is on average likely to increase rather than to decrease 
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because the reduction of contractual working time did, in the past, exceed the 
increases in average working time of individuals due to  enhanced labour partici- 
pation. The lack of time which is often associated with modern times, seems to 
be caused by the increased spending possibilities that the higher level of welfare 
has brought about, rather than by an actual absolute lack of leisure time due to 
long working hours. Obviously increased wealth creates additional leisure time, 
but it consumes even more. In modern lifestyle a lot of time consuming activities 
are planned. This gives the impression of a lack of time. 
The increased labour participation still may cause some problems with respect to 
supervision of children. Because of the higher welfare and productivity increases 
in household production, time spend at home decreases. Yet professional child 
care and arrangements for temporarily leave can provide the possibilities to facil- 
itate a combination of labour and care. Partly this combining of labour and care is 
a matter of private concern, but i t  is also partly in the public interest as a high 
rate of labour participation brings about positive externalities. That is why the 
government should, by institutional arrangements and by subsidies, facilitate 
provisions for care and education of children. 
The informal care for the elderly may become a more serious problem in the next 
decades. However, this hardly can be regarded as a direct consequence of a fur- 
ther increase in labour participation. It is especially the greying of the population 
that will cause this problem. Here we have a possible restriction for further 
labour participation, which will, by the way, become most serious after 2020, 
when the baby boomers with little children reach the (very) old age on which 
their demand for care will rise. This lack of supply of informal care for the elderly 
will probably lead to a shift from the informal to the formal sector. As far as the 
elderly become wealthier in the future, they will have more own means to pay for 
this substitute of informal care. However, also more political pressure may be 
expected that part of this care for the elderly will be paid out of the public budget. 
Schooling and productivity 
Mismatches in schooling and insufficient productive capacity of large groups at 
the lower end of the labour market are other reasons why in the public debate 
doubts are shed on the possibilities for a further increase of labour participation. 
With respect to the mismatch in schooling the major reasons for market failure 
are the long adjustment lags, in combination with a lack of flexibility in some 
sectors of the labour market. Yet there is no much scope for direct government 
intervention in this case. Indirectly the government may support institutional 
reform that makes relevant sectors of the labour market more flexible so that the 
working of the equilibrating mechanisms is improved. This will lead to more 
wage differentiation. However, this wage differentiation does not necessarily 
imply that inequality increases, because the consequent growth of labour partici- 
pation will have the effect that a substantial amount of non-participants with no 
income now, become participants with an income in the near future. So the net 
effect on income inequality may even be favourable. 
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In our scenario analysis the major obstacle for a further increase in labour partici- 
pation appears to be the high and increasing number of people that take part in 
the social security provisions for illness and disability. This analysis and the 
implications for institutional reform of this part of the social security system is 
subject of the next section. 
3.6 INSTITUTIONAL REFORM FOR ILLNESS AND DISABILITY 
PROVISIONS 
A further participation growth in the Netherlands in the next twenty years 
requires urgent policy efforts with respect to the social security arrangements for 
sickness and disability. This is evident from the scenario analysis of a further 
growth of labour participation. Such an increase is desirable to be able to main- 
tain the support base for various collective financial arrangements such as the 
collective old age provision system. 
The problem is not a new one (see e.g. Aarts and De Jong 1992). Since years a 
remarkable part of the labour force that falls ill in the Netherlands, has ended up 
in the disability scheme. The WRR analysis provides four arguments why the 
sickness and disability problem will even become worse if policy reform stays 
out. 
The first argument is the ageing of the labour force that is to come. The participa- 
tion growth in the recent past has mainly resulted from the influx of young and 
healthy people. In the next decades, however, further participation growth 
should come from elderly who stay in employment for a longer period. This is 
shown in figures 3.1 and 3.2. 
In the second place labour participation is selective on health conditions. This 
does not mean that a paid job makes employees more healthy; the causality 
between labour participation and health status is rather complicated (e.g. 
Kerkhofs et al. 2000). If, however, labour participation will have to increase, the 
additional number of participants should come from the potential of people that 
have a larger statistical chance on sickness and disability. 
A third argument is that the character of (much) work is slowly changing. The 
information technology and the use of computers will further reduce the share 
of simple jobs (implying repetitive actions, aimed at a beforehand prescribed out- 
put). More and more work will consist of handling the 'difficult cases'. On the 
one hand this is challenging and can thus contribute to the meaning of life. O n  
the other hand, this may enhance tensions and stress in work. Furthermore, in a 
lot of occupations and professions employers more and more have to deal with 
customers, pupils, and patients that nowadays have a ready tongue. 
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The fourth argument has to do with the regime and culture of the social arrange- 
ments for sickness and disability in the Netherlands. At the moment we have 
about 7 mln. working people and almost 1 mln. that is fully or partly in the dis- 
ability scheme, i.e. one out of eight (Hazeu 2000). Of the disabled one out of 
three is disabled due to a psychological reason, varying from work tensions, 
insufficient appraisal, dissension with the management or the wider working 
environment or a career that has ended in a deadlock, to problems at home. 
Furthermore, due to the way the social security rules function work-related 
problems get an early medical stamp. Taking into account the way the nature of 
work has been changing, this problem will continue to grow if a 'cultural rever- 
sal' cannot be achieved. Although the nineties have shown some sharpening of 
the rules for sickness absence and disability, the sickness and disability arrange- 
ments still have a relatively low threshold and provide insufficient incentives. 
The future perspective of the further growth scenario shows that the social secu- 
rity arrangements relating to sickness absence and disability require a drastic 
reform. Due to the intensified importance of knowledge and skills in society and 
the labour market the life expectation of a clearly defined job will shorten. The 
dynamics of the labour market and the necessary anticipation on changes in one's 
career require that people display a greater flexibility and resilience. The relative- 
ly easy entrance into the (psychological) disability schemes (after one year of 
sickness) is an obstruction in this respect. 
The above argumentation results in a number of policy suggestions (WRR 2000: 
274-278; Hazeu 2000: 217-219). 
First of all, solutions for the sickness and disability problem should be focused 
on prevention of sickness absence, by having more attention for labour and 
organisation conditions. In terms of policy response it is vital to focus on direct 
intervention in the preliminary stages of sickness absence. And once people have 
reported sick, they should be reintegrated as soon as possible. This means that 
the Sickness Benefits Act should be reformed into a 'Reintegration Act'. The dis- 
ability scheme (WAO) should become a last resort rather than something in 
which people end up after a 'semi-automatic' process of a year under the Sickness 
Benefit Act. 
A faster reintegration can be enhanced if the sickness benefit period is made 
dependent of a compulsory track of reintegration. Part of the functioning of such 
a track is that both employer and employee have sufficient financial incentives to 
stimulate recovery and (in some cases) replacement of the sick employee as soon 
as possible. If the employer cannot himself provide the employee with another 
job, he should have an incentive to find him a job elsewhere. The employee, in 
his turn, can claim this right on mediation. Such a reintegration track should take 
three years at the most and be at the expense of the employer (i.e. not of national 
or industrial social security funds). For the employee the financial incentive 
should be that the reintegration benefit he receives during the period of sickness, 
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is susceptibly lower than his normal wage. As a contrast: in the present situation 
in the Netherlands almost all sick employees get a 30 per cent supplement from 
their employer above the legal 70 per cent sickness pay, so there is no effective 
financial incentive. 
The second policy suggestion is that the examination practices for sickness and 
disability should become sharper and more objective. Although we have national 
laws and rules for this, traditions of sickness absence attendance and examina- 
tion practice differ per sector. This should be brought to national standards and 
practices.. 
A third point is that the inflow in the disability scheme shows interesting differ- 
ences for gender and branch of industry. Women have a disability incidence that 
is 50 percent higher than that of men. To be more specific: the disability inci- 
dence of women under 40 is twice as high of that of man under 40; as people are 
older this difference becomes smaller. This gender difference partly has to do 
with the fact that many women are employed in sectors like health care and edu- 
cation, which show an above average influx in the disability scheme. This also 
points out an 'institutional factor': in these sectors the costs of the disability 
scheme is budgeted and claimed on the (funding) government. Our policy sug- 
gestion is that in these para-statal sectors too a financial incentive should be 
introduced, to control the amount of sickness and disability claims. 
The most recent development in the Netherlands is, that as the number of dis- 
ability claimants kept on growing, government installed a national advisory 
committee - a typical Dutch solution - to make an analysis and come with policy 
suggestions. This committee reported to the government to make a rigorous dis- 
tinction between fully disabled and partly disabled (Adviescommissie 
Arbeidsongeschiktheid 2001). The first group should keep its disability 
allowance and should not be re-examined any more. For the second group the 
committee advised for a strict reintegration scheme, with duties and sanctions 
for both employers and employees to cooperate. On this advice of the committee 
government asked for advice of the social partners. But clearly the committee 
had a juridical and categoral bias in its view of the problem, so that the advise at 
least can be criticised because it did not recommend to strengthen financial 
incentives. On the contrary; it neglected the possibility to introduce more incen- 
tives for employees in the sickness fase (the preliminary stage of the disability 
scheme), and further the recommendations of the committee seem even to 
weaken the financial incentives in the disability scheme for employers. 
CONCLUSIONS: INSTITUTIONAL REFORM I N  THE DUTCH POLDER 
MODEL 
The so-called 'polder model' as it has grown in the Netherlands, will not auto- 
matically solve all economic and social problems. It would be an illusion to think 
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that the model is just sanctifying. Labour participation certainly has grown sub- 
stantially since the middle of the eighties, from a European low of 52 percent to 
the European average of 65 in 2000. The strong economic growth in this period 
has stimulated labour demand; the (late) emancipation of women on the labour 
market has been the main source of additional labour supply. The moderate 
development of wages since the 'Wassenaar agreement' of 1982 till the end of the 
nineties, and the policies to make the labour market more flexible, have been the 
most important policy contributions to the success of the 'Dutch cure' after the 
period of 'Dutch disease'. The need of a solid tax base in a greying society on the 
one hand and the contribution of labour participation to social cohesion on the 
other hand, give two strong arguments to continue policies for a further partici- 
pation growth in the near future. Our scenario analysis showed that, principally, 
it is possible to reduce the non-participation rate of the labour force from 35 per- 
cent in 2000 to 25 percent in 2020. Taking a closer look at the policy instruments 
this means that for a further participation growth a policy reorientation is need- 
ed. Sensible general macro-economic policies and continuous attention for better 
and flexible working labour markets cannot be missed, but most of all specific 
policies are needed for the groups that lag behind (elderly, lower educated, 
women) and policies for the specific potential restrictions that may hinder par- 
ticipation growth (traffic congestion, informal care, education and productivity, 
and sickness and disability). 
Of these four potential restrictions the largest obstacle for a further participation 
growth are the present arrangements with respect to illness and disability. 
Concerning the three groups the most urgent policy task is to keep the baby 
boom generation on the labour market. Off course it is clear that these two prob- 
lems are related. Although these problems are well known and public debate on 
them is growing, both in the Netherlands and all over Europe, the institutions of 
the 'polder model' did not lead to clear solutions yet. So, these central problems 
not only are the current proof of the problem solving qualities of our institu- 
tions, but probably will also lead to reform of our institutions themselves. 
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4.1 COUNTRIES WITH SUCCESSFUL EMPLOYMENT POLICY 
Following the profound labour market crisis in the 1990s Germany's employ- 
ment situation is improving only slowly. In contrast, the USA and some 
European countries such as Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland or the Netherlands 
have already been showing a strong upturn in employment for some time now.' 
Whereas the American way does not seem to be feasible for most of the 
European countries because of its negative consequences such as an immensely 
unequal distribution of incomes, the Netherlands have probably found a 
European answer. The labour market results are remarkable, it was obviously 
possible to avoid the downside of unrestricted competition capitalism. The 
reforms were made with the agreement of the social partners and were accepted 
by broad sections of the population. It is therefore worth taking a look across the 
borders and investigating what is behind this "employment miracle". 
The paper begins with the development and structure of unemployment and 
employment. This is then followed by a short account of the relationship 
between economic growth and employment and an overview of the reforms that 
have contributed to the success of the "Polder Model". Then the significance of 
the institutional framework for the upturn in employment in the Netherlands is 
discussed. Finally the paper attempts to draw a conclusion with regard to the 
institutional aspects of the reform approach and its transferability. 
Table 4.1 shows the development of economic growth, employment and the 
unemployment rate for the Netherlands, Germany and EU -15. Until into the first 
half of the 1990s the economic indicators for Germany were not poorer than 
those for the Netherlands. However, the Netherlands have always had a higher 
level of employment growth. A reverse development between the two countries 
did not begin until the early 1990s for unemployment and employment. 
Moreover the outlook for the Netherlands continues to be estimated as consider- 
ably better than for Germany, as the table shows. 
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Table 4.1 Economic growth, development of employment and unemployment rates 
Netherlands 
GPD growth 














* 2001-2003 estimates 
** Until 1991/92 Western Germany only 
Source: European Commission (2002): Spring forecast 
4.2 UNEMPLOYMENT 
6 2 
At the beginning of the 1980s the Netherlands had one of the highest unemploy- - 
ment rates of the European industrial nations. It was considerably higher than 
that of the Federal Republic of Germany (figure 4.1). Afterwards the Dutch rate 
dropped steadily until the early ~ggos, and after a brief increase in 1994 has been 
continuing its fall ever since. At the current rate ofbelow 3 percent, full employ- 
ment has almost been achieved. A rather low unemployment rate is forecast to 
continue. In contrast with this the German unemployment rate has been rising 
since ~ g g o  - also as a consequence of reunification - has overtaken the Dutch 
rate and last stood at about 8 percent (the whole of Germany from 1991). 
As regards the structure of unemployment it is still necessary to point out that 
the unemployment rates of Dutch women - as in most of the Eu countries - are 
higher than those of men. Although youth unemployment in the Netherlands 
fell with the general decline in unemployment, it is almost twice the level of 
average unemployment. In contrast - unlike in Germany - the unemployment 
rate of older workers has impro~ed.~ It must also be mentioned that the low- 
skilled and people belonging to ethnic minorities are affected by unemployment 
to a disproportionate extent. As here in Germany, it can also be observed in the 
Netherlands that with increasing duration the unemployment is concentrated on 
certain groups of people who can only be placed in employment again with diffi- 
culty. In spite of the labour market situation being better in the economy as a 
whole, the proportion of long-term unemployment in the stock (unemployed for 
a year or longer) among the overall figure has remained high at about 50 percent. 
DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS;  
THE EMPLOYMENT-POLICY SUCCESS O F  THE NETHERLANDS 
Figure 4.1 Unemployment rates in the Netherlands and in Germany* - 1982 
until 2000 as percentages 
from 1991 including Eastern Germany 
Source: EUROSTAT, labour force survey, various years; OECD, Quarterly Labour Force Statistics 1/zooz 
4.3 EMPLOYMENT 
Between 1983 and 1993 the Netherlands showed the highest employment growth 
in the Netherlands recorded exactly the same growth rate as the USA for this peri- 
Figure 4.2 Employment in the Netherlands and in Western Germany 1964 
until 2000 - index values (1970 = 100) 
Source: OECD, Labour Force Statistics, various years; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek; own estimates 
for western Germany 
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od. After a slight dip in 1993 (-0.1 %) the Netherlands have since once again 
achieved employment gains of more than 2 percent. The development of employ- 
ment for the Netherlands and (western) Germany can be seen in figure 4.2. 
With a 41 percent share of the labour force in 2000 the Netherlands show by far 
the highest rate of part-time work in the western world. Figure4.3 shows the 
part-time rates for the 15 EU states. Almost 70 percent of all working women and 
nearly a fifth of all men are in part-time employment. Since 1973 there has been 
an almost astronomical rise in the proportion of part-time work, increasing by 
more than 35 percentage points. This development was encouraged by the dyna- 
mic development in the services sector (with an employment share of 74%) and 
by the need to catch up as regards female employment. Analyses by the IAB have 
revealed that changes in the behaviour and preferences of the players on the 
labour market were even more decisive than changes concerning the structural 
composition of the labour force (e.g. by gender or sectors) for explaining the 
dynamics of part-time employment in the Netherlands.3 The example of the 
Netherlands shows that what matters in the promotion of part-time work is not 
so much special support from the state (however: exclusion of discrimination)4, 
but more a change in the attitude to part-time work on the part of everyone, 
employers, trade unions and society alike. 
Figure 4.3 Part-time rates in the EU states by gender, 2000, as percentages 
* Belgium: only employees 
Source: EUROSTAT: labour force survey 2000 -- 
It is also necessary to add that the part-time work is mainly performed voluntari- 
ly, in other words a full-time job is not being sought. In 2000 only 3.5 percent of 
all part-timers were working part-time involuntarily. This is the lowest percent- 
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age of all the EU countries.5 In the Netherlands it is not rare for well qualified 
workers, too, to work part-time. What is striking, however, is that the propor- 
tion of 'inargina1"part-time workers (fewer than lo hours per week) is particu- 
larly high at one quarter.6 These workers are therefore probably already safe- 
guarded elsewhere as regards subsistence or social insurance (via study/voca- 
tional training, through spouse or receipt of social benefits).' 
Against the background of the considerable increase in part-time employment it 
is interesting to examine the volume of work. After all it could be argued that the 
employment growth -which is usually counted by the number of persons - is 
based above all on the expansion of part-time work and less on the creation of 
more employment. Then the employment success of the Netherlands would 
have to be relativised considerably. Figure 4.4 shows, however, that also the vol- 
ume of work in the economy as a whole has increased constantly. 
Figure 4.4 Dependent employment in the Netherlands employees, full-time 
equivalents and volume of work - index values (1983 = 100) 
Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 
What is also revealing is a comparison of the labour force participation rates. The 
development of the Dutch male participation rates ran almost parallel to the 
German rate, having started out from a level that was about 4 percent lower 
(figure 4.5). However, the downwards trend in the Netherlands stopped in the 
~ggos,  in fact it even reversed, with the result that in the meantime the 
Netherlands show a higher labour force participation of men than Germany does. 
In comparison the labour force participation rates of women in the Netherlands 
were far behind those in Germany at the beginning of the 1g8os, though it must 
be noted that Germany's rates are to be found more in mid-table when compared 
internationally. As is evident from figure 4.5, Dutch women have caught up with 
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their German counterparts in the meantime. The immense increase in employ- 
ment can therefore be explained above all by the increasing economic activity of 
women - especially in part-time employment. If one compares the labour force 
participation rates by age groups (figure 4.6), then it becomes clear that in the 
Netherlands older people show a decidedly low participation rate. This is cer- 
tainly associated with the various programmes aimed at older people's with- 
drawal from the labour market (for example due to early retirement or invalidi- 
ty). The reverse is true for the conditions among young people. Here the labour 
force participation rate is considerably higher. This indicates that young people 
also work in addition to their training to a greater extent. 
Figure 4.5 Labour force participation rates in the Netherlands and in Germany 
Men and women, 1980 to 2000 - as percentages 
Source: OECD (2001): Labour Force Statistics 1980 - 2000 
4.4 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT 
One of the reasons for the good economic results is that private consumption and 
investment remained high. The high level of consumption can be explained by 
the improved employment situation and the reductions in tax and social insur- 
ance c~ntr ibut ions.~ In this way both domestic demand was supported and 
labour costs were lowered, which encouraged the policy of wage restraint pur- 
sued by the Netherlands since 1982. The moderate wage development also had a 
positive effect on foreign trade. As the Netherlands had had their guilder linked 
to the German mark since 1983, this resulted in a cost-advantage in the form of a 
"devaluation in real terms" compared with the German mark.9 Investment, too, 
was a growth factor in the iggos. It was always above the EIJ average until 1999, 
whereas in Germany it was below the EU average." 
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Figure 4.6 Labour f o ~ e  participation rates in the Netherlands and in Germany 
Men and women by age groups in 2000 - rates as percentages 
groups 
Source: OECD (2001): Labour Force Statistics 1980 - 2000 
If economic growth (GDP) and employment are compared over time, then it can 
be seen that in the Netherlands employment follows the development of GDP 
more closely than it does in Germany (figures 4.7 and 4.8)." What is particularly 
noticeable for recent years in the case of (Western) Germany is that a gap has 
opened up between economic growth and the development of employment. One 
could also say that more was produced per employee here in Germany. 
This has an effect on the so-called employment threshold, in other words the 
percentage of economic growth from which employment increases. The employ- 
ment threshold can be portrayed in the form of a graph by comparing the 
changes in employment and the changes in the national product as is done in fig- 
ures 4.9 and 4.10. The intersection of the regression lines with the abscissa (eco- 
nomic growth as a percentage) depicts the employment threshold during the peri- 
od under observation. In the Netherlands this level of economic growth from 
which employment begins to increase is close to zero: employment already grows 
with a slight increase in the national product. In Germany this threshold averages 
1.5 percent to 2 percent for the years 1983-2000 and has risen in recent years. 
Similarly to the case of the, USA the high level of employment growth in the 
Netherlands can not be explained solely by a more favourable economic develop- 
ment than in other West European countries. For instance although the average 
economic growth in the Netherlands was above the E u  average of 2.3 percent 
between 1983 and 1993, at 2.6 percent, it was below Germany's average growth 
rate of 2.8 percent and the us's 2.9 percent rate." Since 1995 the Dutch growth 
rates have been fluctuating above the EU average, however, and are considerably 
higher than the German average. 
LABOUR PARTICIPATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT; A COMPARISON OF DEVELOPMENTS 
AND INSTITUTIONS IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS 
As there is little difference between Germany and the Netherlands as regards the 
gdp growth rates until the mid-rggos, the positive employment trend must be 
attributable to other factors. 
As in the USA, more jobs are created in the Netherlands at a given economic 
growth than for example in Germany. In other words the employment intensity 
of the economic growth was higher there than it was here.'3 Explanations for this 
can be found for example in the development of working time and wages, as is 
explained below. 
Figure 4.7 cop* and employment in the Netherlands; annual rates of change 1983 
to 2000 - as percentages 
* Gross domestic product in prices and purchasing power standards of 1995 
Source: Cenuaal Bureau voor de Statistiek, OECD (2002): National Accounts 1989 - 2000, Vo1. I; 
own calculations 
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Figure 4.8 GDP* and employment in Germany; annual rates of change 1983 to 
2000 - as percentages 
** 
* 
Gross domestic product in prices of 1995 
until 1991 Western Germany only 
Source: OECD: Labour Force Statistics, various years; Federal Statistical Office from 1991 (revised 
employment figures); European Commission (2000): Statistical Annex to European 
Economy, Spring 2002 
Figure 4.9 GDP* and employment in the Netherlands; growth rates 1983 to 
2000 - as percentages 
* 
Gross domestic product in prices and purchasing power standards of 1995 
Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek; 
OECD (2002): National Accounts 1989 - 2000, Vol. I; own calculations 
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Figure 4.10 GDP* and employment in Germany**; annual rates of change 1983 to 
2000 - as percentages 
** 
* Gross domestic product in prices of 1995 
70 until 1991 western Germany only 
Source: OECD: Labour Force Statistics, various years; 
Federal Statistical Office from iggi (revised employment figures); 
European Commission (2002): Statistical Annex to European Economy, Spring 2002 
4.1.1 WORKING TIME 
Working time has shown a similarly decreasing trend in the two countries. 
However in the Netherlands this is due above all to the greater spread of part- 
time employment - another explanation for the Dutch "employment miracle" 
(see table 4.2). But part-time work is only one pillar of the Dutch model of work- 
ing time policy. The second pillar has always been the reduction of labour supply 
by means of the early retirement of older workers or those with a reduced earn- 
ing capacity. That is why - as mentioned earlier - the labour force participation 
rates of older workers in the Netherlands are so extraordinarily low in an inter- 
national comparison. 
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Table 4.2 Part-time rates* for Germany and the Netherlands 1985-2000 





Source: EUROSTAT, Labour Force Survey 
Germany The Netherlands 
Total Men Women Total Men Women 
12.4 1.6 29.3 22.3 7.3 51.0 
14.9 2.3 33.6 31.3 14.3 59.1 
16.0 3.2 33.6 37.0 16.1 67.2 
19.1 4.5 37.7 41.0 18.9 70.5 
If all forms of exclusion from the labour market as well as participation in labour 
market schemes and highly subsidised forms of employment are added up then 
according to the OECD we get a so-called "'broad"unemp1oyment rate. This is 
made up of the unemployed, recipients of social transfers following unemploy- 
ment (early retirement, social assistance, invalidity benefit) and participants in 
employment and training schemes. This "broad" unemployment rate comes to 
27 percent for 1996 and has been falling only very slowly since then.'4 In compar- 
ison with this, the rate in Germany at that time stood at 22 percent, though the 
special situation in eastern Germany has already been taken into account.'s The 
considerable level of the so-called broad unemployment rate thus relativises the 
Dutch "success story". Nevertheless the labour-market-policy performance of 
the Netherlands occupies a top position in Europe because it was possible to get 
a continuous employment creation going with employment growth rates like in 
the USA. 
4.4.2 WAGE DEVELOPMENT AND WAGE STRUCIURES 
The more favourable employment trend compared with other EU countries can 
also be partly explained by the moderate wage development. Since the mid- 
1980s the government has supported a policy of wage restraint which also 
received the support of the social partners. According to information from the 
OECD the unit labour costs have grown far less in the Netherlands since 1983 
than they have in the neighbouring European ~ountries.'~ 
Are there differences between the wage structures that could explain the greater 
employment growth in the Netherlands? Whilst for example in the USA the 
wage disparities increased considerably, they remained largely stable in the 
Netherlands." A change in the wage disparity therefore has to be ruled out as a 
possible explanation. The ratio of the middle wage decile (Dg) to the lowest 
decile (Dl) remained constant at 1.6, whilst it fell from 1.6 to 1.4 in western 
Germany between 1983 and 1993, as OECD studies have proven. This means that 
in (western) Germany there was an  above-average increase in the real income of 
workers in the lower wage groups.'8 This involves a danger of the corresponding 
jobs being cut as a part of streamlining efforts. 
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Owing to the labour shortage it  is possible to observe a considerable wage 
increase in the Netherlands from 2000 onwards, which is pushing up the unit 
labour costs. This goes against the wage restraint that was pursued until the late 
1990s. However, it can also be regarded as a "normal" adjustment process in a 
monetary union with different economic cycles.'9 
When searching for the reasons for the Dutch employment miracle it is neces- 
sary to start out from the question as to what factors could have encouraged the 
lower employment threshold. What is to be considered here are not least 
changes in the institutional framework, in other words the labour market sys- 
tem. This is dealt with in the following chapter. 
4.5 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Institutional changes have an impact on employment if they have a wage-moder- 
ating effect (such as a longer-term restraint in the collectively agreed wages or 
measures aimed at activating the unemployed), if they help to reduce the average 
annual working time per worker (such as flexible and individual forms of reduc- 
tion in working time) and if they raise the willingness of firms to hire new work- 
ers in an employment upswing (such as factors easing the agreement of flexible 
employment relationships). These aspects are to be looked into in the following 
sections. 
4.5.1 MORE DECENTRAL WAGE DETERMINATION AND WAGE RESTRAINT 
In the Netherlands there is a long tradition of negotiations between employers' 
associations, trade unions and the government. However, the state has a particu- 
larly strong position in the process of wage formation because it can intervene 
directly in the wage negotiations and can even suspend them. However, no use 
has been made of this possibility since the beginning of the 1980s. As regards the 
organisation of wage determination there is an interesting mixture of centrality 
and decentrality. The platform for the annual wage negotiations is the bilateral 
dialogue between the employers' associations and the trade unions in the 
"Foundation for Labour". The orientation for wage policy found here (the so- 
called "Centraal Akkoord'? then forms the basis for the actual collective negotia- 
tions that take place at industry and firm level. These negotiations are orientated 
towards the Centraal Akkoord, but nonetheless take into account regional and 
sectoral differences. 
Wage policy has been oriented towards wage restraint for more than 15 years now 
and has slowed down the increase in productivity as a result of its longer-term ori- 
entation. The increased flexibility of collective agreements has probably con- 
tributed towards the wage restraint. This can be seen for example from the fact 
that the wage agreements of the individual industries increasingly contain more 
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general outline provisions, thus leaving more freedom for the negotiations in the 
firms. In this way the concrete wage agreements are linked more and more to the 
market development of individual-firms. As already mentioned, a considerable 
wage increase can be ascertained as of 2000 which could impair the competitive- 
ness of the Dutch economy. The Eu and OEcD forecasts assume, however, that the 
economic development and labour market situation will continue to be favourable. 
4.5.2 ACTIVATION OF THE UNEMPLOYED 
For a long time the Netherlands pushed ahead on a grand scale the early retire- 
ment of older people and people who were unable to work. Thus the number of 
assisted people who were unable to work rose to 800,000 at the beginning of the 
iggos. This method was frequently offered in the case of dismissals as a way to 
reduce unemployment. The early retirements provided relief on the supply side 
which was greatly reduced by the activity rate of older people. However, in the 
past decade the public has been becoming increasingly aware of the high level of 
inactivity of the unemployed and the resulting burden of social benefits. 
In the course of the upswing in employment the course was set for activation and 
prevention. The condition of incapacity for work is now checked at regular inter- 
vals. The method of financing invalidity benefits has also changed. In the mean- 
time also the employers pay the contributions due for this. It should be ensured 
that the case of invalidity does not arise if at all possible. Two other moves in this 
direction are the firms taking on the continued payment of remuneration in the 
event of sickness and the entrusting of the private economy with the administra- 
tion of the health insurance funds. After this law came into force in 1994 the 
number of benefit recipients fell somewhat but then stagnated at a high level of 
approx. 800,000. 
With social assistance, too, more emphasis has been placed on a return to work- 
ing life. The employment office and the local social services work closely togeth- 
er to reintegrate social assistance recipients into the labour market. The attitude 
of society has changed: whereas occupational inactivity used to be tolerated and 
the payment of benefits used to be accepted, social assistance recipients are now 
urged to look for work, to retrain if necessary or to take part in further training. 
Otherwise those concerned will be threatened with sanctions. However, an 
improved labour market situation is ultimately the requirement for such a proce- 
dure. It must also be mentioned that since 2001 unemployed people have 
received a one-off payment of 1,815 euros if they cease to draw benefit early. 
Other measures aimed at activation which should be mentioned are the moder- 
ate reduction in the (still generous) transfer payments in the event of unemploy- 
ment and the tightening of the requirements of acceptability in placing the 
unemployed in new jobs. Reforms of active labour market policy are also con- 
nected with this; 
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According to OECD informationzo the Netherlands have always spent a relatively 
large amount on labour market policy measures. In 1998 it was more than 4 per- 
cent of their national product (as a comparison Germany in 1998: 3.6%). The pro- 
portion used to be even higher. As unemployment fell, the expenditure on 
labour market policy measures also dropped to 3.7 percent in 2000. However, 
three fifths (= 2.1%) of the expenditure on labour market policy are allotted to the 
payment of unemployment benefit." A third of the remaining 1.6 percent is 
needed for benefits paid in the event of incapacity to The rest of the 
expenditure is spread over training measures (0.30%) and wage subsidies 
(0.41%). 0.25 percent is used for the public labour administration (Germany: 
0.23%). 
Dutch labour market policy is increasingly focusing on certain target groups, 
such as jobseekers who are hard-to-place (especially the long-term unem- 
ployed), young people or ethnic minorities.'3 A further focus can be found in the 
intensification of placement and advisory services via the public employment 
service and local or non-profit agencies. For this, placement pools or interim jobs 
are set up for the long-term unemployed. This is accompanied by a considerable 
decentralisation, a strict monitoring and a budgeting that is related to results, in 
order to improve the effectiveness of the measures. An example of this is the 
payment to agencies of a flat-rate payment per placement. Moreover efforts are 
being made to facilitate the early recognition of the risks of long-term unem- 
ployment (so-called profiling), in order to start appropriate measures as soon as 
possible after the beginning of unemployment which are intended to prevent the 
individual from sliding into long-term unemployment. At a registration meeting 
unemployed people are classified according to their capacity to work and are 
accordingly looked after more or less intensively, and they are "activated" to look 
for work, to take up a subsidised job or to participate in a training measure. It 
must also be pointed out that a radical reform of the employment service has 
taken place -with considerable trends towards decentralisation and privatisa- 
tion. 
WAGE SUBSIDIES FOR LOW-WAGE EARNERS 
In order to  facilitate access t o  the labour market for low-skilled and long-term 
unemployed jobseekers, firstly the gap between the lower collectively agreed 
wage groups and the statutory minimum wage (2002: 1,207 euros) has been 
steadily reduced by means of exemption clauses in collective agreements. The 
lowest collectively agreed wage groups are only 5 percent above the minimum 
wage in the meantime.''+ Secondly, in the case of low-wage earners, subsidies are 
paid towards the employer contributions to social insuranceAn this way the 
effective labour costs can even be pushed below the minimum wage. 
This support has two target groups. Firstly people who earn no more than 115 
percent of the statutory minimum wage in a 36-hour week. The permanent 
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annual subsidy to the employer amounts to 1,806 euros (1999). Secondly, 
employers can receive a subsidy for long-term unemployed and hard-to-place 
individuals (1999: 2,156 euros) for a maximum of 4 years as long as the newly 
hired worker does not earn more than 130 percent of the minimum wage. The 
different subsidies can be cumulated, thus reducing the wage costs by up to 23 
percent. In addition to this it is being considered to exempt employers temporar- 
ily from the statutory minimum wage if they take on a long-term unemployed 
person. 
These still relatively new measures could push ahead the wage differentiation 
(by qualifications) in the Netherlands, thus contributing to wage restraint in the 
economy as a wh0le.~5 The tax credit for low-earners that was introduced with 
the 2001 income tax reform is along the same lines. 
4.5.4 INDIVIDUAL AND FLEXIBLE FORMS OF WORKING TIME REDUCTION 
The reduction in the average annual working time per worker can be put down, 
as already mentioned, in particular to the increasing significance of part-time 
employment. The majority of part-time employment relationships are voluntary, 
i.e. a full-time job is not desired. Many part-time workers have a higher level of 
education or training, which says something for superior working conditions. In 
addition there is an astonishingly large number of men in part-time employ- 
ment. The large proportion of marginal part-time employment is also worth 
mentioning. This characterises part-time work as a possibility of a secondary 
activity (eg. for housewives or recipients of transfer benefits) and as an instru- 
ment to make gainful employment compatible with other activities (e.g. family 
work, training, further training). 
The basic state retirement pension is seen as one reason for the large increase in 
part-time employment and flexible employment. This pension is independent of 
contribution payments and - depending on the family context - is only just 
higher than social assistance. The advantage of the basic pension is that it 
ensures the subsistence level in old age even for people with low incomes or 
unstable phases of employment. Further reasons for the boom in part-time work 
are the increasing tendency for married women to work, the traditional accep- 
tance of part-time employment by the trade unions, and the active role played by 
the state as a part-time employer. 
4.5.5 MORE POSSIBILITIES FOR FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 
Whilst dismissal protection in the Netherlands continues, according to the OECD, 
to be relatively re~t r ic t ive ,~~ there was a noticeable deregulation in the 1990s 
with regard to temporary forms of employment (hiring-out of labour, fixed-term 
employment). What must be named here in particular are greater possibilities for 
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extending fixed-term employment  and a n  extension of t h e  duration of  t empo-  
rary work in the  case of temporary workers. 
T h e  data f r o m  t h e  European labour force survey emphasise that  temporary 
forms of  employment  have gained clearly in significance. According t o  t h e  
results of t h e  European labour force survey this  f o r m  of employment  h a s  
increased sharply i n  the  Netherlands (as well  as i n  France) and  i n  2002 stands at  
t h e  upper e n d  of  the scale of  t h e  EU countries w i t h  almost 14 percent of  all work- 
ers.'' Above all temporary work  plays a comparatively large role i n  t h e  
Netherlands (with about 4% of t h e  people in dependent  employment).  I t  is used 
i n  particular t o  cover peaks i n  orders and t o  tide over temporary staff bottle- 
necks. OECD analyses o n  t h e  labour market effects of  employment  protection 
legislation s h o w  that  the  effects o n  the  s t ructure of  employment, i n  other  words  
t h e  distribution of  employment  opportuni t ies  and  risks of  unemployment  seem 
t o  b e  considerably more significant than t h e  level  effect^.'^ Legislation also h a s  
a n  impact o n  t h e  inflows i n t o  and outflows f rom unemployment  o r  employment  
i n  the  business cycle. 
Tlexicurity" as a new approach 
In the Netherlands it  is generally accepted that external flexibility (inflows and outflows of staff) 
is an increasingly important precondition for the ability of the labour markets to function. If 
flexibility increases, however, deficits in the area of social security can result where occupational 
histories are less straightforward. In order to alleviate this increasingly clear conflict of aims the 
Dutch government passed the Law for Flexibility and Security (valid as of 01.01.1ggg). The aim 
of this approach, which is known as "flexicurity" for short, is a greater adjustment capacity of the 
labour market - if possible by dismantling the labour market segmentation into core workforce 
and peripheral workers. This occurs firstly by atypical employment being facilitated or its legal 
position being strengthened. Secondly the employment security of the "regular workers" was 
lowered. In this way the segmentation of the labour markets is reduced and transitions become 
more possible. The overall flexibility of the labour market improves. 
The 'Tlexicurity" approach in the Netherlands consists of three components: 
I. more contractual freedom in the case of fixed-term employment (e.g. by facilitating 
consecutive short-term contracts) and in the use of temporary workers (e.g. abolishing the 
obligation to obtain permission and the maximum limit for the length of the period of hiring- 
out and permitting temporary work also in the construction sector); 
2. strengthening of the legal position of people in atypical employment (e.g. for temporary 
agency workers the right to the same times of employment as for permanent employees and 
entitlement to continued payment of remuneration in periods when the worker is not being 
hired out and to dismissal protection after at least 18 months of employment) and 
3. fewer protective rights for so-called "regular workers" (e.g. extended probationary periods, 
shorter notice periods). 
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In addition to the greater fluctuation, which counteracts the strengthening ten- 
dencies on the labour market, there is another advantage of flexible labour mar- 
kets: they respond far more rapidly and more strongly to changes in the econom- 
ic basic conditions. This could have encouraged the linking of the upturns in the 
economy and employment. 
4.6 CONCLUSION: WAYS TO GAIN MORE LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY 
In the early eighties economic growth in the Netherlands almost came to a stand- 
still, unemployment shot up to about 11 percent, the national debt and deficits 
reached record levels. Against this background the government and the two sides 
of industry decided to conclude an alliance for work, the main component of 
which was wage restraint (Wassenaar Agreement of 1983). The government took 
this to heart and cut the salaries of civil servants and pensions by 3 percent. 
Furthermore the national deficit was stemmed by means of economising. 
Subsidies for endangered industries ceased to be the guiding principle of struc- 
tural policy, they were replaced in this aspect by the strengthening of technolog- 
ical change and of research and teaching. Since then the Netherlands have shown 
considerable success in growth policy. Besides the consistent supply policy ( e g  
moderate wage policy, budgetary consolidation) the real devaluation of the 
guilder and the resulting activation of the foreign trade and payments balance 
have had a positive effect on development.'9 However, the finally strong eco- 
nomic growth alone does not explain the spectacular increase in employment, 
which had already begun earlier. 
Internationally comparative analyses suggest that strict employment protection 
is negatively correlated with labour mobility. However, for everyone involved 
fluctuation at industry and macroeconomic level is associated with effort (e.g. 
frictions owing to search and settling into a new job) and return (e.g. new ideas 
and better allocation). It is clear here that an evaluation of the fors and againsts 
(in the sense of a cost-benefit analysis) of labour mobility can not be done solely 
with the aid of scientific analyses. Therefore in conclusion there should be some 
employment-policy arguments. In view of increasingly persistent unemploy- 
ment, any revisions of labour legislation would have to take in particular the 
interests of outsiders (the unemployed and peripheral workers) more into 
account.3' More mobility due to labour-law reforms would not only open up 
more entry possibilities to outsiders, however, but would also direct public 
interest away from the preservation of existing employment and towards the 
creation of new employment, thus promoting structural change. 
In order firstly to take into account the growing need for scope for action in per- 
sonnel policy and secondly to be able to avoid social rejections there are two con- 
ceivable ways to arrange the labour market order: in the first one it would only 
be necessary to change little in the substance of employment security de jure - 
apart from a partial modernisation of the legal norms - if the existing freedom 
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for flexibility in wages and working time were consistently made full use of or 
were expanded, e.g. by means of exemption clauses in collective agreements. If 
the second method were chosen, the effective level of employment security de 
jure would be in question. More freedom in the termination of employment rela- 
tionships and thus more market on the labour market seem to be possible if - like 
in our Dutch neighbour's "F1exicurity"concept - there were acceptable exchange 
deals: if the workers are expected to accept less employment stability, their social 
security should not be neglected in the reforms of the tax and transfer systems 
that are also on the agenda. 
What must also be mentioned in this context is the fact that the IAB, with their 
set of strategies, formulated a catalogue of measures on the basis of simulation 
calculations, which could bring about an employment-intensifying growth path 
for Germany t00.3' This policy-mix consists of three components that are to be 
implemented simultaneously: (I) reductions in working time, which should be 
arranged in such a way that it would not incur any additional expense and would 
be individual, flexible and reversible - e.g. more part-time work and less over- 
time; (2) moderate increases in nominal wages at macroeconomic level, which 
would have to be below the progress in productivity initially and (3) fiscal-policy 
impulses - e.g. delayed consolidation, restructuring in the public budgets in 
favour of investments and the reduction of direct taxes. Furthermore, an interna- 
tional comparison of countries with successful employment policy come to simi- 
lar re~ults.3~ 
The years between the development of the IAB set of strategies (1996) and today 
have shown, however, that model calculations and reality are two very different 
things. The implementation of the set of strategies in this country could be facili- 
tated further, however, if, as in the Netherlands, the institutional framework also 
left more scope for labour market flexibility and if the course were set consis- 
tently for more employment. The precondition for the reversal of the employ- 
ment trend in the Netherlands was the wish to act together and the view that 
labour market flexibility plus security is the order of the day. With the alliance 
for work, training and competitiveness there would at least be a forum at which a 
process of rethinking - similar to the Dutch "Stichting van de Arbeid" could be 
introduced and stepped up. 
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On this issue see Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 
No. 2/1998, subject focus "Strategien &r mehr Beschaftigung - Internationale 
Erfahrungen" [Strategies for more employment - international experiences] and a 
series of country reports on the respective labour market situations under 
w w w . ~ ~ ~ . d e ,  in the series "IAB-Kurzberichte" (full text for downloading). 
This can be put down among other things to early withdrawal from working life as a 
result of incapacity to work and early retirement. Both of these methods were prac- 
tised on a large scale in the Netherlands. See the remarks on the concept of the ''broad 
unemployment rate" in Chapter 4 'Working time". 
On this subject see Walwei/Werner 1995: 365 ff. 
Dutch labour legislation has always been as neutral as possible with regard to work- 
ing time. Part-time and full-time workers are treated as equal in legal terms. See Act 
on Part-time Employment in: European Commission 1996: 21. 
EUROSTAT 2001: 140-141 
In Germany this proportion for 1998 was 15 percent. However, surveys such as the 
Socio-Economic Panel or the studies conducted by the Institut fiir Sozialforschung 
und Gesellschaftspolitik (Institute for Social Research and Social Policy) or also the 
IAB establishment panel find considerably higher values for so-called "marginal" 
part-time employment than the EUROSTAT microcensus used here. On this subject 
see: Kohler/Rudolph/Spitznagelrgg6. 
What is certain to contribute to the large spread of these jobs with short working 
hours is the possibility to  work a certain number of hours per week while continuing 
to receive social benefits in full (invalidity benefit, retirement pension). 
OECD 1996: 11 and OECD 2000: 19 ff. 
Giinther Schmid 1997: 27. 
European Commission 1997: 264 ff. and European Commission 2002: 113. 
The employment figures for the Netherlands come from the Statistical Office there. 
No information about the civilian labour force is available from this source. 
According to information from the OECD. From 1992 onwards the growth rate also 
takes into account the economic development in eastern Germany. 
The employment intensity indicates the percentage by which employment increases 
(decreases) when economic growth rises (falls) by i percent. 
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OECD 2000: 25. Meanwhile the '%road"unemployment rate still stands at almost 20 
percent. See OECD 2002: 27. 
Gunther Schmid 1997: 30. 
OECD 1999: Annex Table 13 and Gunther Schmid 1997: 27. 
It must be taken into account that this comparison refers to full-time employees. See 
OECD 1996a: 60 ff. 
OECD 1997a: 7 and Giinther Schmid 1997: 27. 
OECD 2002: 30 and OECD 2002a: 146. 
See the information in the OECD'S Employment Outlook. 
In an international comparison the wage-replacement benefits in the event of unem- 
ployment have remained high in the Netherlands. 
In the Netherlands early withdrawal from working life owing to incapacity to work is 
extraordinarily high compared with other countries. 
The non-profit-making temporary employment business "Start" has served as a 
model for a number of European industrial countries. Start hires out hard-to-place 
unemployed people to firms on a trial basis. Start funds itself from the income 
achieved from hiring out workers to employers. In 1994 Start made 130,000 place- 
ments in more or less short-term jobs. In addition to this it is necessary to mention 
non-profit-making agencies which place social assistance recipients in work above all 
on behalf of the local authorities (e.g. "Maatwerk"). Agencies in the context of 
Maatwerk, which means Sailor-made work", receive a flat-rate payment from the 
employment office for every successful placement. 
However, they appear to have been little used by the firms so far. In contrast 
300,000 or 5 percent of employees already draw the minimum wage. 
See OECD 2000: 57. 
On this subject see the model calculations in OECD 2000: 56. 
OECD iggga: 66. 
Germany, too, is in the upper group of countries with large proportions of fixed- 
term employment, with a good 13 percent. However, the change was far less dramatic 
..- than it was in the Netherlands. 
OECD 19gga: 49 ff. 
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'9 Cf. on this subject Pohl/Volz 1997. 
3' Cf. Ichino 1998. 
32 Werner 1998: 324  ff., Walwei 1998: 334 ff. and Walwei/Werner/Konig 2001. 
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INCREASED LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
Ruiner Fehn 
5.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
For some time now the highly developed economies have been passing through a 
phase of radical structural change, which can be recognised by at least four 
points. Firstly the service sector is expanding, whereas the industrial sector is 
tending to shrink. One speaks of a tertiarisation of the highly developed 
economies, though this is clearly further advanced especially in the USA than it 
is for instance in Germany. Secondly a change towards the so-called "new econo- 
my" can be detected; this is an expansion of all the sectors that increasingly back 
the new information and communication technologies or the use of high-quality 
EDP. A perfect example of this development is biotechnology, which also already 
has a far greater status in the USA than it has in Germany, though within the USA 
it is possible to detect a considerable concentration on certain regions such as for 
example the catchment areas of Boston and San Francisco. Thirdly in numerous 
firms a far-reaching change in the organisation of work is taking place, which is 
facilitated not least by the extensive use of computers. Firms are increasingly 
giving up the Taylorist-Fordist production methods with a very extensive spe- 
cialisation of workers and are adopting instead a holistic work organisation in 
which workers have to perform different tasks which are often complementary 
to each other and in which they are expected to show a far greater ability to work 
in a team and to make decisions. Fourthly the extent and frequency of data 
changes with which the firms find themselves confronted has increased with the 
result that the economic environment has become more volatile on the whole.' 
These considerable changes in the economic environment have caused an 
increase in the adjustment burdens with which the highly developed economies 
have to cope. Especially in the large Continental European countries of 
Germany, France, Italy or also Spain, however, the capacity to deal with such 
considerable adjustment burdens is relatively small. The main reason for this can 
be seen in relatively rigid labour markets and generously developed welfare 
states which open up to the players numerous channels to pass the arising 
adjustment burdens on to third parties such as the taxpayers or future genera- 
t i o n ~ . ~  The somewhat unsurprising result is steadily increasing hard-core unem- 
ployment which does not disappear even in boom phases. This structural hard- 
core unemployment, which can not be attributed to a poor demand for goods in 
the economy as a whole, probably makes up some 85 percent of total unemploy- 
ment in Germany for example. The counterpart to this increasing hard-core 
unemployment is a completely insufficient creation of new jobs. Here in 
Germany it is obviously considerably more difficult to create new jobs especially 
in the expanding sectors of the economy than it is for instance in the USA.~ 
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This serious deficit in the creation of new jobs is also related in particular to the 
defensive policy strategy which is pursued in Germany of maintaining for as 
long as possible old jobs in declining sectors such as mining, agriculture or also 
in the shipyards, and compensating the losers in the structural change on a con- 
siderable scale. Consequently it is possible to identify two core elements of this 
defensive policy strategy. Firstly the attempt to postpone the destruction of old 
jobs for as long as possible by means of subsidies and labour market rigidities, 
such as dismissal protection, thus tying down the resources in the appropria- 
tions that are no longer profitable. Secondly a generous social cushioning of the 
workers who are nevertheless made redundant in these declining sectors by 
means of the welfare state, that is unemployment benefit, unemployment assis- 
tance which is unlimited as regards time but nonetheless linked to the last net 
wage, and as a final safety net, social assistance, which especially for families 
provides a benefit level that comes close to the level of an average earner's net 
pay and puts an absolute minimum wage into the spectrum of wages that can be 
achieved on the market. However, such a generous welfare state runs the risk of 
largely destroying the incentive to work of the losers in the structural change, so 
that the people affected do not just live off the general public temporarily but 
more permanently. The actual aim of the welfare state to help people to help 
themselves and to act as a kind of trampoline facilitating the way back into the 
regular labour market is being missed on a grand scale, which can be seen among 
other things from the long-term unemployment rate of about SO percent, which 
is extremely high in an international comparison.4 
What is without question far more promising in the long run especially in phas- 
es of radical structural change is an offensive policy strategy which pursues the 
central aim of creating the best possible institutional basic conditions for the cre- 
ation of new jobs in the expanding sectors and which actively promotes the 
process of redirecting resources away from the declining sectors and into the 
expanding sectors. To be consistent, however, such an offensive policy strategy 
must then also be prepared to accept a larger degree of social hardships in the 
process of structural change. Consequently the core element of such an offensive 
policy strategy must be the comprehensive reform of the institutional basic con- 
ditions on the labour market and in the field of the welfare state. The entire jun- 
gle of regulations in these two areas must be put under the microscope to see 
whether it has a negative or positive effect on the creation of new jobs. In view of 
constant mass unemployment it is more than doubtful whether regulations that 
have a negative effect can be justified as a result of other "considerations of jus- 
tice". If a system permanently contributes to responsible citizens not standing on 
their own feet and makes them dependent on the drip of the welfare state, then 
this is probably one of the greatest possible "injustices" and wrong controls in a 
state whose constitution is based on the principle of liberty. However, the rate at 
which new jobs are created also depends decisively on other institutional factors 
besides the labour market and the welfare state, namely in particular on the 
openness and competition intensity on the goods markets, the ability of the capi- 
tal markets to function - they must be suitable in particular for financing busi- 
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ness start-ups and high-risk, innovative projects - and also on the arrangement 
of the tax system, which must above all provide strong incentives for entrepre- 
neurial activities. On the whole dealing successfully with structural change thus 
depends on the institutional basic conditions promoting outsider competition in 
all areas and not hindering it. The more successfully the established players on 
the different markets succeed, with the state's help, in protecting themselves 
from the unpleasant competition from new arrivals and outsiders with poten- 
tially innovative ideas, the less an economy is in the position on the whole to 
cope successfully with a phase of radical structural change.5 
This paper is intended first and foremost to deal with how rigid labour markets 
help to explain the persistent employment problems here in Germany, although 
it seems reasonable to suppose that other areas, such as the institutional basic 
conditions in the field of the welfare state, on the capital and goods markets and 
the arrangement of the tax system, also play an important role. The paper contin- 
ues as follows. First it is explained that wage policy is a central determinant of 
labour market performance and that in particular wage moderation and wage dif- 
ferentiation are important in order to reach better employment results perma- 
nently. After this some central labour market institutions are examined more 
closely with regard to their employment effects, namely unemployment benefit, 
social assistance, dismissal protection and the degree of centralisation of wage 
negotiations. 
5.2 WAGE POLICY AND LABOUR MARKET PERFORMANCE 
A wage policy that is orientated towards employment is the key requirement for 
a permanently good labour market performance. From the point of view of 
employment the institutional basic conditions on the labour market are therefore 
to be arranged in such a way that the wage policy makes the largest possible con- 
tribution towards avoiding persistent mass unemployment or reducing it if it 
already exists, as for example in Germany. At aggregate level this means first of 
all that the so-called macroeconomic leeway of wage policy must on no account 
be fully exhausted if a contribution is to be made towards reducing unemploy- 
ment. Only then will scope be left for employment gains and a wage differentia- 
tion conforming to market conditions, which can be realised for example by 
means of voluntary surcharges of firms that are developing better than average or 
by introducing plans for profit-sharing at firm level. This macroeconomic leeway 
results from the level of aggregate growth in the trend development of labour 
productivity plus the inflation rate that is considered acceptable by the central 
bank.6 Progress in labour productivity which was only made possible by previ- 
ous job cuts does not justify any higher wage increases because this would other- 
wise trigger a vicious circle of falling employment and constantly increasing 
wage demands. The same is true of data changes and policy measures that lower- 
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the consumption real wage but which do not face an equivalent increase in 
labour productivity. Typical examples of this are deteriorations in the "terms of 
trade", for example due to a large increase in the price of crude oil or owing to a 
clear devaluation of the domestic currency, increases in social insurance contri- 
butions or in value-added tax or income tax. If the two sides of industry respond 
to such data changes with higher wage agreements in order to keep the con- 
sumption real wage constant, then in this way they inevitably contribute to the 
further reduction of employment. 
The current round ofwage negotiations in Germany in 2002  shows that trade 
unions still do not want to admit the negative relationship between wage 
increases and the development of employment. The most prominent example is 
the current demand by the trade union IG-metal1 for a 6.5 percent wage rise, 
which exceeds by far the macroeconomic leeway even though, in view of persis- 
tent mass unemployment, wage restraint would clearly be necessary in order to 
leave room for employment gains. If as a result of their strike power, which is as 
considerable as ever, IG-metal1 manages to enforce these demands even only 
approximately then the result will inevitably be an intensified reduction in the 
number of jobs and pressure to rationalise in the metalworking industry. The 
current 3.3 percent wage rise in the chemical industry, too, is not in any way 
suitable for facilitating employment gains. Obviously once again far greater 
importance was attached to the employees' interests in income rises than was 
attached to the interest of the unemployed in improved chances of being hired. 
As a result of the pilot function of the first wage agreement in a round of wage 
negotiations, which can usually be observed in Germany, it is additionally to be 
feared that the wage agreement in the chemical industry will influence the other 
sectors and even be regarded by the trade unions as a lower limit, resulting in 
further negative employment effects. As a longer-term response, the firms will 
produce even more capital-intensively than they did before and will continue to 
transfer their manufacturing plants abroad. Above all less-skilled workers will be 
affected by the growing pressure to lay off workers, which will push up the 
already high unemployment among this problem group on the labour market. 
The trade unions try to justify their aggressive wage policy with its supposedly 
positive effect on demand in the economy as a whole, which would then suppos- 
edly result in a positive employment effect. However, this is nothing but eye- 
wash. The argument about the purchasing power of the wage has long since been 
disproved.' If it were even only approximately true, then the employment situa- 
tion in eastern Germany should be magnificent, since the wage policy there in 
the nineties was anything but restrained. But the opposite is true. In view of the 
employment crisis here in Germany, whose primary causes are structural, a 
deficit of demand for goods is not an urgent problem anyway:Even if Keynes' 
demand-related component of unemployment gains importance, however, an 
expansionary wage policy is not the right policy instrument for responding to it. 
The positive demand effect on the home market of an expansionary wage policy 
is highly uncertain, but the cost increases and thus the deterioration of the sup- 
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ply side occurs in any case and thus predominates in terms of weight. What is 
more important in the case of a collapse in the demand for goods in the economy 
as a whole is monetary and fiscal policy, the latter in particular in the form of the 
automatic stabilisers, in order to stabilise macroeconomic demand.' 
In this context it is also necessary to point out that the calculations of unit labour 
costs, which one can frequently find and which make Germany not look all that 
bad in international comparisons, especially in the manufacturing sector, are 
highly problematical. It can not come as a surprise that the development of unit 
labour costs proceeds relatively moderately if wage and social policies are pur- 
sued which systematically promote the increase of real capital and human capital 
intensity in the production process and contribute for example to low-skilled or 
older workers no longer having a chance on the labour market and becoming a 
burden on the welfare state. The measured increases in labour productivity have 
then not been obtained genuinely by the firms' careful management, but are to a 
considerable part the result of a personnel policy responding to increases in wage 
costs, the burden of which falls on the general public. Moreover, such a situation 
is highly unstable in as far as firms can generally choose their production loca- 
tion for new establishments or for expansion investments. Unit labour costs 
which seem to be fairly moderate as a result of an artificially excessive use of cap- 
ital are then, however, not exactly an argument for establishing firms in such an 
institutional environment. From the viewpoint of the firms when making such a 
longer-term decision it depends far more crucially in the planning period on the 
expected ratio of the burden from wages, taxes and insurance contributions rela- 
tive to the public infrastructure in the broadest sense and relative to the workers' 
qualification level and work input. The institutional basic conditions with regard 
to the firms' freedom of disposition, which especially in Germany has been fur- 
ther restricted for larger firms by the recently extended works councils' share in 
decision-making, also plays a considerable role. The development of the direct 
investments made in Germany by foreign firms, which continues to be rather 
modest, suggests that, irrespective of all comparisons of unit labour costs, 
Germany does not appear to be particularly attractive as a production location 
from the point of view of firms. In summary therefore the institutional basic 
conditions on the labour market should be arranged in such a way that they pro- 
mote a permanently restrained wage policy and thus create scope for the urgent- 
ly needed employment gains. 
5.2.2 WAGE DIFFERENTIATION 
What is at least as important as a permanent policy of wage moderation, how- 
ever, is that the wages are adequately differentiated with regard to qualification, 
sector and region in accordance with the requirements of the labour market. If on 
the other hand the wage structure in these three dimensions is very narrow and 
is more egalitarian in nature, then workers must demonstrate a very high level of 
mobility in order to avoid considerable problems with mismatch unemploy- 
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ment. Especially in a welfare-state environment in which the state transfer pay- 
ments via unemployment assistance are linked to the last net wage and are 
unlimited as regards time and where the unemployed are not expected to move 
to a different town or region, one can not expect the unemployed to be particu- 
larly mobile. Labour demand and supply then have difficulty coming together, 
however, and the combination of the low level of mobility among the unem- 
ployed, resulting from the welfare state, and wage structures that are only slight- 
ly differentiated inevitably leads to huge mismatch problems on the labour mar- 
ket.9 
The situation intensifies even further when, as has been the case for some time 
now, radical structural change can be detected in particular with regard to sec- 
tors and qualifications. The outstanding trend in the structure of labour demand 
away from standardised industrial production and towards services and the so- 
called "new economy", and away from low-skilled workers and towards highly 
qualified workers who demonstrate extensive abilities and can perform a broad 
spectrum of tasks, demands a clearly growing wage differentiation in order to 
avoid an increase in structural ~nemployment.'~ However, contrary to the inter- 
national trend, this has not occurred in Germany. I t  is more the case that, con- 
trary to the needs of the market, the wage structure in Germany has been further 
levelled out in particular with regard to qualifications." Against this background 
it should not come as a surprise that especially low-skilled workers and former 
workers from the industrial sector are affected by persistent unemployment. 
This policy of little differentiation in wages is once again largely the result of the 
institutional basic conditions that can be observed here in Germany on the 
labour market and in the area of the welfare state. A wage policy which systemat- 
ically tries to level out the income differences that actually arise from the market 
process can only be kept up if the resulting unemployment is socially cushioned 
on a grand scale via insurance and transfer payments from the welfare state. If, 
however, the social net is only very wide-meshed, as is the case for example in 
the USA, then the social fall of laid-off workers who fail to find a new job quickly 
is so great that a considerable political and social pressure arises to give up such a 
wage policy which is not in accordance with the demands of the labour market. 
The people affected then simply can not afford to be unemployed permanently, 
so that ultimately it can not come as a surprise that the rate of long-term unem- 
ployment here in Germany is roughly eight times higher than that in the USA." 
The wage negotiations in Germany, which continue to be relatively centralised 
compared with other countries, and the leitmotiv of German wage policy of 
"equal pay for equal workJ', which already proved fatal in the process of reunifi- 
cation, result in steadily growing losses of efficiency and employment. The situa- 
tion is thus becoming more and more unstable and sooner or later serious 
changes will have to be made in both respects in Germany too. 
It will, however, be a major challenge for the model of the "social market econo- 
my" to organise this process of change in such a way that it is accompanied by 
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less social hardship than is the case for instance in the USA. This should be possi- 
ble if one considers that other European countries such as Switzerland or the 
Netherlands have for a long time been far more successful in their employment 
policy than Germany has, without demonstrating the same extent of income 
differences and social hardship as the USA. However, these countries are rather 
small, comparable in size with German Lander such as Bavaria, Baden- 
Wiirttemberg or North-Rhine-Westphalia. Therefore two central questions arise 
in this context. Firstly, to what extent the experiences of such countries can be 
applied to larger countries such as Germany, France or Italy. Secondly whether it 
is necessary in Germany, too, to transfer far more competences to the more 
decentralised Lander level in the field of labour market and social policy, though 
this might have to be accompanied at least by cooperations of smaller Lander if 
not even by the task of reorganising the Lander, a task that would be politically 
extremely difficult. 
5.3 REFORM OF THE INSURANCE AND TRANSFER PAYMENTS TO THE 
UNEMPLOYED 
An employment policy can ultimately only be described as successful if it man- 
ages to reintegrate a great many of the unemployed and especially many long- 
term unemployed into the regular labour market. In order to achieve this aim 
both positive and negative incentive mechanisms, in other words the carrot and 
the stick, are basically suitable. However, it is also necessary for the firms to be 
willing and able to hire job-seekers at a real wage in accordance with their mar- 
ginal productivity. It would make most sense to pursue all three methods, mak- 
ing it essential first of all to increase the competitiveness of the unemployed on 
the regular labour market by means of targeted measures to promote reintegra- 
tion, second to arrange far more restrictively the transfer payments to unem- 
ployed people who do not use the opportunities offered to them in spite of an 
objective ability to work, and finally to raise firms' interest in hiring new work- 
ers. As this paper deals with the influence of labour market rigidities on labour 
market performance, the extensive first area of a sensible arrangement of active 
labour market policy is not discussed here.'3 Therefore in the following para- 
graphs the arrangement of the insurance and transfer payments to the unem- 
ployed is first discussed before going into the influence that dismissal protection 
and the degree of centralisation of wage negotiations have on firms' willingness 
to hire and on the macroeconomic labour market performance. 
In internationally comparative studies it is shown again and again that the gen- 
erosity of unemployment benefit is a key determinant for the extent of unem- 
ployment in a country."+ The longer that benefits are paid, the higher these ben- 
efits are and the more lax the criteria are that govern what is expected of an 
unemployed person in order to be granted these benefits, the higher the level of 
unemployment and particularly long-term unemployment is. Several chains of 
effect are responsible for this rather unsurprising result. First of all i t  simply 
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leads to a reduction in the search intensity of the unemployed and subsequently 
to a drop in their probability of being hired. In addition to that the wedge of 
taxes and insurance contributions that lies between the gross wage costs for the 
firms and the net wage that the workers receive broadens with the subsequent 
higher costs of the welfare state. The incentives shift towards non-employment 
or clandestine employment. The inevitable consequence is a more aggressive 
wage bargaining behaviour on the part of the trade unions, which of course focus 
on the net wage that their members actually receive, with corresponding 
employment losses. Another reason for this result is, however, that trade unions 
and firms know that excessive wage increases and rash dismissals entail less seri- 
ous consequences for those workers who are made redundant as a result. After 
all they fall into a generously structured welfare-state net that guarantees them a 
considerable part of the net income they last earned in Germany even for an 
unlimited time. The existence and the arrangement of the state unemployment 
insurance thus induces a number of changes in behaviour which are detrimental 
to employment, it causes so-called 'inoral hazard"prob1ems. 
Germany does badly in international comparisons with regard to the arrange- 
ment of unemployment benefit. The benefits are not only relatively high, but 
they are above all paid for a very long time, basically for an unlimited period, and 
what is more the criteria of what an unemployed person is expected to accept in 
a job can be described as rather lax, with the result that the incentives to work are 
low. These criteria were made slightly stricter during the last phase of the Kohl 
government with the reform that came into effect in 1997. In that reform in par- 
ticular the time that a worker can be expected to have to travel for a working day 
of more than six hours was extended from 150 to 180 minutes. The Schroder 
government, however, immediately cancelled this slight tightening of the crite- 
ria again and even abolished entirely the obligation to report regularly to the 
employment office. Even workers who are seeking full-time employment are still 
not expected to accept a move to a different town even if they have been unem- 
ployed for a longer time. It can therefore not come as a surprise that the mobility 
of German workers can only be described as low compared for example with that 
of their American colleagues. What has also not yet been touched upon despite 
the recent discussions is the duration of benefits for the unemployed. The pay- 
ment of unemployment benefits, lasting for up to 32 months, is already very long 
in an international comparison. But in Germany this is also followed by the 
unlimited payment of unemployment assistance, which is also orientated 
towards the previous net wage.'s 
INDIVIDUAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ACCOUNT 
There are two key elements for getting the serious "moral hazard" problems 
associated with unemployment benefit better under control. They are a far 
stronger emphasis of the actuarial principle of equivalence and the property 
rights in the context of the state unemployment insurance. The thought which 
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actually seems to suggest itself, that of privatising unemployment insurance in 
order to achieve these aims is, however, not implementable so easily. As long as 
the state guarantees a socio-cultural subsistence level, workers will not voluntar- 
ily insure themselves adequately against the risk of becoming unemployed. Since 
especially a state that is bound to the concept of the "social market economy" 
does not allow the individual in case of doubt to fall into a bottomless abyss, 
there is not enough personal interest in making one's one insurance provisions. 
Furthermore it is also doubtful whether a private unemployment insurance 
would have the necessary stability at all during macroeconomic disturbances. 
Unemployment constitutes a risk that is not insurable or only insurable with dif- 
ficulty because in the case of macroeconomic disturbances the material conse- 
quences of risk do not occur independently of each other and they can not there- 
fore be diversified or at least only partly. Therefore as long as private insurances 
do not manage to pool the risk of unemployment with other risks which are sta- 
tistically independent of unemployment a private insurance solution always runs 
the danger of collapsing. In any case it is not sufficient if private unemployment 
insurances act internationally because macro-shocks such as oil price shocks or 
turbulences on the financial markets often affect numerous countries simultane- 
ously and the cyclical swings these days seem to be passed on between the high- 
ly developed industrial countries rather more markedly than they used to be, as 
is suggested by the recent recession. Finally, private insurers would also try to 
pursue a strategy of taking the pick of the bunch and would only insure the good 
risks, with the result that bad risks would have to pay prohibitively high contri- 
bution rates. 
What is quite conceivable, however, is the setting up of individual unemploy- 
ment insurance accounts (individuale Arbeitslosenversicherungskonten - IAK) 
within the framework of the state unemployment insurance, that is under state 
charge.'6 Employed workers could then leave the state unemployment insurance 
on a voluntary basis as soon as they have paid into this account at least the 
amount which is equal to the worker's socio-cultural subsistence level multi- 
plied by the duration of the unemployment benefits that he or she would be enti- 
tled to on becoming unemployed. After losing a job the worker should therefore 
not become a burden on social assistance during an otherwise existing entitle- 
ment to unemployment benefit. Whenever the balance on the unemployment 
insurance account fell below this amount the workers would have to pay contri- 
butions to the unemployment insurance. The workers would only have access to 
the account in the event of unemployment. If the balance of the account were 
positive at the time of retirement, the workers would also be entitled to this, and 
the state would have to pay interest equivalent to Federal loans on positive bal- 
ances. The current state pseudo-insurance would therefore become an insurance 
with considerably reinforced property rights and a savings function. Such a con- 
struction would have the decisive advantage that workers would fall back on 
their own money in the event of becoming unemployed, so that the "moral haz- 
ard" problems described would be reduced. The unemployed would look more 
intensively for a job because every further day of unemployment would have to  
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be paid out of their own pocket. Moreover, for the same reason trade unions with 
excessive wage demands and firms making rash redundancies would have to 
expect substantially more resistance from the workers. Finally, administrative 
costs would be saved because owing to the improved incentive structures unem- 
ployed people who support themselves from their unemployment insurance 
accounts would automatically seek work intensively. The supervision and spoon- 
feeding of all unemployed people which is necessary in today's system could be 
stopped at least for some of the unemployed. 
Furthermore, however, the question arises as to how the compulsory state part 
of the unemployment insurance should be arranged so that the negative reper- 
cussions on the employment situation are as small as possible. It makes particu- 
lar sense to reduce the maximum period of unemployment benefit receipt, to 
make the criteria ofwhat must reasonably be accepted more strict and to link the 
amount of earnings replacement benefit to the duration of the spell of unem- 
ployment. Only in this way is it possible to avoid a growing sediment of long- 
term unemployed in an economic environment that is becoming increasingly 
volatile and is marked by a tremendously rapid structural change. It must be 
taken into consideration here that above all the maximum duration of receipt of 
earnings replacement benefit helps to explain empirically the very different level 
of persistence of unemployment in individual countries, so the prime concern in 
reforms has to start here.'' A general rearrangement of the unemployment 
insurance systems in this direction would clearly raise the incentive of the 
unemployed to look for a job more intensively so that they are successfully rein- 
tegrated into the labour market sooner." 
5.3.2 SHORTER DURATION OF RECEIPT OF BENEFITS FROM THE UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE 
In addition to setting up individual unemployment insurance accounts, the max- 
imum duration of receipt of unemployment benefit should at any rate be clearly 
reduced, for instance to one year, so that entitlement to unemployment benefit 
ceases with the transition into long-term unemployment. The USA which has 
been far more successful in employment policy in the last decades, even limit 
entitlement to unemployment benefit to a maximum receipt duration of only six 
months.'g This is a key reason for the far lower rate of long-term unemployed in 
the USA. In addition to the long duration of receipt, constantly high earnings 
replacement benefits, too, aggravate the "moral hazard" problem of unemploy- 
ment benefit. Here, too, the incentives should be set in such a way that unem- 
ployment is avoided as far as possible without losing sight of the insurance 
aspect. Terminating an employment contract should be clearly punished finan- 
cially, whilst finding a new job should be rewarded filian~ially.~~ These consid- 
erations suggest that unemployment benefits should not be constant throughout 
the duration of receipt. What would be preferable is if they were especially low 
in the first month of unemployment, then increased up to a maximum for exam- 
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ple after six months of unemployment, in order then to be reduced again gradu- 
ally until the benefits ran out after a maximum of one year. Furthermore the cri- 
teria of what must be accepted in a job should be intensified to the effect that an 
unemployed person must also be prepared to move home after a certain duration 
of unemployment, for example after six months. This would mean an unem- 
ployed person losing his or her entitlement to unemployment benefit after draw- 
ing it for six months if he or she only turns down jobs offered because of the 
need to commute more than 180 minutes per day to reach the place of work. 
5.3.3 ABOLITION OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE 
It must be stated furthermore that the institution of unemployment assistance is 
a bad design." It is not financed from insurance contributions but via taxes. Its 
benefits lead one to believe, however, that one has an entitlement to insurance 
by their nonetheless being linked to the last earned net income with the result 
that in spite of a means test it is possible to receive more than the social assis- 
tance rate.22 In addition to this, unemployment assistance is paid for an unlimit- 
ed time. If one assumes that the local authorities share with the employment 
offices the responsibility for reintegrating long-term unemployed people, then it 
is in addition extremely problematic that unemployment assistance is financed 
from the national tax coffers. The funding of the benefits and the responsibility 
for reintegration should be in the same hands in order to avoid false incentives. 
A high rate of success in the reintegration efforts must also be reflected in an 
immediate financial advantage for the relevant institution. Taken together all 
these arguments are in favour of abolishing unemployment assistance altogether. 
Anyone who has still not found a job when his or her unemployment benefit has 
expired is not an insurance case but a hardship case. Those affected should also 
definitely be made aware of this in order to urge them to increase their job- 
search efforts. Of course, if they are needy the people concerned should also 
receive social assistance like anyone else. 
5.3.4 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE ONLY WHEN WILUNG TO WORK 
If unemployment assistance is abolished and the duration of receipt of unem- 
ployment benefit is reduced clearly at the same time, then of course the question 
immediately arises as to what should happen to the unemployed people who 
still have not found a new job even after their unemployment benefit entitle- 
ment has expired. First of all it is clear that in a "social market economy" needy 
people are then entitled to social assistance. But this results once again in "moral 
hazard" problems. Above all unemployed people have the advantage over people 
in employment of having far more free time at their disposal. The better also 
long-term unemployed people are integrated into society, the greater the influ- 
ence this time advantage has, because the free time can be used in particular for 
clandestine work. For this reason long-term unemployed people should only 
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receive the full social assistance rate if one of the two following conditions is 
met. Firstly that the person concerned is objectively not able to work, either 
because he or she has to care for small children and there are no adequate child- 
care facilities available, or because the person concerned shows too serious phys- 
ical limitations whereby the burden of proof is always to be left to the potential 
recipient of transfer payments. Secondly, that the social assistance recipient does 
not decline to participate in integration or job-creation measures offered by the 
particular local authority. These can by all means also be ancillary activities and 
the actual income of the long-term unemployed individual should be equivalent 
to the previous social assistance rate. 
Such a rigorous policy of service and service in return also in the area of the wel- 
fare state would have the inestimable advantage that it would increase once again 
the general acceptance of the principle of the welfare state. For some time now 
the wage-gap principle for families in the lower income bracket has no longer 
been given. Families in which only one parent is working in the lower income 
segment are only slightly better off financially than similar families which are 
financed by social assistance and in which nobody goes to a regular job that is 
generally rather arduous; if the family receiving social assistance does clandes- 
tine work then the genuine working families are even worse off.'3 This distorted 
situation and the subsequent envy effects could at least be reduced with this 
approach, once again without disregarding the elementary principles of the wel- 
fare state. Furthermore this reduces the problem that the way social assistance is 
currently arranged it constitutes an absolute lower limit for the net wage at 
which unemployed social assistance recipients are prepared to accept a regular 
job, if it is more pleasant for the people concerned and is associated with better 
opportunities for advancement to perform a low-paid regular job instead of the 
work offered by the local authority. A reform of social assistance is particularly 
promising above all if, in contrast to the current institutional arrangement, a 
constant transition is created with regard to the net wage from the receipt of 
state transfer payments to the performance of a regular job. This could be 
achieved in particular by permitting people who have been unemployed for a 
longer time to earn their own income from regular employment for a limited 
period in addition to receiving social assistance without them losing in tax loo 
percent of every extra euro earned.'+ 
5.3.5 INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION I N  THE TRANSFER PAYMENTS TO UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE 
It is obvious that the outlined far-reaching reforms in unemployment insurance 
will meet with considerable resistance in view of the general scepticism concern- 
ing market-economy solutions. I t  will hardly be possible to introduce them in 
one large step. The support depends above all on the extent to which the general 
public also hopes to obtain positive employment effects from passing reforms. 
This dangerous obstacle can be negotiated successfully, however, by firstly open- 
ing up to institutional competition within Germany the arrangement of the 
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transfer payments to the unemployed, that is unemployment benefit, unemploy- 
ment assistance and social assistance. Regions, for instance Federal Lander, 
should have considerably more freedom to arrange their benefit package for the 
unemployed than they have had so far. Here it is also quite desirable for the 
regions to offer the unemployed differently generous benefit packages which 
then also differ in price. In order to set the incentives correctly, however, the 
worker concerned would have to have the full benefit of any savings in the con- 
tributions, not giving part of it to the employer.'S 
In the context of such institutional competition in the area of the transfer pay- 
ments to the unemployed, some pacemaker regions would then develop consid- 
erably more polished and also stricter systems than has so far been the case. The 
consequent gains in efficiency in the form of lower unemployment and lower 
contributions would of course have to benefit the particular region in full so that 
financing, too, would have to be regionalised. Only then do workers and firms in 
a certain region benefit directly from regionally more efficient solutions. The 
insurance principle however suggests once again that regions must not be too 
small to be able to organise a reasonably efficient protection against the risk of 
unemployment. In the case of larger Lander such as Bavaria, Baden- 
Wiirttemberg or North-Rhine-Westphalia, this should not be an all too serious 
problem, but in the case of smaller ones such as the city Lander or Saarland it 
would be. Thus several small Lander would have to get together with regard to 
the matter of protection against the risk of unemployment, or one dares to tackle 
the large and very controversial project of reorganising the Lander. However, one 
must not expect any employment-policy miracles just from an arrangement of 
the insurance and transfer payments to the unemployed, no matter how restric- 
tive it is. Only if it is possible at the same time to make the wage negotiation 
behaviour of those in possession of jobs more restrained and more flexible can a 
breakthrough in the reintegration of the (long-term) unemployed into the regu- 
lar labour market really succeed. 
5.4 HOW CAN THE WAGE SElTING BEHAVIOUR BE DISCIPLINED? 
The actual crux of the problem of structural unemployment is that the people 
with jobs have the market force, not only on partial labour markets but even at 
macroeconomic level, to push through real wages that are not in agreement with 
full employment. They manage to monopolise productivity gains for themselves 
largely in the form of wage increases. For an employment-orientated wage poli- 
cy, however, it would be necessary in the situation of large-scale underemploy- 
ment, which has now prevailed for many years, for wage increases to lag behind 
the productivity increases clearly and for a longer period of time so that the pro- 
ductivity gains can benefit the unemployed in the form of improved employ- 
ment opp~rtunities.'~ 
- 
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The job-holders' strong position is based to a considerable extent on statutory 
labour market regulations which undermine its ability to function. It is therefore 
necessary to reform the institutional arrangement of the labour market in such a 
way that the market forces on the labour market once again are strengthened. 
This means that a surplus of labour supply must result in a clearly more marked 
restraint in wage agreements than has so far been the case. It must not be the case 
in particular that an "end of modesty" is already pronounced when open unem- 
ployment falls modestly, if mass unemployment continues to prevail and at least 
five million jobs are missing." 
The wage setting behaviour could be moderated easily if radical interventions 
were undertaken in the present institutional arrangement on the labour market. 
A first possibility in this direction would be to suspend the collective bargaining 
autonomy as long as the unemployment rate is above a certain critical value. 
Secondly it would be possible to grant by law to representatives of the unem- 
ployed a right to be heard in wage negotiations. Thirdly it is conceivable in the 
event of the employers and the trade unions not reaching agreement, that a state 
compulsory arbitration could come into effect so as to avoid a situation such as 
that currently occurring in the wage negotiations in the metalworking industry, 
where extensive strike measures are already being prepared although no attempt 
at arbitration has yet been made. Fourthly the market force of the trade unions 
could also be reduced decisively by restricting their right to strike, for example 
by giving each worker the right to relinquish his or her right to strike by means 
of an individually negotiated contract with his or her firm. However, at least in 
Germany all these measures constitute infringements of employee rights which 
are guaranteed by Basic Constitutional Law and also intrusions on the collective 
bargaining autonomy.'* Especially in the case of the first three suggestions it is 
also doubtful whether they are compatible with a liberal economic order. It is not 
necessarily appropriate to replace the current cartel solution on the labour mar- 
ket with the iron hand of the state. Instead the state should first of all eliminate 
all the legislative obstacles to competition on the labour market and mind that 
market entry and offers from outsiders as well as alternative wage determination 
systems are possible without any restriction and are not hindered by laws. This 
would already moderate wage setting behaviour lastingly and would make it 
more flexible. 
5.4.1 REDUCTION OF STATUTORY DISMISSAL COSTS 
In principle the employment effect of high statutory dismissal costs is controver- 
sial. They have the effect firstly that firms are more restrained in times of crisis 
when it is a matter of laying off employees. The other side ofthe coin, however, 
is that firms are also more restrictive about hiring new employees during 
upturns. That is why it is only possible to ascertain clearly first of all the fact that 
high statutory dismissal costs reduce the fluctuation on the labour market and 
intensify long-term unemployment, which from a political viewpoint is particu- 
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larly problematic, in other words fostering a more marked segmentation on the 
labour market between insiders and outsiders. Such an ambivalent point of view 
is only appropriate, however, when economic fluctuations prevail. In a long- 
term perspective and above all in times of radical structural change the declining 
industries and firms will have to lay off at least a great many of their employees 
in any case in the end, irrespective of the level of statutory dismissal costs. In 
contrast to cyclical fluctuations, lay-offs can only be delayed but not prevented. 
Thus the more intensive the structural change is, the more clearly high statutory 
dismissal costs result in a long-term negative employment effect, because fewer 
new jobs are created and a considerable number of the old jobs are nonetheless 
lost through the process of creative destruction irrespective of the high statutory 
dismissal costs. In the extreme case the declining firms simply go bankrupt. 
The level of statutory dismissal costs in Germany, which is high in international 
comparison and which primarily takes the form of dismissal protection regula- 
tions and obligations to draw up a "social plan", has a negative effect on the real- 
isable employment volume in the longer term in two respects. Firstly high dis- 
missal costs increase the market force of the people with jobs in wage negotia- 
tions. Therefore the wage setting behaviour is generally more aggressive.'9 In 
crisis situations, too, the necessary change of course in wage policy is delayed 
because those with jobs are protected from actually being made redundant. The 
extension of the statutory dismissal costs which took place in Germany in the 
late sixties and early seventies is therefore partly responsible for wage policy on 
the whole following a too aggressive course, and for it failing to respond flexibly 
enough, in particular in the event of negative shocks, to avoid a permanent rise 
in ~nemployment.3~ An extensive reduction of statutory dismissal costs can 
thus help decisively to moderate wage setting behaviour and to make it more 
flexible. The job-holders' risk of being laid off grows if they enforce excessive 
wage agreements. As a result of the wage policy which is then oriented more 
towards employment the firms are in a better position to take on unemployed 
people again. 
Secondly, as high statutory dismissal costs reduce the demand for labour in the 
longer-term, even the realisable employment volume falls as a result of the 
response of both sides of the market. High statutory dismissal costs increase the 
costs associated with the utilisation of the factor of production of labour. Before 
a worker is hired all the costs are variable like in an investment decision. A hiring 
therefore only takes place if the expected present value of this decision is posi- 
tive. Consequently, as a result of high dismissal costs fewer new hirings occur. 
The firms try to make themselves more independent from the now almost fixed 
production factor of labour and, as is the case in Germany for instance, opt for a 
production technology that is very intensive in terms of real capital and human 
capital. The dismissal costs have a greater negative impact on new hirings the 
greater the probability is assessed that a firm will have to lay off workers owing 
to poor business development sometime in the future. This probability has 
grown as a result of the accelerated structural change and because of the general- 
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ly more volatile economic environment. High dismissal costs therefore have a 
more marked negative effect on the extent of new hirings nowadays than they 
did in times of a constant upward economic trend such as that in the fifties and 
sixties. They also lead to an economy tending to specialise in the production of 
safe goods which are already further advanced in their product cycle, because the 
demand for these goods is less volatile and therefore the necessity for future dis- 
missals is smaller. However, in a dynamic perspective these safer goods generally 
show a lower growth potential than high-risk innovative products. Therefore in 
the long run this results in a further serious negative effect on the demand for 
labour in the economy as a whole because economies with high statutory dis- 
missal costs have lower growth potential.3' High dismissal costs also make it 
more difficult to take over or rehabilitate ailing firms. Therefore they contribute 
to an unnecessarily large number of bankruptcies, which also has a negative 
effect on the demand for labour in the economy as a whole. An excessive devalu- 
ation of real capital and human capital is the inevitable consequence. 
Seen in the longer-term these negative effects of high statutory dismissal costs 
are of greater significance, especially in the case of a high stock of unemploy- 
ment, than the positive stabilisation effect that high dismissal costs have on 
labour demand, which results from firms waiting longer before making employ- 
ees redundant during a crisis. This applies in particular because high dismissal 
costs help to avoid lay-offs primarily in the case of cyclical fluctuations but not 
in the massive structural changes that can currently be observed. The result is 
the stagnation in employment growth that is visible here in Germany and the 
huge increase in particular of long-term unemployment and unemployment 
among low-skilled workers. 3' 
Against this background there is highly controversial debate in Germany about 
how in particular the excessive regulations in the area of general dismissal pro- 
tection and the obligation to draw up a social plan can be relaxed.33 Both the dis- 
missal protection and the obligation to draw up a social plan were originally 
designed to prevent employers from abusing their market power, but the current 
extent of these regulations grants privileges to those with jobs at the expense of 
the employment opportunities of the unemployed. It is particularly problematic 
that the labour-law judicial decisions in dismissal processes give strict priority to 
the individual protection of the worker concerned and that these labour-law 
judicial decisions which focus on the individual case leave no scope for macro- 
economic considerations. As a result of the dominance of case law, a considerable 
legal uncertainty is also created in this area, which is why now and then a real 
trade in severance payments arises. The legislator is therefore at least required to 
clarify exactly when dismissals are legal. If in addition he puts into concrete 
terms and reduces the criteria to be observed in the event of lay-offs for opera- 
tional reasons then this would constitute a major steptowards more importance 
once again being attached to the macroeconomic interest in a high level of 
employment. 
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What opposes a complete elimination of statutory dismissal protection is the 
fact that protection against arbitrary dismissals obviously has an efficiency- 
enhancing effect. Furthermore it should be in accordance with the ideas of social 
values to weigh up company-related aspects against social aspects when carrying 
out redundancies.34 However in times of crisis very small firms hardly have any 
alternative adjustment instruments other than redundancies, which larger firms 
do have for example in the form of transferring workers within the firm. For this 
reason it would make sense from an employment point of view at any rate to 
cancel the extension of the statutory dismissal protection to cover small firms 
with six to ten full-time employees, which was carried out by the Schroder gov- 
ernment at the start of its period of office. Especially such smaller firms are often 
more innovative than average and promising with regard to future employment 
growth. However, they have to rely especially on being able to respond to data 
changes rapidly and flexibly so that they do not disappear from the market again 
due to problematic regulations, without this being necessary from a longer-term 
economic perspective. 
In addition to statutory dismissal protection, the obligation to draw up a social 
plan in the event of mass redundancies for operational reasons also causes consid- 
erable dismissal costs. In economic terms the social plan is justified by the fact 
that it is intended to force the firms in the event of dismissals to include in their 
calculations the mobility costs incurred by the employee. These mobility costs 
consist primarily of the costs for searching for a new job, costs for moving house 
and the devaluation of the firm-specific human capital. However, laid-off workers 
generally suffer considerable income losses due to the general imbalance on the 
labour market because it is relatively rare for them to find a new job immediately. 
But this does not belong to the responsibility of the individual firm. Therefore 
from an economic viewpoint the costs arising due to the worker concerned losing 
his or her privileged status as a job-holder do not belong in the firms' social plan 
obligations. The current legal regulation and above all the actual implementation 
of the social plan obligation in Germany is thus not only too far-reaching, it also 
has a discriminating effect, and this in two respects. Firstly the obligation to draw 
up a social plan only applies to firms with more than twenty employees. Secondly 
only victims of mass dismissals have the benefit of social plans.35 
In principle it is essential to ensure a more employment-friendly arrangement of 
dismissal protection and the social plan obligation. In order to achieve these aims 
but also to protect against arbitrary dismissals, it would be possible to prescribe 
by law flat-rate indemnity payments for lay-offs for operational reasons in gener- 
al, i.e. irrespective of the size of the firm and of the number of redundancies. So 
far, however, both Germany and also numerous other European welfare states 
have tried to rope in the firms for compensating to a large extent for the social 
hardships associated with redundancies. But if redundancies are unavoidable 
owing to the increasingly rapid structural change and the more volatile economic 
environment, then this attempt has fatal consequences for employment in the 
long run, as can be recognised without difficulty in the meantime. 
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Another important point of departure for moderating the wage negotiation 
behaviour of those with jobs is the arrangement of the collective negotiations. 
Especially the optimum degree of centralisation of wage negotiations has been 
discussed intensively in literature during the last decade. Three quite different 
hypotheses compete about what effect the degree of centralisation of wage nego- 
tiations has on the employment 
The corporatist hypothesis:37 corporatist countries are always characterised 
by wage negotiations being conducted at a very centralised level. The more 
extensive an interest group is, however, the less success it can have in 
obtaining special advantages at the expense of other social groups. Central 
social partners therefore take more into consideration the macroeconomic 
consequences of the wage increases that they agree upon and thus act more 
or less in the sense of an actor maximising the common good? Centralised 
wage negotiations consequently also have a positive effect on consensus-ori- 
entated behaviour based on partnership between the social partners, which 
is also reflected in a lower strike rate and a constructive co-operation 
between the state and the two sides of industry. 
The liberal-pluralist hypothesis:38 based upon considerations of political eco- 
nomics, in particular the danger of policy failure is emphasised here and the 
problems are brought out which are associated with systematically can- 
celling the market forces on the labour market by means of a central organi- 
sation of wage negotiations. A close involvement of powerful interest groups 
with integration of the state can at best reduce the negative effects of data 
changes in the short term. But in the longer-term this leads to decrepitude 
and inflexibilities that hinder growth and employment. 
The hump shape hypothesis:39 this hypothesis brings together the two previ- 
ous explanatory approaches. According to this, both wage negotiations 
organised at a very centralised level and those organised at a very decen- 
tralised level have a positive effect on the employment results. What do con- 
siderably less well on the other hand are intermediate forms in which the 
disciplining force of the market has been lost to a large extent but on the 
other hand the wage negotiations are not yet organised so comprehensively 
that the two sides of industry orientate themselves towards the good of the 
economy as a whole. 
The three hypotheses must be judged by which degree of centralisation ofwage 
negotiations is more likely to fulfil the two main criteria - micro-flexibility and 
macro-flexibility - that a wage negotiation system must fulfil in order to obtain 
positive employment results. A wage negotiation system should firstly have a 
positive effect on the growth of a country's productivity and economy, because 
taken together these two factors facilitate employment gains (micro-flexibility). 
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This can occur in particular by means of a wage structure that fosters economic 
incentives. secondly a wage negotiation system should help to orientate wage 
increases towards the development of productivity (macro-flexibility). If at the 
starting time there is full employment, then the wage increases should not 
exceed the progress in productivity, whereas if there is mass unemployment 
initially, as has been the case in Germany for some time now, it is necessary to 
make a clear deduction from the trend growth of labour productivity. Aggressive 
general wage increases which are not justified by productivity progress, on the 
other hand, inevitably lead to employment losses. From the point of view of 
macro-flexibility, the preferable degree of centralisation of wage negotiations is 
therefore the one that keeps at a low level the macroeconomic pressure to raise 
wages and responds flexibly to macroeconomic sh0cks.4~ 
Degree o f  centralisa tion o f  wage negotiations and micro-flexibility 
The question as to the effect that centralised wage negotiations have on a coun- 
try's micro-flexibility is a controversial one. On the one hand it is argued that 
centralised wage negotiations have a positive effect on the speed of structural 
change and the formation of real capital and thus on economic growth. On the 
other hand more and more economists have recently been of the opinion that the 
more inflexible wage structures and lower wage dispersion that are associated 
with centralised wage negotiations have a negative impact on micro-flexibility.4' 
If wages are fixed bindingly at central level then every firm pays roughly the 
same wage for the same work irrespective of their particular profit position. This 
is why with centralised wage negotiations the wage structure is more inflexible 
and the wage dispersion is smaller than with decentralised wage negotiations. 
This is frequently regarded as an advantage and not as a disadvantage, however, 
because it supposedly results in an acceleration of structural change and invest- 
ment activity.4' Less dynamic and inefficient industries and firms are forced to 
rationalise more intensively or to withdraw from the market more quickly. In 
this area employment will thus decline. This is opposed, however, by a possibly 
greater positive employment effect which arises as a result of the more dynamic 
and above-average productive firms paying lower wages than they would in the 
case of decentralised wage negotiations because the wages do not follow the 
profits. For this reason these firms have at their disposal more available funds for 
financing investments from their own resources. In the case of the often lament- 
ed imperfect capital markets especially in the area of innovative and higher-risk 
investments this has a positive impact on economic and employment growth. In 
conclusion, according to this idea, centralised wage negotiations can manage to 
speed up the process of creative destruction.43 
If these ideas are examined more closely, however, they turn out to be too simple 
and misleading. Cause and effect become confused if the more flexible wage 
structures associated with more decentralised wage negotiations are held 
responsible for an inadequate structural change. A flexible wage structure is only 
necessary at all if the production factor of labour is not sufficiently mobile. If, 
however, in the case of immobile production factors one prevents any occurring 
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structural shocks from being dealt with by means of flexible wage structures, 
then unemployment among the less mobile workers will necessarily rise. Wage 
structures which are artificially lashed down by means of centralised wage nego- 
tiations increase the pressure on these unemployed workers to move to the 
expanding industries and regions against their actual wishes. A considerable pro- 
portion of the laid-off workers is unable to gain the qualifications required in the 
expanding industries, however, which means that especially when transfer pay- 
ments to the unemployed are generous it is not possible to avoid a permanent 
increase in unemployment.44 
It is often claimed for other reasons, however, that centralised wage negotiations 
have positive repercussions on investment in real capital and thus on the 
employment situation.45 Whereas with centralised wage negotiations the devel- 
opment of wages is orientated more towards macroeconomic factors, with 
decentralised wage negotiations the profitability situation of the individual firm 
is also a decisive influential factor. In this respect decentralised wage negotia- 
tions are closely related to profit-sharing systems as regards their conse- 
quences.46 Since in the case of decentralised wage negotiations the workers are 
able to skim off at least part of the profits arising from the production process, 
the firms' incentives to make new investments decrease according to this 
thesis.47 
This is opposed, however, by a number of positive effects of decentralised wage 
negotiations on investment behaviour. Investments are always decisions made 
under uncertainty, in which the optimum division of risk plays a considerable 
role. With functioning capital markets and a low level of discretionary freedom 
in the management's decision-making it makes sense for the capital owners to 
bear the entire firm-specific risk because they are able to diversify it by means of 
a broadly spread investment on the capital market. In reality, however, neither of 
the requirements are quite met. Especially in the area of innovative and high-risk 
investments the capital market shows considerable imperfections, especially in 
Germany. In Germany it is extremely difficult for young and innovative firms to 
acquire sufficient venture capital without providing appropriate material securi- 
ties.@ Owing to the inadequate supervision by the financial backers the man- 
agement also has considerable discretionary freedom in decision-making so that 
its behaviour which is averse to risk has an effect on investment decisions. 
Managers behave averse to risk because they generally have to accept income 
losses if they change their job involuntarily. Both arguments, imperfections on 
the capital market and management behaviour that is averse to risk, support hav- 
ing to take into account what effect a more volatile economic environment has 
on investment behaviour. Only if the firms behaved neutrally as regards risk 
would more frequent shocks have no significance in decisions regarding invest- 
ment. In the case of centralised wage negotiations the wages are not orientated 
towards the particular firm's profits. Thus the risk of investments in real capital 
is higher and the investment activity in the economy as a whole is morelikely to 
be lower with centralised than with decentralised wage negotiations as a result of 
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the risk aspect. The empirical significance of this argument can be substantiated 
by the fact that especially in young and innovative firms the pay is frequently 
linked to the business profit, so that a considerable part of the firm-specific risk 
is passed on to the employees. 
In addition to this, the argument that with a centralised organisation of wage 
negotiations there is a greater possibility of an agreement to go without wage 
rises today in order to facilitate higher investment in real capital and consequent- 
ly even greater wage increases tomorrow seems dubious.@ Firstly such "stand- 
still agreements" suffer from the classical problem of externalities. The positive 
returns are concentrated on the employees in whose firms the wage restraint 
leads to greater investments, whilst the rest of the workers come away largely 
empty-handed. Secondly it is more difficult to check at central level whether the 
profits made are really invested in real capital within the country. Thirdly such 
centrally organised "standstill agreements" usually only come into existence as a 
result of intervention by the state. The state then generally guarantees efficiency- 
reducing special advantages to both of the groups involved. The costs of these 
advantages often only come to light with a delay and are usually passed on to 
taxpayers, consumers and above all the future generations without the individ- 
ual noticing much. All three of these problems only occur to a lesser extent how- 
ever with decentralised wage negotiations so that "standstill agreements" are 
more likely to come into being at firm level without efficiency-reducing state 
involvement. On the whole the argument which is frequently presented that 
decentralised wage negotiations or also the introduction of a profit-sharing com- 
ponent in the wages have a negative effect on the real investment activity must 
be called into question in the light of the above arguments. The reverse relation- 
ship seems more likely to apply. 
Finally, minimum wages fixed bindingly at central level also reduce individual 
performance incentives as well as the willingness to invest increasingly above all 
in firm-specific human capital. As a result of this the gains in labour productivity 
and in economic growth decline. Individual performance incentives and the for- 
mation of firm-specific human capital are of little importance for the level of 
national income only when the economy produces primarily standardised, so- 
called Fordist products and is in a technological catching-up process. However 
this situation hardly exists any longer in Germany. I t  is more the case that the 
production structure is developing away from largely standardised, Fordist mass 
goods and towards more sophisticated and higher-quality "high-tech" products 
which can be used more flexibly. This post-Fordist production method stands 
out for a flexible specialisation in production technology. As the individual prod- 
ucts are only produced in small numbers, returns to scale can not be taken 
advantage of so we11.S0 
The more this technological catching-up process is completed and the more 
markedly the focus of production shifts towards 'high-tech" goods, the more 
the economy is forced to create technological knowledge itself. In such an envi- 
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ronment highly qualified activities gain importance and thus also the firm-spec- 
ific human capital, so that the question increasingly arises as to how workers can 
be motivated and trained also by means of appropriately arranged wage con- 
tracts. It is therefore becoming more and more important to use flexible qualifi- 
cation-related and sectoral wage structures and a high wage dispersion as incen- 
tive instruments. It must be borne in mind here, though, that firms' most impor- 
tant parameter of response to increased international competitive pressure in a 
post-Fordist environment is the introduction of innovative technologies and 
products. But this necessarily demands more decentral decision-making powers 
in order in this way to gain information and response advantages over the com- 
petitors. Not least for these reasons workers' pay must also be increasingly orien- 
tated towards success. Thus the firms require great leeway in the wage structure 
and wage level, which is ultimately only possible with decentralised wage nego- 
tiations.5' 
With a rapidly accelerating technological change in which the activities of the 
individual workers and firms are constantly becoming more heterogeneous, it is 
also more and more problematic to fix at central level wage groups into which 
the individual workers are pressed. The information problem increases so that 
central solutions become more inefficient. After all the information problem is 
known to have been partly responsible for the failure of the central administra- 
tive economies of Eastern Europe. It is almost inevitable that regulations made at 
central level overly restrict the management's freedom to use wage incentives to 
promote the workers' productivity.5' As centralised wage negotiations weaken 
the workers' incentive to form human capital, however, this then also causes a 
reduction in investment in real capital. This is immediately clear if it is borne in 
mind that human capital is a complementary production factor to real capital. 
Therefore in a world that is characterised meanwhile by post-Fordist production 
methods in which the generation of rents at firm level by building up informa- 
tion and response advantages over the competitors is gaining in importance, 
these aspects support the idea of giving preference to decentralised wage negoti- 
ations with regard to micro-flexibility.53 
Degree of centralisation of wage negotiations and macro-flexibility 
The next task is to check the thesis which is frequently stated that centralised 
wage negotiations result in a lower wage pressure than decentralised ones do, so 
they have a positive effect on a country's macro-flexibility. In order to discuss 
the problem of macro-flexibility, in the following the central idea of the hump 
shape hypothesis mentioned earlier is presented. Then it is shown that decen- 
tralised wage negotiations are ultimately superior with regard to macro-flexibili- 
ty, 
The hump shape hypothesis claims that both centralised and decentralised wage 
negotiations lead to wage restraint and thus to favourable employment results, 
whilst wage negotiations at middle level such as at industry level foster aggres- 
sive wage increases, therefore causing employment losses.55 This theoretical 
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result arises as follows. With decentralised wage negotiations at firm level those 
with jobs have no freedom in wage setting. As an individual firm is virtually 
unable to pass aggressive wage rises on to the prices, the immediate result is lay- 
offs. If the wage negotiations are conducted at industry level, on the other hand, 
then the firms have a certain scope for price setting because those with demand 
for the goods can not easily switch over to products from other industries. The 
temptation to enforce excessive wage agreements is therefore far higher at indus- 
try level because the related employment losses are smaller. The costs of exces- 
sive wages can largely be passed on to the rest of the economy in the form of 
higher prices for goods. As all industry-wide trade unions behave in this way, 
though, the wage rise pressure is too great on the whole so that macroeconomic 
employment losses are the inevitable consequence. The situation with wage 
negotiations at central level is different again. On the one hand the trade union's 
negotiating power is very great in this case because it is ultimately able to bring 
the whole economy to a standstill. On the other hand, however, at least in a 
closed economy no more costs can be passed on because an increase in unem- 
ployment and inflation must ultimately always be borne by the members of the 
centrally organised trade union. In this respect there is no longer any incentive to 
enforce excessive wage agreements. Therefore both centralised wage negotia- 
tions trusting in social consensus and decentralised wage negotiations orientated 
towards competition lead to wage restraint and thus to similarly good employ- 
ment results, whereas wage negotiations at middle industry level lead to  poorer 
employment results. 
However, there is a number of weighty arguments in favour of ultimately prefer- 
ring decentralised wage negotiations also with respect to macro-flexibility. 
Increased international trade and an accelerating structural change increase the 
probability of data changes arising which concern specific sectors, regions and 
worker groups. Such specific data changes can, however, be dealt with far better 
by decentralised wage negotiations because they permit greater flexibility in the 
wage structures and a greater wage dispersion. In addition to that, with cen- 
tralised wage negotiations there are generally partially informal subsequent 
negotiations at firm level, also in order to defuse the problem of micro-inflexibil- 
ity. The central wage agreements are therefore only binding at the lower end and 
not at the upper end so that the conflict between unemployed people and those 
with jobs is not really alleviated. These subsequent negotiations generally take 
place under a duty to refrain from industrial action, which means that the 
employees are not allowed to strike and the employers have to pay at least the 
wage agreed at central level.s6 Nonetheless the employees are able to exert con- 
siderable pressure on the firms by threatening to work to rule or by using code- 
termination rights that they are entitled to. Such wage agreements at several lev- 
els tend to lead to greater wage pressure than when negotiations are conducted at 
one level only, which can only realistically be the case with decentralised wage 
negotiations. Furthermore, relatively high wage agreements at central level also 
reduce the firms' possibilities to fan out the wage structure by means of volun- 
tary supplements in order to  alleviate incentive problems. Thus wage negotia- 
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tions at several levels intensify both the problem of macro-inflexibility and that 
of micro-inflexibility.57 
This can also be shown if the case of Sweden is examined more closely, a country 
which was for a long time a perfect example of centralised wage agreements and 
allegedly of moderation in real wages. In Sweden restraint in real wages was 
achieved not by concessions in the nominal wages but by the acceptance of con- 
siderable, discretionary devaluations of the nominal exchange rate and, in the 
wake of this, acceptance of high inflation rates compared with the average of the 
OECD states. High inflation rates are, however, probably a necessary condition 
for central wage negotiations to function. If nominal wages are downwardly rigid 
both at central level and at the subsequent negotiation levels, then real wage 
restraint connected with an adequate wage differentiation with a relatively low 
trend growth of labour productivity requires the acceptance of higher inflation 
rates. If great importance is attached to the aim of price stability then this is a 
serious disadvantage of centralised wage negotiation ~ ~ s t e m s . 5 ~  
The moderation in real wages in Sweden caused by the relatively high inflation 
rates was, however, by no means so marked that it could explain satisfactorily 
the considerably better employment trend that prevailed for a long time. This is 
easier to do if one takes into account the enormous over-expansion of state 
employment and of active labour market policy as well as the increasing tax bur- 
den and national debt which inevitably accompany this. However, this is not a 
specifically Swedish phenomenon; it can be observed generally that countries 
with a high degree of centralisation in wage negotiations put a lot of money into 
active labour market policy. In such countries the state therefore easily degener- 
ates to a repair firm for a wage policy that is not orientated sufficiently towards 
employment.59 In these countries the two sides of industry are more likely to 
manage to take the state hostage with regard to employment policy and to blur 
the economic-policy distribution of tasks that is actually sensible in economic 
terms. 
In conclusion it can thus be stated that decenaalised wage negotiations have a 
positive effect these days not only on micro-flexibility but also on macro-flexi- 
bility. Alliances for work should therefore be established at firm level and not for 
instance at the national level with intervention from the government. It is 
important, however, to arrange decentralised wage negotiations in such a way 
that the people in employment are not in a position to block new hirings. The 
legislator should therefore exercise great restraint in the case of statutory dis- 
missal costs and legally imposed co-determination rights for the staff in compa- 
ny decisions, so at least from this point of view the expansion of employees' co- 
determination rights which was initiated under the Schroder-government was 
counter-productive.60 
Besides the reduction of statutory dismissal costs, the transition to more decen- 
tralised wage negotiations thus constitutes the most important point of depar- 
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ture to make the wage setting behaviour not only more restrained but above all 
also more flexible and more differentiated with regard to qualifications, sectors 
and regions. In today's economic environment, which is characterised by a high 
degree of volatility and a rapid structural change, firms require greater freedom 
in decision-making in order to be able to respond more rapidly in particular to 
crisis situations. It is therefore indispensable to shift the wage negotiation com- 
petences, too, as quickly as possible from sectoral level to firm level. 
The transition to more decentralised wage negotiations 
It is not surprising therefore that a development towards more decentralised 
wage negotiations can be observed in numerous OECD countries. In these OEcD 
countries economic rule already seems to be asserting itself against political 
force. What is problematic, however, is that Germany is clearly lagging behind in 
this decentralisation process.61 Therefore the question arises as to how the tran- 
sition to a more decentralised collective bargaining policy can take place in 
Germany, too, and how it might be speeded up. The rigorous solution is to can- 
cel entirely § 77 paragraph 3 of the Law on Labour Relations at the Workplace 
("Betriebliche Regelungssperre/Betriebsverfassungsgesetz so that wage nego- 
tiations at firm level would be admissible without restriction. The huge resis- 
tance against this path which can still be observed today makes it seem rather 
unlikely however that this logical solution can be reached within the foreseeable 
future. The radical alternative is that no statutory and/or collectively agreed 
flexibilisation steps are undertaken and the corporatist state disintegrates gradu- 
ally or even eruptively under the pressure of economic constraints. This process 
can take a very long time, however, and is in this respect associated with sub- 
stantial efficiency losses. If, furthermore, one wishes to avoid the eruptive and 
thus also largely uncontrolled collapse of the corporatist state, the thing to do 
would be to delegate decision-making competences to the firms rapidly and in a 
controlled way in order to create scope for flexibility and to reinforce the capaci- 
ty to adapt to shocks. Such a way is in all probability not associated with a com- 
plete loss of competence on the part of the unions, so it should also be in their 
interest. 
In the meantime there are numerous suggestions in literature as to what shape 
this could take with an institutional arrangement of wage negotiations that is in 
principle unchanged to begin with.62 A first suggestion is that the collectively 
agreed wages effective at sectoral or regional level continue to provide the collec- 
tively agreed framework for the working time and the level of pay, but that this 
can be deviated from at firm level. The employees both in firms bound by collec- 
tive agreements and in firms which are not can then in principle decide with a 
qualified majority about whether they wish to deviate from the sectoral or 
regional wage agreement. In addition to the works council, all other coalitions of 
workers are also able to be a party to a collective agreement. In general, sectoral 
or regional wage agreements should in future include the option that with regard 
to the wage level the individual firms can deviate in a downward direction if the 
firm and the works council simultaneously agree on a certain level of employ- 
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ment or if the firm introduces in return an adequate profit-sharing component in 
the pay.63 In addition to this it would also be possible simply to fix at union level 
a corridor within which the wage rises have to move. Furthermore the collective 
agreements should increasingly include hardship clauses and exemption clauses 
permitting the firms to pay less than the centrally agreed wage rises during times 
of crisis. Finally lower entry wages should be created for problem groups such 
as the long-term unemployed, new entrants to the labour market and older 
workers. 
It is the responsibility of the legislator to accompany positively such a policy of 
shifting decision-making competences to firm level. The legislator will do this 
task justice if he firstly changes the Law on Labour Relations at the Workplace to 
the effect that remuneration and other conditions of employment may in future 
also be regulated unequivocally by means of a works agreement. Secondly the 
principle of favourability ('Giinstigkeitsprinzip") in the Collective Bargaining 
Act should be arranged in such a way that it can also be to the employee's advan- 
tage if he or she is paid below the agreed wage rate but in return keeps his job or 
is employed at all. Thirdly the legislator should make more precise at least the 
criteria regarding when a declaration of general application of collectively agreed 
wages ('~Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserkl%rung") is in the interest of the general 
public.64 What would be even better, though, is to abolish the institution of the 
declaration of general application entirely straight away. 
110 
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5.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
To summarize it can be stated that a therapy for the persisting employment crisis 
in Europe which is adequate for the causes must amount mainly to a permanent 
strengthening of the market forces above all on the labour market. It is frequently 
pointed out that there are numerous causes of unemployment and that therefore 
a mono-causal explanatory approach does not do justice to the complexity of the 
problem. However, even if this is without doubt right, it must still be empha- 
sised from an economic point of view that wage moderation and flexible wage 
structures as well as the unemployed showing a high level of willingness to work 
are crucial requirements for permanently good employment results. Countries 
such as the USA, which put their trust in this market-economy principle of a flex- 
ible price to balance supply and demand also on the labour market, prove to be 
superior to the more corporatist countries of Europe with regard to economic 
and employment growth in the longer term. Of course even on a competitive 
labour market the wage level and the wage structures are not perfectly flexible. 
The pronounced rigidity of these two factors in Germany, however, can be 
attributed decisively to state interventions. It is essential to reduce these rigidi- 
ties which have political causes if one is interested in a longer-term improve- 
ment in the employment results. As the market forces on the labour market have 
been largely restricted by the government it is not possible to hope that together 
with a start of economic growth they will suffice to reduce unemployment deci- 
sively. What is necessary is more an offensive in favor of giving market forces 
greater leeway on all markets, but especially on the labour market. 
- 
Such an offensive focussing must revive the price mechanism on the labour mar- 
ket and thus contribute to a more moderate and more flexible wage setting 
behaviour. A reduction of all statutory regulations which grant privileges to the 
people with jobs at the expense of those without helps towards this aim. An 
extensive reduction of statutory dismissal costs is an important step in this 
direction. In addition to this the trend that can be observed internationally 
towards more decentralised wage negotiations helps to make wage setting 
behaviour become more restrained and above all more flexible. In this respect it 
must be classified as a disadvantage from a German viewpoint that Germany is 
lagging behind other countries in the development towards more decentralised 
wage negotiations. All the statutory regulations that help to stabilise the current 
wage bargaining cartel should be put under the microscope. 
However, it will hardly be possible even in the medium term to reduce the exist- 
ing mass unemployment extensively solely by means of a change in the course of 
wage policy. What is also required are additional measures which specifically 
help to reintegrate the (long-term) unemployed into the labour market. A first 
key point of departure for this is the arrangement of the transfer payments to the 
unemployed, that is unemployment benefit, unemployment assistance and 
social assistance. In their present form all of these systems foster the emergence 
of long-term unemployment. From an economic point of view unemployment 
assistance is absurd and foreign to the system. I t  should be abolished. 
Unemployment benefit should only be paid for a shorter period and should also 
be gradually reduced. If in addition the criteria of what an unemployed person 
has to accept in a job are tightened, then the result that can be expected from all 
these measures together is a lasting increase in the search intensity of the unem- 
ployed. Social assistance should finally be paid to unemployed people who are 
able to work only on condition that they are willing to work. 
The state should also help the unemployed to get back into the regular labour 
market. As a result of the numerous problems associated with this, however, the 
state should make less use of state training and employment schemes and on no 
account use general wage subsidies that are unlimited as regards time. It makes 
more sense to permit the unemployed, depending on the length of their unem- 
ployment, to convert some of their entitlement to state benefits into wage subsi- 
dies for a limited period. This would reduce the 'runemployment trap" which 
generally exists in Europe's welfare states, and would in addition help the unem- 
ployed to build up human capital again 'bn the job". 
Having the right remedies is one thing, implementing them in a democracy is 
another. It is particularly difficult because although all the measures that seem 
suitable for permanently improving the situation on the labour market do 
improve the situation of many people, there are always also some who lose, even 
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if only temporarily and in relation to the winners. Therefore the question as to 
how it can be possible to steer clear of these political-economy cliffs and actually 
to carry through employment-enhancing measures in the political decision- 
making process is one which is extremely complex and remains largely unan- 
swered. A considerable number of the proposed measures affect without a doubt 
the vested rights of the people with jobs. As these people exert an especially 
great influence on political decisions, however, considerable difficulties have to 
be expected when such painful interventions are translated into policy. State 
interventions in the labour markets' capacity to function fulfil an important 
political-economy function. They create a greater political middle class, which is 
interested in political stability and in maintaining the status quo. In this way 
they are useful to both politicians and people with jobs. But this is at the expense 
of the unemployed and at the expense of future generations, because economies 
with persistently high unemployment suffer growth losses. The dreadful 
employment situation must therefore be regarded altogether as a political-econo- 
my problem. 
However, this political-economy problem does not mean that it is permanently 
,-- 
impossible to deregulate the labour market politically.65 The transition from the 
currently rigid labour market to a considerably more flexible one is probably easi- 
est to pull off if at least the following conditions are met. This requires firstly 
Schumpeterian political entrepreneurs who credibly make their trademark a 
market-economy orientation in economic policy. They must resolutely put 
through an extensive package of measures to strengthen the market forces. The 
chances of successfully implementing such a programme of reforms increase sec- 
ondly if it includes a certain amount of compensation for those who lose out as a 
result of the reforms, and additional demand-policy measures. The latter con- 
tribute towards the positive employment effects not taking too long to happen, 
without the inflation rate rising as a result. In addition to this, thirdly, the right 
timing is of crucial importance. From a political-economy viewpoint it makes 
sense to tackle an extensive package of radical reforms immediately after a 
change of government. 
Such a offensive in favor of strengthening market forces is, however, in any case 
only implementable in political terms when there is an appropriate pressure to 
make decisions and if the principle of the institutions of a market economy once 
again meets with a greater agreement in the population. Only a government that 
pursues the fundamental principles of competition on all markets will have the 
power and credibility to liberalise a labour market which is particularly explosive 
politically. For this reason alone a consistent liberalisation of the labour market 
should be connected with an appropriate policy of deregulation also on the 
goods and capital markets. This makes additional sense because especially the 
existence of monopoly rents on the goods and capital markets stirs up distribu- 
tion conflicts and reinforces the incentive for the job-holders to cartelise the 
labour market and in this way to skim off part of these monopoly rents. Finally 
an arrangement of the goods and capital markets that is more competition- 
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orientated is needed to achieve a higher rate of new business start-ups and the 
creation of innovative products that are strong in added value. Without the boost 
in economic dynamics triggered off by this, it will hardly be possible to get the 
employment problems in Europe under control.66 On the whole, however, irre- 
spective of all the political-economy difficulties, more market is to be expected 
in any case on the labour market, too, in the longer-term. The visible rapid tech- 
nological change, which is increasingly pushing low-skilled workers out of the 
production process, and the rapid globalisation of the markets will gradually 
weaken the blockade attitude of the people with jobs, thus smoothing the way 
for reforms. 
If it is therefore possible sooner or later to grant right of way again to a way of 
"neoliberal" thinking and to push the employment aim into the foreground again 
in economic and collective bargaining policy, then this is also the best distribu- 
tion policy in the medium- to longer-term. The unemployed are best helped if 
they are able to perform a regular job. If appropriate reforms get investment 
activity going again, then lasting employment gains can be achieved without the 
workers losing income permanently. As the examples of other successful reform 
countries such as Holland, Great Britain or New Zealand have impressively 
shown, when investment activity is started up it opens up to the same extent the 
scope for employment gains and wage increases in the long run. Therefore it is 
essential to stand up to pessimism and fatalism in view of the persisting mass 
unemployment. Unemployment is not an inevitable fate but can be avoided to 
quite a large extent by improving institutional conditions. However, the exciting 
question as to how the necessary political majorities can be forged from this 
knowledge remains largely unanswered. 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
High and persistent unemployment, like that in Germany, is often attributed to a 
lack of labour market flexibility. The OECD Job Study, the EU Commission, the 
German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverstandigenrat) and the European 
Central Bank are obviously in agreement on this. Mr Tietrneier, in the days of the 
German Federal Bank, and today Mr Duisenberg have referred to inflexible 
labour markets that bind the hands of monetary policy. Europe and Germany can 
not grow more rapidly because so-called 'rigidities' in the labour market prevent 
it. Expansionary economic policy measures would produce nothing but more 
inflation and no additional employment. In other words, this position claims 
that in the Federal Republic of Germany an unemployment rate of eight or nine 
percent is equivalent to the equilibrium unemployment rate. This is the non- 
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment which arises as a result of the insti- 
tutional conditions (the 'rigidities') in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
According to this thesis lower unemployment can only be achieved by 'deregu- 
lating' the labour market, and this is then usually followed by a long list of wel- 
fare-state institutions that are supposedly a spanner in the works of the labour 
market (cf. for example Siebert 1997). 
There is no doubt that inflexible economies and labour markets that do not 
respond to changes in the basic conditions will not be able to set the tone in eco- 
nomic terms, they will fall behind and will have to let other more flexible 
economies have the first league. Rigidities reduce the capacity for adjustment 
and competition. Who can fail to agree with that? But what are rigidities in 
labour markets, what is a flexible labour market? What does the institutional 
framework of a flexible, economically fit economy look like, how must the 
labour market be organised so that the economy can grow as smoothly as possi- 
ble and so that it achieves as high a level of efficiency as possible? In this paper I 
would like to restrict myself to the theoretical and empirical evidence for the 
growth-hampering and employment-damaging effect of welfare-state institu- 
tions and regulations, and not touch upon other assessment criteria than a high- 
est possible efficiency - even though these can not be less relevant (Stiglitz 2000, 
Krueger 2000). 
Popular though this thesis of over-regulated European labour markets is, the 
empirical evidence of the employrnent-enhancing effect of deregulation or vice 
versa the employment-damaging effect of welfare-state institutions is amazingly 
thin. It is at any rate out of all proportion to the absoluteness of the 'deregulation 
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demands', as even 'The Economist" occasionally complains. Whilst unemploy- 
ment in Europe was increasing steadily, unemployment benefits were by no 
means increased but were lowered, the criteria for jobs that have to be accepted 
were not relaxed but made stricter etc. (for a detailed overview cf.: Esping- 
Andersen/Regini 2000 and for Germany cf. Fuchs/Schettkat 2000). The devel- 
opment of the institutional regulations which potentially cause labour market 
rigidities is not a suitable reason for the increasing unemployment and employ- 
ment weakness in Europe. 'Timing is wrong" says Professor Solow (2001) briefly 
and succinctly commenting on attempts to attribute Europe's unemployment to 
an increasingly generous welfare state. 
The deregulation argument also gets its strength above all from the model of per- 
fect markets (markets with complete information, infinite speed of adjustment 
etc), which is based on numerous assumptions. The 'perfect market' is used as a 
yardstick for assessing welfare-state institutions, and deviations from this refer- 
ence model are classified as 'rigidities' which only disturb the tendency for equi- 
librium. It is assumed that markets without 'artificial' institutional interventions 
would function in the way that the idealised theoretical model intends, though 
'natural' rigidities are usually left out of account here. Of course no serious econ- 
omist claims that the ideal market model is an adequate description of reality, 
which is of course far more complex and less 'perfect', but - it is argued - it is an 
appropriate reference model. It is inferred from the conclusiveness of the ideal 
model, which is based on numerous assumptions, that countries which come 
closer to the theoretical ideal model show a better economic and/or employ- 
ment-policy development. 
Indeed numerous welfare-state regulations seem to be unnecessary or inefficient 
when they are compared with the model of perfect markets. Reality must always 
do badly compared with this model. In real markets, however, there are 'real 
rigidities', which is why the negative employment effects of regulation, which 
are derived with the model of perfect markets, are also by no means so clear the- 
oretically. ''Some of the so-called rigidities may represent rough institutional 
corrections for other distortion of the labor market" (Blanchard/Wolfers rggg: 
12). It is even possible that without institutional embedding, asymmetric infor- 
mation would cause the market to 'die', as F'rofessor George Akerlof (1970) 
showed in his 'markets for lemons'. Josef Stiglitz (1994) argues that if the 
assumptions of the ideal market model were correct, then planned economies 
would be the ideal form of economy, since one would know according to the 
assumption exactly what was needed where, what could be produced where, 
what the equilibrium prices were etc. But it is well known that planned 
economies did not survive and in leading economics the questions are asked as to 
how markets actually function (Gordon 1g8g), what consequences incomplete 
and asymmetric information has on the players' market behaviour, what conse- 
quences interactions between the expectations of the market participants have. 
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What is referred to in economics as flexibility is described in biology as fitness - 
the ability of organisms to adapt in such a way that their ability to survive is 
high.' The standard statement on-Germany's labour market situation assumes 
that there is only one optimal institutional arrangement, which is equivalent to 
the 'ideal' of unregulated markets. The closer one gets to this ideal, the better the 
labour market situation. This idea is portrayed in figure 6.1 in the upper fitness 
landscape. Economic fitness reaches its maximum when the real institutions cor- 
respond to those of the idealised market model. Here there is only one optimal 
form of the institutions, the landscape of institutions and economic fitness is 
unimodal. In such a model world, international comparisons and policy recom- 
mendations are relatively simple: 
- the fittest economy is identified (the economy with the lowest unemploy- 
ment rate, the highest rate of economic or employment growth etc.); 
- recommendations are given to copy the institutional arrangement of this 
economy. 
As there is only one single optimal constellation, any movement towards these 
institutions must increase the economic fitness. Neither in identifying the fittest 
economy nor in analysing the institutional arrangements is it necessary to go 
into much detail, since above all the theoretical analysis guides the action. The 
optimal institutional arrangement has been deduced from the model of perfect 
markets and empirical knowledge is more or less used only as illustration. The 
USA, as a supposedly deregulated economy, enjoys great popularity in this 
respect. In the second half of the iggos the USA was undoubtedly very successful, 
they reduced unemployment without inflationary pressure (cf. Blinderflellen 
2001). At the same time the welfare state in the USA is minimal, dismissal pro- 
tection is virtually unknown, the trade unions are weak and wages are flexible 
But the Netherlands, too, are often used to illustrate the correctness of the neo- 
classical policy recommendations. Have the Netherlands not lowered unemploy- 
ment benefit payments and experienced an expansion of employment which 
even surpasses the boom in the USA? That is right, but it is also right that the 
Netherlands are one of the best countries in  the world for social security and its 
institutional arrangements can certainly not be equated with those of the USA. 
It is therefore not in any way agreed either empirically or theoretically that there 
is only one optimal arrangement for highly developed economies. It is more like- 
ly that several institutional arrangements can achieve similarly good results. In 
other words it has not been shown theoretically and definitely not empirically 
that deregulated economies produce the better results. It is more the case that 
there can be a multitude of institutional arrangements that can all yield equally 
good results. Capitalist economies can be multimodal (figure 6.1, lower graph). 
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Figure 6.1 Fitness landscapes: institutional arrangements and economic fitness 
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In the following, labour-market-related institutional arrangements in the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Netherlands are compared with each other and it is 
examined whether the institutional differences can plausibly explain the remark- 
ably diverging employment development in the Netherlands and Germany. If the 
hypothesis of the employment-damaging effect of welfare-state institutions is 
right, the Netherlands should be "more deregulated" than Germany in important 
aspects, the transfer payments should be lower and the incentives to take up 
work should be greater. It can be seen, however, that the Dutch welfare state is 
more generous, dismissal protection is stricter and wage negotiations have 
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become like those in Germany in institutional terms. Regulations that are fre- 
quently criticised in Germany such as the assumption of dependent employment 
in some contracts for services, a right to part-time work etc. have long been com- 
mon practice in the Netherlands. 
I would like to take up three areas of institutional regulations which are particu- 
larly interesting for the Germany-Netherlands comparison and which are fre- 
quently blamed for the labour market problems. (I) Dismissal protection, where 
the Netherlands have stricter regulations than Germany, (2) wage negotiation 
systems, where the Netherlands have come closer to Germany's regulations, and 
(3) incentives to take up work associated with transfer payments, tax and social- 
security contributions. 
6.2 DISMISSAL PROTECTION 
Although dismissal protection occupies a prominent position in political debate, 
the simplifications in the conclusion of fixed-term employment contracts 
(Employment Promotion Act of 1986 and its numerous extensions) have only 
been used to a small extent in Germany (Biichtemann/Holand 1989, Bielenski 
1997, Bielenski/Kohler/Schreiber-Kittligg4). Why do firms not use the possi- 
bility of fixed-term employment contracts to a greater extent, why are they 
found above all in the lower-skilled labour market segment and why are they 
used above all as an extended probationary period? One answer can be found in 
the 'natural rigidities' of the labour market. In general the firms have an informa- 
tion deficit about an applicant's actual qualifications, about whether the advised 
hiring is actually a good 'match' and about whether the new employee will pos- 
sess the expected productivity. 
Dismissal protection (or the severance payments association with it) increase the 
wage costs and thus shift the labour demand function in figure 6.2 from Ld' to 
Ld". Fewer people are employed at a given wage (in figure 6.2 employment falls 
from E' to E"'). How far downwards will the labour demand function shift? This 
depends on the extent to which the dismissal protection actually leads to an 
additional cost burden for the firm, which in turn depends on the exact arrange- 
ment of the dismissal protection, on the employment stability in the firm and on 
the recruitment costs. 
Absolute dismissal protection in the sense that dismissals are not possible at all 
will certainly push the labour demand function down clearly. But there is no 
absolute dismissal protection either in the Netherlands or in Germany. 
Terminations of employment relationships are possible in both countries 
although they require a reason and a notice period of at least four weeks. In both 
of the countries the statutory regulations can be extended by collective agree- 
ments or  individual agreements. Unlike in Germany, however, dismissals in the 
Netherlands still have to be approved by the employment offices, although a 
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Wage negotiations can take place decentrally at firm or even individual level, or 
at the other end of the scale they can take place at centralised level between the 
leading employee and employer associations (cf. Calmfors/Driffill1988, 
Appelbaum/Schettkat 1996 and literature listed there). Two different effects are 
associated with an increasing degree of organisation of the workers. Firstly the 
power of the organised workers increases along with the degree of centralisation, 
which corresponds to a monopoly if it is fully centralised, in which case the 
temptation to misuse power (the price or wage mark-up) is known to be at its 
greatest. This negative effect is opposed, however, by the internalisation of nega- 
tive effects, which also increases along with the degree of centralisation. For a 
trade union that represents all the workers, negative effects of their wage policy 
will affect their own members, which is why the effects are carefully weighed 
up. Mancur Olson deduced that organised interests are all the more harmful the 
more specific they are, because then the negative effects influence the rest of the 
economy but burden one's own clientele only imperceptibly. The wage agree- 
ments for pilots that were concluded between the Cockpit organisation and 
Lufthansa may illustrate the Olson thesis. Collectively agreed wages are usually 
declared to be generally applicable in the Netherlands, which is often criticised as 
opposing an employrnent-enhancing wage differentiation. But the general appli- 
cation of the collective agreements of course also leads to trade unions internalis- 
ing the macroeconomic consequences of their wage policy, which can produce 
positive employment effects. 
Both in the Netherlands and in Germany most employees work under industry- 
specific collective agreements (Hartog 1999). Collective bargaining autonomy has 
actually been in existence in the Netherlands since the late 1970s but has only 
been established by law since 1986. Previously the government was able to inter- 
vene directly in wage negotiations and there was an automatic price compensa- 
tion (Scala Mobile like in Italy). In the course of time the negotiation level has 
shifted from central level to industry level, which is known in the Netherlands 
as decentralisation. In Germany, like in the Netherlands, the collective agree- 
ments contain emergency clauses which provide for deviations from the collec- 
tively agreed regulations in practice when the survival of the firm is at stake 
(Hartog 1999, Fuchs/Schettkat 2000). In the Netherlands of the 1990s collective 
bargaining was organised in roughly the same way as in Germany but, because of 
the size of the Netherlands, without regionalisation components. The 
Netherlands have come closer to Germany with regard to the wage negotiation 
institutions. 
The Dutch and the German wage bargaining systems are very similar, however, 
and also produce very similar wage distributions, which are at the lower end of 
the scale compared with international values. Thus for instance the relation of 
the wage of the lo percent best-paid workers (Dg) to that of the 10 percent 
worst-paid workers (Dl) is 2.3 in Germany, and 2.6 in the Netherlands, but 4.4 in 
the USA. Interestingly the differences between the two European countries and 
the USA turn up in other statistics, too, such as the proportion of children living 
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in poverty, which is some 25 percent in the USA but only about l o  percent in the 
Netherlands and Germany. Differences between Germany and the Netherlands 
are found above all in the development of the wage level, which has risen only 
very slightly over a twenty-year period in the Netherlands and has contributed 
considerably to the foreign trade success of the Netherlands (cf. Schettkat/ 
Reijnders 2000). 
High minimum wages and a small wage spread are often identified as the 'roots 
of Europe's employment problems' (e.g. Siebert 1997), which is why the 'wage 
gap principle' occupies an outstanding position in the discussion surrounding 
employment policy. The Netherlands (like the USA, too) have a statutory mini- 
mum wage which fell clearly in the 1980s, but which in the Netherlands still 
amounts to some 58 percent of the average wage and thus lies clearly above the 
us minimum wage (approx. 35% of the average wage). In Germany, social securi- 
ty establishes a minimum wage demand (Sinn 1998) which is comparable in its 
labour market effects with those of the minimum wage. If social assistance 
including housing benefit payments for a single person is taken as a basis, then 
the minimum wage demand that can be derived from this is 32 percent in 
Germany and thus lies approximately at the level of the American minimum 
wage (Freeman/Schettkat 1998). 
Freeman and Schettkat (2000) also find on the basis of the Comparative German- 
American Structural Database (CGAS, cf. Freeman/Schettkat 1998) that the wage 
structure in the upper qualification sector in Germany is clearly more condensed 
than in the USA, but that in the lower qualification segment there are more 
'returns to education' in Germany than in the USA. Undoubtedly the individual 
wages vary less in Europe than in the USA but the raw wage variation is of course 
irrelevant, since any economist will agree that wages should be differentiated 
according to qualifications. A broader spread of the qualifications also leads to a 
greater variation of wages. In the USA the spread of qualifications is clearly greater 
than that in Germany and the Netherlands, which is concealed by the customary 
indicator for qualifications - periods of formal education. In the USA formal edu- 
cation periods have a higher mean value and a lower variation than in Germany 
(Freeman/Schettkat 2000). The use of formal education periods as an indicator 
for qualifications assumes, however, that an academic year in the USA generates 
the same qualifications as in Holland or Germany. But the education systems are 
actually very different with regard to intensity of learning, length of schooling, 
teaching qualifications, motivation of the pupils etc. Before the PISA study, the 
OECD together with Statistics Canada conducted an internationally comparative 
survey of job-relevant qualifications among the population of working age (aged 
15 and above), which shows in standardised form on a scale of o to 500 for exarn- 
ple the capacity to process written and quantitative information (OECD 1995, 
1997). This was the first comparable survey of qualifications among the adult pop- 
ulation, and it shows clearly differing distributions between the USA and the 
European countries, but very similar distributions in Germany and the Nether- 
lands. It is not so much the mean values as the variation, which differs clearly 
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from that in Germany and the Netherlands especially at the lower end of the qual- 
ification scale.3 Figure 6.3 illustrates the qualification differentials among workers 
and unemployed people in the Netherlands, Germany and the USA. 
If the claim that a higher wage spread can integrate the low-skilled unemployed 
into the employment system is right then in the USA the qualification decile of 
the workers in employment should be roughly equal to that of the unemployed, 
since the unemployed should not be selected negatively according to the integra- 
tion thesis. In the two European countries, however, clear qualification differ- 
ences between the unemployed and those in work should open up. The large dis- 
crepancy between the qualifications of workers and those of the unemployed is 
found in the USA, however, and not in Europe. In other words the American 
unemployed have clearly lower qualifications than the Americans in work, 
whilst the Dutch and German unemployed have roughly the same qualification 
levels as the people in employment. 
This finding completely contradicts the wage compression hypothesis and con- 
firms the results of Steve Nickel1 and Brian Bell (1996) as well as those of Freeman 
and Schettkat (~ooo),  which find that the relative unemployment of people with a 
low qualification level is approximately as high in countries with a 'flexible' wage 
structure as in countries with a 'rigid' wage structure. It is possible that the effect 
of relative wages on the relative employment chances of low-skilled workers is 
overrated. The differences between the USA and Germany regarding labour force 
participation are then also not qualification-specific but can be determined in gen- 
eral in all qualification levels (Freeman/Schettkat 2000). 
Figure 6.3 Differences in qualification levels in the Netherlands, Germany and the USA 
Workers 
Unemployed 
NL - D  USA 
- 
Wages Dl/D5 64 -69% 
Source: calculations are based on the International Adult Literacy Survey 
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6.4 TRANSFER PAYMENTS, TAXES, SOCIAL-SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS 
Are the incentives to take up work sufficient? The answer to this question 
depends of course on the achievable wage and on the family status because when 
an unemployed person takes up a job, housing benefit and other transfers may be 
reduced or cancelled altogether. The relation between net wages and net transfers 
determines the incentives to take up employment and if net transfers exceed the 
net wages, then employment is only likely to be taken up in exceptions. As 
earned income often reduces transfer payments almost proportionately, the mar- 
ginal tax rates for low incomes can be very high, which is rightly of great impor- 
tance in the debate surrounding the incentive effects of transfers and taxes. 
Transfer payments, taxes and social-security contributions are very difficult to 
compare internationally and average values are frequently used, which can be 
very misleading, however, if the individual conditions (for instance the family 
status, number of children etc) have an influence on these quantities. In some 
countries transfers are subject to taxation (in the Netherlands) whereas in other 
countries they are largely excluded from taxation (like in Germany). The Dutch 
'Central Plan Bureau' (CPB, 1995) has worked out data that take into considera- 
tion the family allowances and housing benefits etc. As these benefits generally 
depend on the income and family status, values for single people and single- 
earner households with two children are presented here. 
In unemployment benefit (and unemployment assistance) the net wage replace- 
ment rates are higher in Holland for all lengths of unemployment than they are 
in Germany. Only in the case of a single-earner couple with two children does an 
unemployed person in the Netherlands receive lower wage replacement benefits 
than in Germany. In all other cases Dutch unemployment benefit is more gener- 
ous than the German eqivalent. Although the wage replacement benefits in the 
event of unemployment have been reduced in the Netherlands, they are still 
higher than those in Germany even if a spell of unemployment lasts 60 months, 
apart from the exception mentioned above. In other words the monetary incen- 
tives for taking up work which are derived from unemployment benefit are high- 
er in Germany than in Holland.4 
In both of the countries the transfer payments may be reduced or cancelled if job 
offers are turned down. The definition of acceptable jobs has been made more 
strict both in Holland and in Germany in the course of time. Losses of income 
amounting to 20 to 30 percent have to be accepted in Germany during the first 
six months of unemployment and after that any job that provides an income at 
least equivalent to the level of unemployment benefit is regarded as reasonable 
(Emmerich 2001). In the Netherlands the acceptance is defined depending on the 
qualification level. In the first six months of unemployment the original qualifi- 
cation level is taken as a basis, after that time the acceptance definition is reduced 
by one qualification level every six months (Emmerich 2001). 
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Is it worth working? Figure 6.4 shows net wages as a percentage of transfer pay- 
ments. Even in the case of the minimum wage (collectively agreed minimum 
wage) it is worthwhile in both countries for a single person to take up a job. Only 
in the case of a single-earner couple with two children and minimum wage is the 
transfer income in Germany higher than the earned income, and in the 
Netherlands the earned income is only just above the transfers in this case. If fac- 
tors of need play a role, such as in the case of single-earner couples with children, 
the reduction of transfer payments can even overcompensate for the achievable 
earned income. This is a real poverty trap which urgently requires correction and 
for which numerous credit models have been suggested that would make it 
financially attractive to take up work. In the Netherlands this 'need effect' has 
been moderated by taxation and transfer income being orientated above all 
towards the individual and being largely independent of the household context 
(Schettkatnocarini 2001). 
In summary it can be stated that, with the exception of single-earner couples 
with children, in the Netherlands the taxes and social-security contributions are 
higher and unemployment benefits more generous than in Germany.5 Explaining 
the Dutch employment miracle solely with microeconomic 'push factors' is 
therefore not very plausible. It is more the case that 'pull factors' must be includ- 
ed for the explanation of the Dutch-German employment differences. 
Figure 6.4 Net wages as a percentage of the net transfers 
Single 
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Source: calculations are based on CPB 1995 
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6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The institutional arrangement of-the Dutch labour market is very similar to the 
German institutional arrangement. In many areas, such as collective bargaining 
or unemployment benefit, the Dutch institutions have moved towards the 
German ones. As a rule the Dutch regulations are more restrictive than the 
German ones, however, and the Dutch transfer system is more generous than its 
German counterpart. Nonetheless in the Netherlands employment has grown 
even more strongly than in the USA. The Netherlands show that employment 
expansion is indeed possible with an arrangement of the welfare state that is typ- 
ical for Continental Europe. Employment expansion does not require the dis- 
mantling of all social achievements whose supposed negative effect on employ- 
ment is often theoretically ambivalent and can not be proven empirically. 
If the differences in the welfare-state regulations can not explain the diverging 
employment trends of the Netherlands and Germany, the macroeconomic con- 
stellation in the Netherlands must play a special role. Interestingly the employ- 
ment success was achieved under the monetary policy of the German Federal 
Bank, since the Netherlands had a kind of monetary union with the 
Deutschmark since 1983, which was in turn the requirement for the success of 
the restrained wage policy, which was supported in fiscal policy terms by reduc- 
tions in taxes and social-security contributions. The macroeconomic connec- 
tions can not be picked up here, however, and interested readers are referred to 
Schettkat (2001). 
Flexible labour markets are essential in a dynamic economy but the classification 
of regulations as rigidities, which is derived from the model of perfect markets, 
need not necessarily be correct. Labour market institutions can be a spanner in 
the works of the labour market but they can also be a lubricant and be the pre- 
condition for flexibility. 
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NOTES 
Cf. Bak 1997. To my knowledge the metaphor of fitness landscapes was first intro- 
duced into economics by Richard Freeman (2000). 
It is frequently argued that the large proportion of part-time employment results 
from the strict dismissal protection. Part-time employment is certainly a flexible 
working time buffer, but all labour-law regulations apply to part-time workers just as 
much as they do to full-time employees. 
The comparison of the PIsA study with the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) 
must be alarming both for Germany and for the Netherlands, since it makes clear the 
rapid decline of the general education standard. 
The data of the CPB agree with the more recent net wage replacement rates of the 
OECD (1999). Sie sind auch in der OEcD Publikation in Deutschland niedriger als in 
den Niederlanden (OECD 1999: 34). 
Contrary to all prophecies of doom the taxes and social-security contributions for 
low-earners differ surprisingly little between some US states and Germany. The 
social-security contributions in New York are comparable with the values in 
Germany (cf. Schettkat 2001). 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
What can we learn from the contributions in this volume? What are the major 
determinants and institutional characteristics which made the working of the 
labour market in the Netherlands and that in the Federal Republic of Germany 
differ so much? A number of important results from these contributions are dis- 
cussed below in order to provide some answers to these questions. 
The articles of this volume highlight both from the theoretical and from the 
empirical perspective some striking differences in labour market developments 
and policies in the last decades in these industrialised countries whose 
economies are much intertwined. As yet, the articles illustrate that there is no 
unanimity amongst the authors about what differences in policy and institution- 
al set ups can be held responsible for the differences in labour market develop- 
ments. So, we will, in this rejoinder, not try to derive lessons from policies 
which seem to have been successful in one country in order to recommend that 
this policy should also be conducted in the other country. As a matter of fact, as 
Freeman (1998,2000) and Schettkat (this volume) have noted, there is no true 
and unique institutional model that can be applied with success in each country. 
The remainder of this rejoinder is as follows. The next section discusses by way 
of summary the major arguments in the policy assessments of the contributions 
to this volume. Section 3 reviews, with reference to the political situation, some 
recent developments in both countries. Here, the perspective is the turn to right 
wing policies in general elections in Europe in recent years. The results of the 
general elections in May 2002, in the Netherlands, have been in accordance with 
this trend. However, the trend was not continued in Germany as the Social 
Democratic and Green coalition of the Schroder government was re-elected in 
September 2002 (albeit by a small margin). In a final section we draw conclu- 
sions and give some prospects for future developments and policies. 
7.2 SOME MAIN FINDINGS OF THE ARTICLES FROM THIS VOLUME 
Den Butter and Hazeu focus, in their analysis of the situation in the Netherlands, 
on the enhanced labour participation rate which increased from an European low 
of 52 percent in 1985 to the European average of 65 percent now. Enhancing 
labour participation has been one of the major policy goals of the previous Dutch 
coalition governments - the first cabinet or prime minister Kok even had "work, 
work, work" as its slogan (see e.g. Klauder, 1999, for similar arguments for 
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Germany). This participation policy has been rather successful. The way the 
social dialogue is organised in the Netherlands can be regarded as a major source 
of success of this transition from the Dutch disease of the early 1980's to the 
Dutch miracle of the late 1990's. In this social dialogue, with a major role for the 
Social Economic Council (Sociaal Economische Raad: SER), consensus and com- 
promises are formed on labour market policies. This way of organising the dia- 
logue enhances social acceptance of the policy proposals, and therefore their 
effectiveness. Wage moderation has played a prominent part in enhancing labour 
participation and promoting employment equilibrium. Yet it should be noted 
that some observers in the Netherlands attribute this success merely to the work- 
ing of the Phillips curve effect after a period of high unemployment in the late 
1970's and early 1980's. From that perspective the labour market in the 
Netherlands has proven to be rather flexible. As a matter of fact, as also Walwei 
and Werner mention in their article in this volume, there was an early need for 
such flexibility of the labour market in the Netherlands as this small open econo- 
my already had, for a long period, its currency fixed to the German Mark. In 
doing so it gave up the possibility of using the exchange rate for adapting asym- 
metric shocks much earlier than other (and larger) European countries where the 
need for more flexible labour markets became more urgent only when entering 
the EMS. 
Den Butter and Hazeu also stress the importance of considering labour market 
dynamics in the analysis of policy measures which aim to improve the working 
of the labour market. Using a scenario analysis they consider the possibilities of 
further enhancing labour market participation in the Netherlands in the next 
two decades. Because of the ageing of the working-age population a major policy 
goal in enhancing labour participation in the future is to keep the elderly people, 
especially the baby boom generation, at work. It is noticeable that, although age- 
ing of the population is a problem in Germany as well, none of the other articles 
in this volume discuss the need for policy options in this respect. Finally it 
appears that the social dialogue, up to now, was unable to solve a major problem 
which is typical for the Dutch labour market, namely the very high amount of 
people receiving benefits from arrangements with respect to illness and disabili- 
ty. Den Butter and Hazeu state that these arrangements are still too generous 
with too little financial incentives for prevention and early reintegration. 
The German authors in this volume put much emphasis the huge amount of part 
time jobs when discussing labour market developments in the Netherlands (see 
e.g. the articles by Walwei and Werner, and Kromphardt). Indeed, a major part of 
additional labour participation in the Netherlands in the past two decades comes 
from part time jobs. Yet, surveys conducted in the Netherlands indicate that 
these part time jobs are much in accordance to preferences and that they do not 
only consist of bad jobs at the lower end of the labour market. Admittedly it were 
mostly women who were responsible for the enhanced labour participation in 
the Netherlands in the last decades, and, of course, many of them have taken part 
time jobs. 
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Some contributions to this volume discuss whether the policy of wage restraint 
can be beneficial to employment. Here there are two conflicting mechanisms, 
namely the Keynesian demand effect and the neo-classical supply effect. The 
policy consensus in the Netherlands on the need of wage restraint, which was 
confirmed by the Wassenaar agreement, emanated from the believe in the policy 
models of the Central Planning Bureau (nowadays called Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis) which showed that the neo-classical supply effect is 
much larger than the Keynesian demand effect (see e.g Den Hartog and Tjan, 
1974,1976; Den Butter, 1991). However, a policy of wage restraint will be less 
effective in enhancing labour participation in the years to come than it was in the 
past. On the other hand, when real wage increases will exceed the growth rate of 
labour productivity, it will depress economic activity and hence labour demand. 
In the present situation of substantial differences between and within sectoral 
and regional labour markets, more emphasis should be on wage differentiation 
than on wage restraint. 
I t  is, anyhow, an almost unanimous conclusion from the various contributions to 
this volume that the Dutch labour market has benefited much from the policy of 
wage restraint after the Wassenaar agreement. Kromphardt is the only author 
who has doubts about this policy. Yet it should be noticed that fixing the Guilder 
to the D-Mark contributed considerably to the effectiveness of such policy. The 
strong links of the Dutch economy with the German economy gave rise to a 
direct cost advantage over the German economy, which resulted in higher 
employment growth in The Netherlands. 
The other factor that is consistently emphasised in the contributions to this vol- 
ume (e.g. that by Van Paridon) as being behind the positive evolution of the 
Dutch economy is the close degree of coordination between the various interest 
groups. This is at the heart of the 'polder model". Of course, it is not the coordi- 
nation itself that has direct effects on the labour market, but it is the general 
agreement and consensus about measures which seem most beneficial to the 
labour market. It is the contents of the agreements which is the crucial factor. 
Such a measure is that of wage restraint, as Fehn emphasises in his contribution. 
He proposes that the German economy should follow this example. More gener- 
ally he also calls for the strengthening of market structures, for which he puts 
forward a number of important arguments. Fehn notes that smaller countries, in 
particular, have successful employment policies in Europe and proposes that the 
Lander in the Federal Republic should be given wide-ranging powers to shape 
labour market policy, for example in relation to the level and calculation of 
unemployment benefits, so as to open up institutional competition in Germany 
as well and to switch to smaller political decision-making units. The regionalisa- 
tion of labour market policy and unemployment insurance would also extend to 
the financing arrangements. 
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The allocation of wider regional powers in labour market policy could certainly 
contribute towards an improved and, in particular, more appropriate response to 
labour market problems in the Federal Republic, in that asymmetrical regional 
shocks could be absorbed more effectively. Unfortunately the far-reaching 
regionalisation of benefits and the financing of unemployment insurance as 
described would inevitably have problematical consequences for regional devel- 
opment. Prosperous regions would be able to demand lower contributions than 
crisis regions, in turn easing the cost burden for employers in the better-off 
Lander, while employers in Lander that were faring less well would find them- 
selves at an additional disadvantage. The regionalisation of unemployment 
insurance would have the effect of entrenching an additional trend towards the 
regional divergence of labour markets. Fehn's proposal would only be feasible if 
the institutional organisation of unemployment insurance were the central 
determinant not just of developments in the labour market but indeed of the 
economy in general. In these circumstances it would then be possible to have 
effective competition among the Lander. 
Another striking element in Fehn's contribution is that he calls for "the incorpo- 
ration of a greater measure of social rigour in the process of social change". Fehn 
advocates cuts in various social benefits and seeks greater wage differentiation 
and lower wage increases in circumstances of mass unemployment. Fehn regards 
institutional changes as a necessary element in improving the labour market sit- 
uation. The currently restricted market forces should be set free in order to com- 
bat unemployment. 
The heavy emphasis on market forces sought by Fehn would not appear compat- 
ible with basic continental European political viewpoints and social values. Even 
if the desired labour market effects were to be achieved they would need to be 
balanced against the consequences of a marked polarisation in society. These 
might include substantially higher crime rates, as has been the experience in 
other countries. A further argument in this connection is that social competition 
among the countries of Europe which results in a race to the bottom should be 
prevented. If a country is in a position to attract more international capital 
because it  sets lower social standards than its neighbours, this position could be 
lost again when the other countries make downward adjustments as well. 
Independently of Fehn's position, a number of arguments in Schettkat's contri- 
bution could be used against a line of reasoning that would place the labour mar- 
ket itself at the centre in explaining unemployment. He makes it clear that in 
many respects the Dutch economy does not measure up to the image of the lib- 
eral labour market but that many institutional regulations are shaped along much 
the same lines as those in Germany. If the level of unemployment were in fact 
primarily determined by the institutional structure of the labour market, the 
way in which the major differences between Germany and the Netherlands had 
arisen could then be hardly explained. 
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7.3 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND POLITICAL SITUATION 
In the Netherlands the general elections for the 150 seats in the second chamber 
of the parliament in May 2002  mark the end of eight years of government by the 
purple coalition. The purple coalition was exceptional in the political landscape 
in the Netherlands as it combined the left wing Labour party (PVDA, coloured red) 
with the rather right wing and conservative Liberals (WD, coloured blue). The 
third party in this coalition was the Social Liberals of D66 which, in a way took, 
the role of instigator and binding factor in this coalition government. The coali- 
tion was exceptional in the sense that it excluded the Christian Democrats (CDA) 
which are in the middle of the political scene and which, up to 1994, had always 
been part of the government either in a centre-left or a centre-right coalition. 
However, as the table 7.1 shows, they suffered a large defeat in the elections of 
1994 when Lubbers, who had been prime minister in three consecutive govern- 
ments, stepped back as political leader of the Christian Democrats. 
From a macroeconomic point of view, the two consecutive purple governments 
of prime minister Kok, have been rather successful. Employment increased with 
over loo,ooo jobs a year which resulted in a considerable rise in labour participa- 
tion. Unemployment decreased to a very low level relative to other European 
countries. In public finance government deficit was reduced drastically and even 
turned into a surplus in order to make provisions for the future increase in gov- 
ernment spending due to the ageing of the population. This reduction of the 
government deficit was accompanied by a reduction of the tax burden. As yet, 
the favourable economic situation still allowed considerable increases in public 
expenditure in fields of concern of the public opinion. During the period of gov- 
ernment of the second purple cabinet, the volume of expenditure for public 
health and care, and for security increased respectively with 4 percent and 7.25 
percent yearly, whereas average growth of real GDP was 'bnly" 2.5 percent. 
Table 7.1 Election results in the Netherlands; number of seats in 'second chamber' of 
parliament (total = 150 seats) 




Christian democrats (CDA) 
Social liberals (066) 
Green left 
Pim Fortuyn (LPF) 
Other Christian 
Other Left wing 
Other 
Total 
1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 
49 37 45 23 42 
24 3 1 38 24 28 
52 34 29 43 44 
12 24 14 7 6 
6 5 11 10 8 
26 8 
6 7 8 6 5 
0 2 5 9 9 
1 10 0 2 0 
150 150 150 150 150 
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In spite of these achievements the purple coalition suffered a dramatic loss in the 
elections of May 2002. Table 7.1 shows that, from the majority of 95 seats in the 
parliament of 150 seats, only 54 seats remained after the elections. All three par- 
ties in the coalition lost about half of their seats in the elections. This was espe- 
cially hard for the Labour party of prime minister Kok who had just regained in 
the elections of 1998 some of the considerable loss from the elections of 1994. 
Yet, apparently Kok's successor as party leader (and alleged prime minister) 
Melkert, conducted a very unsuccessful election campaign. 
A major issue in the election campaigns of all three parties of the purple coalition 
was that they emphasised the economic success in their past periods of govern- 
ment. The message was that when only the problem of the high demand for dis- 
ability provisions were to be solved, - and the Social Economic Council had 
already reached an agreement on that matter - glorious prospects glimmered for 
economic welfare in the Netherlands. However, it appeared that the coalition 
partners in their election campaign, disregarded public discontent on issues 
which were not captured by the admirable macroeconomic indicators, namely 
security and crime, immigration and integration policy, bureaucracy and mal- 
functioning of the public health and care system. 
This discontent was articulated and made explicit in an unusual political cam- 
paign of a single person, namely Pim Fortuyn. Only a few months before the 
elections he founded a new political party, and although Fortuyn was assassinat- 
ed just before the elections - the first political murder in the Netherlands after 
more than 300 years - , his party gained 26 seats and became, after the Christian 
Democrats, the second largest party in the country. The Christian Democrats, 
which were in the opposition for 8 years now, conducted a very cautious election 
campaign, unlike the coalition parties who heavily attacked Fortuyn's ideas. By 
emphasising in their campaign the need to a return to individual responsibility 
and the importance of keeping up with values and norms, they regained a con- 
siderable number of their seats lost after the end of the Lubbers government in 
1994. Their new leader, Jan Peter Balkenende (a professor of economics at the 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and former financial spokesman) became the next 
prime minister of a right wing coalition with the Liberals and Pim Fortuyn's 
party. Yet, as we will see, this government was not born under a lucky star! 
It must be admitted that the public discontent with the achievements of the pur- 
ple government were by no means evident from the surveys conducted by the 
Social Cultural Planning Bureau. As table 7.2 shows, according to the answers in 
the surveys, "to combat crime" and "maintaining public security" did not gain 
much importance as political issues amongst the population since the mid 
1990's. So sociologists and political scientists that supported the purple coalition 
have disregarded these as the main issues for the election campaign. It was finally 
Pim Fortuyn's focus on these issues, and on the issue of immigration policy, that 
articulated the discontent. May be the fact, that according to the survey data, "to 
combat unemployment" and "facilitating a high economic growth" lost consider- 
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able importance as policy issues, could have been a warning for the parties of the 
purple government to put less emphasis on their economic successes in the elec- 
tion campaign. However, this is an interpretation with the benefit of hindsight. 
Although the purple government, in combination with the working of the pol- 
der model, has brought structural economic success to the Netherlands, it is 
noticeable, that not so much the parties of the purple coalition but much more so 
the Christian Democrats are advocates of consensus formation in the polder 
model. Pim Fortuyn (2002:17) was even a strong opponent of the endless discus- 
sions in the polder model in order to reach consensus agreement and compared it 
with the moesjawara system, the discussions between the local chiefs on the Isle 
of Java (former Netherlands' Indies) which sometimes lasted a year or more. In 
the end nobody took final responsibility for the decisions which were taken. 
Therefore, expectations were that the new coalition of the Christian Democrats, 
the Liberals and the late Pim Fortuyn's LPF would not form a stable government, 
the more so as members of parliament and the Ministers of the LPF were recruited 
in a somewhat hasty and unusual way. It was already in November 2002, after 
only 87 days of government, that the Balkenende cabinet had to resign. 
Remarkably, the reason was not disagreement in the cabinet, or in parliament, on 
policy matters, but it was a conflict between two Ministers of the LPF and contin- 
uous rows between the LPF members of parliament, which led to the fall of the 
cabinet. New general elections were held in January 2003. The outcome of these 
elections is that Pim Fortuyn's party suffered a huge loss and only retained 8 of 
its 26 seats (see table 7.1). The Christian Democrats, led by prime minister 
Balkenende, remained the largest party and even gained one more seat in parlia- 
ment. However, there was a remarkable recovery of the Labour party, with 
Wouter Bos as the new and charismatic leader. They obtained 42 seats, which is 
only 2 seats less than the Christian Democrats. 
Table 7.2 Political issues of major importance in the Netherlands (in O/o amongst 
5 highly ranked issues) 
To combat crime 
Maintaining public security 
Keeping social security at level 
Maintaining stability of the economy 
Protect freedom of speech 
To combat unemployment 
Facilitate high economic growth 
To combat inflation 
Year 
Source: surveys conducted by SCP 
1996 1998 1999 2000 
A further problem for the Balkenende government was that, after the economic 
successes of the purple government, the economic situation in the Netherlands 
worsened quite drastically as the country was hit by the world wide economic 
I 
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cyclical downturn and, to a lesser extent, by the bursting of the ICT bubble. The 
picture of the present cyclical situation (december 2002) in the Netherlands is 
somewhat mixed. At the end of 2002 GPD growth has been almost nil for 5 con- 
secutive quarters and total GPD growth in 2002 is expected to be 0.2 percent 
only. Growth of consumer expenditures was very high at the end of the nineties 
(above 4.5% in 1998 and 1999) but dropped considerably afterwards and is now 
around I percent (but still positive!). After a steady decrease from 1994 onwards 
to the lowest level of 134,000 registered unemployed in November 2001, unem- 
ployment started to rise slightly from that month onwards. Up to very recently, 
the number of persons receiving benefits because of disability was still rising 
further, and the indicator also did rise when it is expressed as a percentage of 
total employment. It is remarkable that the latest data on new entrants to disabil- 
ity show a reversal of this trend. This may be caused by the fact that finally mea- 
sures to foster reintegration during the period of illness before entering the dis- 
ability scheme become effective (see the article by Den Butter and Hazeu in this 
volume). Consumer confidence dropped again further after a short rise in the 
period around the start of 2002. Inflation in the Netherlands was high as com- 
pared to other EMU-countries, which was partly due to a rise in labour costs and 
to a change in the tax system from direct to indirect taxes. However, in the years 
to come inflation is expected to come down to the European average. 
On the basis of calculations using the MORKMON-model, at the end of 2002  the 
Netherlands Bank foresees a slight increase in GPD growth in 2003, namely to I,I 
percent and a further increase in 2004 to 2,1 percent (De Nederlandsche Bank, 
2002). Hence the recession will come to an end in the next year, albeit very slow- 
ly. However, according to these projections the growth of labour supply will 
exceed that of labour demand, so that for the years 2003 and 2004, the 
Netherlands Bank predicts a further increase in unemployment. For 2003, even a 
decrease in employment is foreseen, which is a lagged reaction to the slack and 
fall in investments in the previous years. May be, unemployment can be expect- 
ed to rise even more than in the projections of the MORKMON model when 
demand for disability provisions will indeed continue to fall, because part of 
those in the disability scheme are unemployed in disguise. 
7.3.2 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
The collapse of the world economy affecting the Netherlands had an equally 
adverse effect on the German economy. Unemployment once again broke 
through the 4 million barrier in July 2002, the highest level in four years, where 
the average of 2001 was 3.85 million persons. In that year the rate of unemploy- 
ment (in relation to the labour force, including self-employment) in West 
Germany was 7.4 percent but in East Germany it was 17.5 percent, producing a 
rate of unemployment for the country as a whole of 9.4 percent. In 2 0 0 2  the 
average annual rate was 9.8 percent. The growth rate of the economy came to a 
l o  year low in 2002 with a figure of 0.2 percent according to estimates by the 
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Federal Statistical Office. Due to the strong orientation of the German economy 
towards the world market the downswing of business is stronger than in other 
European countries. It is interesting that especially in two election years (1998, 
2002) the German economy performed especially bad, showing that there is no 
obvious political business cycle in this country. 
The marked divergence of labour market trends in East and West Germany partly 
"explains" the relatively high rate of unemployment in Germany as a whole. 
Productivity in significant parts of the East German economy remains too low 
for that part of the country to compete in world markets, while conversely the 
competitive segments remain too small (cf. Blien et al. 2001 and Ragnitz et al. 
2001). Taking just the western part of the country, the rate of unemployment 
remains below the EU average (cf. the contribution by Walwei and Werner, cf. 
Blien/Walwei/Werner). 
The situation in East Germany is in fact even worse than its looks, since there is 
a substantial net commuter outflow to West Germany (437,000 people in 2001) 
and many employees remain covered by employment-generating measures. In 
East Germany in 2001 an annual average of 190,ooo persons were covered by 
employment-generating (ABM) and related measures, while 134,000 persons 
were in full-time further education courses. A comparison of these figures with 
the annual average level of registered unemployment of 1,374,000 in the eastern 
part of the country provides an indication of the scale on which the labour mar- 
ket is being directly relieved by such measures. The actual employment shortfall 
is clearly higher than that represented by the rate of unemployment. The "col- 
1apse"of employment in East Germany after reunification may be seen in detail 
from figure 7.1. 
The Schroder-led coalition government consisting of the Social Democrats and 
the Green Party set itself the target of achieving a substantial reduction in unem- 
ployment in East and West Germany, which could not be achieved. In order to 
get closer to the target a package of changes to the Social Code was introduced in 
early 2002, known as the Job-AQTIVL~W, the basic conception of which was 
developed in the expectation of a sustained upswing in the labour market. The 
law contains a wealth of detailed changes based on the principle of an active 
labour market policy, while also providing incentives to return the long-term 
unemployed and other people with poor placement prospects to employment. In 
this connection many traditional labour market policy instruments were made 
more flexible and efforts were made to bring them more closely into line with 
business practice. 
LABOUR PARTICIPATION A N D  UNEMPLOYMENT; A COMPARISON OF DEVELOPMENTS 
A N D  INSTITUTIONS IN GERMANY A N D  THE NETHERLANDS 
Figure 7.1 Development of the labour market in East Germany, 1989-2000 
(annual averages) 
employees,trainees,civil servant5,relf-employed and helping 
family members 
1) Migration effect net arrival and departure of labour since 1989 
2) Labour market relief fmm labour merket policy measures (pre-retirement, retirement transition pay, benefit 
recipient5 under 5 428 Social Code III,further training or retraining,German language training, rehabilitation 
measures, benefit recipients under 5 125 and 126 Social Code Ill). 
3) Takes into consideration the revision of the labour force figures by the Federal Statistical Office. 
* Source: IAB-Kurzbericht 10/98 (updated) 
During 2002 the number of placement officers at the local units of the Federal 
Employment Services was increased from approximately 5,000 to approximately 
8,000. Even after this change each placement officer remained responsible for 
some 500 unemployed persons, meaning that the measures provided for in the 
law for the individual support and guidance of the unemployed could be imple- 
mented on a limited scale only. Newly introduced measures for profiling and the 
conclusion of integration agreements (involving compulsory integration steps 
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In a situation of economic downturn, the law was unable to throw up any barri- 
ers to the rise in unemployment resulting from the collapse of the economy and 
failed to have the desired effect. Its overall orientation was consistent with the 
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mainstream economic theory of the 1990s which, as explaind by Layard/Nickell/ 
Jackman (1g91), centred not on the goods market, as in Keynesianism, or on the 
money/capital market, as in monetarism, in explaining the problem of unem- 
ployment, but on the labour market itself. Under this approach more flexibility 
of the labour market should lead to equilibrium between the two sides of the 
market. Reference has already been made to the significance of Schettkat's argu- 
mentation in his contribution to this volume in the discussion of positions such 
as that of Layard et al. 
Several years ago the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) simulated a pack- 
age of measures that represented a special approach, as it combined various 
political areas and market approaches (cf. Klauder/Schnur/Zika 1996 and the 
contribution by Walwei &Werner in the present volume, section 6). This pack- 
age of measures for Germany was designed to bring about an employment- 
boosting growth path and was worked up into an all-embracing concept in time 
for the 1998 Federal elections (Autorengemeinschaft 1998). 
Apart from measures to promote flexibility in the labour market, the package 
provides for a reduction in the social insurance burden bearing on the factor of 
labour and greater funding of the welfare state through indirect taxation. In addi- 
tion it calls for reductions in working hours that would not serve to increase 
costs and additional fiscal policy impulses, together with moderate wage policies 
to help ease costs. Although the IAB strategic package attracted widespread atten- 
tion among the German public, it was never seriously tested in practice. In par- 
ticular, the temporary increase in public borrowing which the package involved 
was not politically acceptable in the light of the Maastricht stability criteria. 
An event took place in February 2002 the consequences of which have since had 
a major impact on the debate about labour market policy and the development of 
practical strategies. Following an audit by the Federal Audit Office it was dis- 
closed that the number of job placements in the labour market that the Federal 
Employment Services (BA) had ascribed to their own activities had been exagger- 
ated. This state of affairs became the occasion for subjecting the entire organisa- 
tion of passive and active labour market policies in Germany to thorough exami- 
nation. A Commission was set up under the chairmanship of Peter Hartz, a 
member of the vw Board of Management, which was asked to come up with rec- 
ommendations as to how the BA should be reformed. The "Hartz Kommission" 
(see Kommission 2002) developed plans for the restructuring of the Federal 
Employment Services job-placement activities, but interpreted its terms of refer- 
ence very broadly and accordingly came up with proposals for reforming the 
entire institutional structure of the labour market and also other aspects, up to 
and including a new system for the generation of capital in East Germany. 'The 
goal of full employment can only be achieved by means of an overarching labour 
policy approach" (Kommission 2002: 37). Some of the propositions of the com- 
mission gain by the example given by The Netherlands. I t  is planned to increase 
the number of people working in flexible working arrangements by creating spe- 
LABOUR PARTICIPATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT; A COMPARISON OF DEVELOPMENTS 
AND INSTITUTIONS IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS 
cia1 Personal Service Agencies (PSA). 
The IAB assessed the propositions of the commission and came to the conclusion 
that they are steps in a direction effective to reduce unemployment. The hopes of 
halving the unemployment problem are, however, not feasible by these measures 
alone. A recovery of the whole economy is needed. At the moment the re-elected 
red-green government of chancellor Schroder is busy in taking steps to translate 
the propositions of the Hartz Kommission in political actions. The first law has 
passed the Parliament, three more will come during the year 2003. 
Even before the publication of the Hartz Commission's proposals the leadership 
of the Federal Employment Services was reshaped. Instead of a president (for- 
merly B. Jagoda) it is now led by a full-time three-person executive chaired by 
Florian Gerster. For its part the executive of the BA had already submitted ideas 
for the transformation of the BA, providing inter alia for greater customer focus 
and more internal flexibility. In particular a higher level of service was to be pro- 
vided to firms in the private sector. The individual employment exchanges have 
been given greater independence, as well as more responsibility. 
7.4 PROSPECTS 
The discussion examined so far indicates that a reduction in unemployment can- 
not readily be achieved by transferring the institutional structures of the one 
country to another. Once again we may refer by way of substantiation for this 
argument to Schettkat's contribution. Institutions that have proven their effec- 
tiveness in the context of one country for particular (e.g. state) goals will not func- 
tion in the context of a different country as they are not consistent with the insti- 
tutional arrangements, state regulations and cultural traditions in that country. 
The new institutionalism in economic theory (which now has its counterpart in 
sociological theory, cf. Mense-Petermann 2002) holds the view that institutions 
need to be regarded as an interrelated whole and are not just shaped by formal 
rules (referred to by Engerernoigt 2002  as "external institutions'?, laid down 
for example by the State. Also important are normative expectations ("internal 
institutions" subset) of economic subjects and members of society. An economy 
can only function effectively if its formal institutions and cultural expectations 
are in accordance. 
As the example of most transformation economies indicates, this demand for 
consistency is not readily fulfilled. Positive economic developments have taken 
place much later (if at all) after the usual crisis of transformation than most econ- 
omists had expected. East Germany is a by no means unimportant example of 
this, a fact that also serves to explain a substantial part of the German labour 
market imbalance. East Germany exemplifies the strategy of the rushed intro- 
duction of market economy capitalist institutions that had formerly proven" 
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themselves in a large country. Even so this institutional transformation failed to 
have the positive effects that had been expected upon German reunification. 
One reason for this unsatisfactory state of affairs was that the West German 
institutional structure is not consistent with the experience and expectations of 
the East German population. In retrospect it is a matter for some astonishment 
from an economic viewpoint that it proved possible immediately after reunifica- 
tion for such a rapid increase in wages to be demanded and indeed pushed 
through that the wages in the new Lander (new federal states) were for a while 
twice as high as per capita productivity. Since unit wage costs were correspond- 
ingly around twice as high as in West Germany (Hoffmann 1gg3), production 
only took place in East Germany when the cost disadvantage was eliminated by 
subsidies. Unemployment spiralled upwards to levels from which they have yet 
to come down significantly. Right to the present day the productivity/wage ratio 
in the East is distinctly less favourable than in the West. 
The East German population, however, had no experience with the connection 
between unemployment and remuneration but viewed wage levels from the 
standpoint of "justice": why should East German workers be paid less than West 
German workers? Are they worth less? It proved possible for such high wages to 
be pushed through in wage negotiations because the counterpart to  the trade 
unions - the employer associations - while formally in place were by no means as 
organised and motivated (Sinn/Sinn 1992). This development indicates that for 
an economy to change, special arrangements need to be made to assist the 
process of institutional transition. 
Relating this to our current problem of the comparison between the Netherlands 
and Germany it is obvious that an agreement along the lines of the Dutch 
Wassenaar agreement could not be reached in Germany as the cultural traditions 
of the polder model are lacking. While the Netherlands is not such a small coun- 
try as its area might suggest - it has a population of over 15 million - the number 
of responsible actors is more manageable than in Germany. This i n  turn facili- 
tates consensus-building and makes it easier to control the consequences of the 
decisions that are taken. Furthermore the cultural tradition of the Netherlands is 
based more on consensus than on conflict. The 2002 election, based as i t  was on 
highly polarised political camps, was a-typical and the election defeat by the 
Purple Coalition may in part be explained by the fact that the leaders of the coali- 
tion parties were simply not used to such polarisation. Such an election contest is 
closer to the practice in Germany, with the exception that there is no counterpart 
in Germany to the LPF of Pim Fortuyn. 
The German trade unions are under pressure "to offer something" to their rank 
and file in return for their membership. Kromphardt notes that the total wage 
sum related to the national product in the Federal Republic has fallen heavily 
over the past two decades. How is one to persuade the rank and file that in the 
future an even worsened distributional position is to be expected? The situation 
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is especially bad since the tax and social security contribution wedge in Germany 
is large and increased during the nineties. German unification was financed by 
the social security system to a large extent. Therefore cost wages are high but 
consumption wages are not  or at least there is an increasing discrepancy. 
In the discussion concerning the consequences of institutional change a number 
of limitations to the theoretical approaches come to light. The concept of institu- 
tions as put forward in the new institutionalist approaches (e.g. by North 1991) is 
misleading in some aspects, as it suggests that institutions are additive, whereas 
they cannot be combined at will, as has already been seen in the light of the work 
by Freeman and Schettkat. In order to ensure positive economic development, 
the basic institutions of a society must have coherent foundations. At the surface 
level - i.e. where they come into contact with the economic subjects - they must 
be compatible with the culturally developed expectations and viewpoints of 
those subjects. A 'ielational" approach is necessary which places the institutions 
in their common contexts and secures an analysis for the economy as a whole. 
What perspectives can then be developed for the two at once so similar and so 
different economies in the Netherlands and Germany? We have already seen that 
the current economic problems are if anything pointing in different directions. 
In Germany economic growth - especially in the East - is too low and the labour 
market is consequently not  growing as it needs to. The Netherlands if anything 
has a productivity problem; wage restraint has taken the pressure off individual 
companies to boost productivity in the way required in order to maintain inter- 
national competitiveness. 
In order to analyse the problems of both countries there it is interesting to con- 
sider an approach developed by Appelbaum/Schettkat (1993,1999,cf. Schettkat 
1997, elaborated by Blien 2001), although it is not mentioned by Schettkat in his 
article in this volume. As the authors demonstrate in a simple formal model, the 
effectiveness of productivity gains depends, under certain conditions, above all 
on the elasticity of demand in the product markets. If demand is elastic towards 
price changes resulting from productivity increases, the demand of goods 
increases sufficiently for employment to grow. In this case the negative effect 
exerted by productivity increases on employment is more than offset by the 
greater volume of sales. 
If on the other hand demand is inelastic, employment will shrink. In this case 
price cuts will do little to increase the volume of goods sold. Instead the produc- 
tivity gains permit a certain amount of labour to be scrapped. This is not fully 
counteracted by higher sales of goods resulting from price cuts. 
In economic theory the two  possible consequences of productivity increases for 
employment are known as the rationalisation and compensation effects. The 
sizes of these effects have been systematically derived in the approach put for- 
ward by Appelbaum/Schettkat, in that they are related to the elasticity of the 
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demand for goods. The empirical question then arises as to the branches of the 
economy in which demand will tend to be either elastic or inelastic. 
An understanding of how the processes run their course may be obtained by 
drawing on the widely held product-cycle theory. Among others this may be 
traced back to Schumpeter (1g3g), while modern versions have been based on 
Utterback/Abernathy (1975). A product cycle describes an empirical regularity, 
not a necessity of development. In such a cycle a new product first enters the 
market at a very high price based on small-batch production and the manufactur- 
er has a more or less pronounced monopoly position (the product innovation 
phase). Continuing experience with manufacture and efforts to improve produc- 
tivity (the process innovation phase) lead to production in larger batches and 
clear price reductions which, given unsaturated (elastic) demand, in turn lead to 
high production increases well above the productivity gains, so that the input of 
labour grows very strongly. The situation alters over the course of time as 
demand becomes increasingly saturated, competition in the market grows and 
the scope for technological innovation is exhausted. In these circumstances pro- 
ductivity gains only lead to small increases in the volume of goods sold and 
hence to falling turnover and reduced employment. 
We may draw certain conclusions for the two economies under comparison 
when we realise that product cycles can place their stamp on entire industries 
and that the key question then concerns the extent to which an economy is based 
on "old industrial" or innovative areas. There are at any event certain empirical 
indications to suggest that the specialisation of the German economy is 
unfavourable in so far as the economy's strengths do not lie in the services area, 
as in the case of the Dutch economy, or in innovative new technologies, but in  
the classical areas of manufacturing industry. The latter tend however to be char- 
acterised by inelastic demand. What is important is that the danger of a reduc- 
tion in employment will occur even if the economy in question is highly com- 
petitive. The high export ratios of the German economy are fully compatible 
with a structure characterised by inelastic demand. 
Recently empirical investigations by J. Moller (2001) have revealed that the 
demand for the products being produced by the Federal German economy grew 
increasingly inelastic towards the end of the 1960s, when unemployment rose 
sharply. This finding confirms the Appelbaum/Schettkat approach. Large-scale 
regional surveys conducted by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) (cf. 
Blien et al. 2001 and 2003) are also consistent with this proposition. 
According to this approach, appropriate economic strategies for the Dutch and 
German economies would - as Fehn would also argue -be based not on subsidis- 
ing the traditional, superseded parts of the economy but on the promotion of 
innovative new industries. Subsidies which keep established industries alive 
only exacerbate economic problems as they are used for rationalisation purposes 
which, in circumstances of inelastic demand, will only lead to a contraction in  
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employment. In vain did the IAB recommend its "strategy package" to combat 
unemployment in Germany (Autorengemeinschaft 1998). 
Despite the scepticism about the possibility of simply copying each others' insti- 
tutions, much can be learned from the discussion on the institutional solutions 
in the two countries. An important point is the increase in the labour force par- 
ticipation rate (especially among older people) being pushed for in the 
Netherlands. In Germany the corresponding discussion is confined to the 
aspects of the social security system, but i t  is seldom transferred to the design of 
labour market policy, since the primary problem here is that of high unemploy- 
ment. Certain proposals being put forward in the current political debate con- 
cerning labour market problems in fact provide for the early elimination from the 
labour market of unemployed persons aged over 55. 
They can however be no doubt that a high labour force participation rate is cru- 
cial for the long-term preservation of the welfare state, and indeed for the pro- 
duction of goods and social wealth (cf. Kommission 2002: 117 ff.). AS the popula- 
tion is rapidly ageing, similar efforts towards the activation and integration of 
older persons in the labour market are to be expected, at least in the medium 
term. For this to succeed it is important for the high birth years to remain 
employed and productive. Only in this way can the funding of the welfare state, 
pensions and health system be sustained. For this reason further initiatives in 
the Netherlands deserve to be closely monitored in Germany. 
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